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ABSTRACT
MILITARY RECRUITMENT IN NEW STATES
Max Z. Margulies
Michael C. Horowitz
This dissertation examines why some states develop conscript militaries while
others rely solely on volunteers. I argue that two variables determine what recruitment
decisions states make when initially designing their military. First, either domestic or
foreign policymakers can dominate the decision-making process. These actors often have
different perceptions about the military’s most important goals and how to achieve them.
When foreign powers view new states as sufficiently important enough to their interests,
recruitment policies reflect their preferences, rather than those of domestic policymakers.
Second, the threat perception of the actor making recruitment policies affects how they
approach military design. Major external threats to the new state’s territory constrain
recruitment options in the interest of immediate defense, leading to conscription, while
lower threat environments permit more freedom to adopt different practices.
I test this argument using an original dataset of 224 cases of state creation and
major regime change from 1918–2011, including original variables that measure different
types of foreign military influence. I also use qualitative evidence—including archival
documents and interviews—to conduct a series of case studies focusing on the Middle
East and Europe that are designed to control for alternative hypotheses and establish the
causal processes. The results support my initial hypothesis, demonstrating that military
design is often affected by hierarchy in international relations. This research suggests
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important lessons for policymakers interested in effecting military reform by highlighting
a role for foreign security assistance in processes of military design.
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An army raised without proper regard to the choice of its recruits was never yet made
good by length of time.1
Vegetius, De Re Militari

Troops are raised by enlistment with a fixed term, without a fixed term, by compulsion
some times, and most frequently by tricky devices.2
Maurice de Saxe, Mes Réveries

1

As quoted in Trevor Royle, A Dictionary of Military Quotations (New York, NY: Simon and
Schuster, 1989).
2
Ibid.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND FRAMING OF THE DISSERTATION
I. The Question: What Explains Military Recruitment in the Context of Military
Design?
The Republic of Korea is well known today for its system of universal male
conscription. The origins of this system can be traced to the Korean War, when the
sudden disintegration of the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) in the face of the North
Korean invasion in June 1950 created an immediate demand for replacements. President
Syngman Rhee’s government passed the Emergency Defense Law on July 22, 1950,
making all men aged 14 years or older eligible for conscription.3 While a previous
conscription law had been passed in September 1949, it was only implemented for a few
months, as volunteers met the military manpower requirements.4 In fact, the organization
responsible for conscription had been disbanded in March 1950.5
The theory advanced in this dissertation can explain why South Korea was so
unprepared in terms of military manpower when the North Korean invasion came in June
1950. At the time, it relied on a military patron, the United States, which also preferred to
use volunteers.6 In fact, South Korea’s Emergency Defense Law was implemented only

3

Brian R Gibby, The Will to Win: American Military Advisors in Korea, 1946–1953 (The
University of Alabama Press, 2012): 321.
4
Chum-kon Kim, The Korean War: The First Comprehensive Account of the Historical
Background and Development of the Korean War (1950–3) (Seoul, South Korea: Kwangmyong
Publishing Company, 1973): 286; Alan R. Millett, The War for Korea, 1945–50: A House
Burning (Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 2005): 213.
5
Kim, The Korean War, 286.
6
The United States effectively had a volunteer military itself, and was far from convinced of the
utility of peacetime mass armies at this time. While the United States had technically reinstated
conscription domestically in the summer of 1948, this was intended as a temporary measure;
inductions lasted only three months, and ended in February 1949. No conscripts were called up
again until the Korean War, nor were inductions expected to be renewed until the conflict broke
out. The United States was still thoroughly in a post-World War II mindset of demobilization
during the years in which it helped create the South Korean army. Aaron Friedberg (2000, p.177)
argues that “But for Korea, it is quite likely that by the beginning of the 1950s, the US would
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after the United States Congress voted to reinstate draft inductions and to extend military
conscription, which it did three days after the war broke out.7 Conscription in these
circumstances is not necessarily surprising. The immense demands of the highly
threatening military situation likely would have led South Korea to implement
conscription even without the influence of a patron state. Nonetheless, the United States
played an important role in this process. Ultimately, the United States molded the ROKA
in its own image, reducing the ROKA’s readiness and likely contributing to the need for
drastic conscription policies after war broke out.
The United States played a major role in the formation of the ROKA, particularly
through the provision of a large American advisory mission, the Korean Military
Advisory Group (KMAG). KMAG’s role was so great that it has been described as “the
midwife to a new Korean army.”8 The first military advisory mission, the Provisional
Military Advisory Group, was established by General MacArthur on the date of South
Korea’s independence, August 15, 1948, and amounted to 100 military advisors.9 PMAG
grew to 241 members by the end of the year, and increased further to 472 when it became
KMAG with the withdrawal of the last American troops on July 1, 1949.10 In addition,
the United States furnished arms and equipment to the South Korean army. However, the

have completed the transition to an entirely volunteer military format.” See Bernard Rostker, I
Want You! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,
2006): 27; Aaron L. Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and
Its Cold War Grand Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000): 173–177;
7
Rostker, I Want You!, 2006.
8
Gibby, The Will to Win, 13.
9
James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First
Year (Washington, D.C: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1992): 34.
10
Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, 34; Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in
Korea: KMAG in Peace and War (Washington, D.C: Office of the Chief of Military History,
Dept. of the Army, 1962): 49–50.

3

ROKA consistently recruited greater numbers of soldiers than the United States was
willing to support. For example, the ROKA was nearly 100,000 strong in August 1949,
although the United States had only agreed to support an army of 65,000.11 This
discrepancy between supply and demand was a key reason why the Korean experiment
with conscription before the war failed.12 It indicates that the United States attempted to
limit South Korea efforts to recruit a conscript army.
Indeed, while some South Korean leaders wanted a mass conscript army as a
source of “population and territorial control” to guard against communism, General
Roberts, commander of KMAG, believed that “the Korean military establishment should
mirror the American system” and include a relatively small but highly trained army.13
Even after the war started and the United States implemented conscription domestically,
Americans seemed uneasy about conscription in South Korea. During the war, South
Korean requests to expand the ROKA were rejected because American decision-makers,
including Generals MacArthur and Ridgeway, were reluctant to increase manpower and
thought South Korea should focus on “qualitative improvement in its organizational
capacity, especially training and leadership.”14 Even at the darkest period of the war,
American Ambassador Stephen Muccio reported on September 4, 1950 that President
Rhee had ordered all conscription to stop, while Muccio himself bemoaned the use of
“forceful impressment.”15 This shows that there was still a strong American tradition of

11

Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, 34; Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, 58.
Kim, The Korean War, 286.
13
Millett, The War for Korea, 172.
14
Taik-Young Hamm, Arming the Two Koreas: State, Capital and Military Power (London, UK:
Routledge, 1999): 65.
15
United States Dept. of State, Office of the Historian, “The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to
the Secretary of State,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII.
Available at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v07/d489.
12

4

limiting the use of conscription, and that these recruitment preferences may have been
transmitted, at least in part, to South Korea. Thus, like the United States, which heavily
influenced its military development, South Korea went into the Korean War with a
primarily volunteer army, and would only use conscription under the most extreme
circumstances.
The creation of South Korea’s armed forces demonstrates the importance of
foreign powers in influencing patterns of military design, particularly when it comes to
military recruitment decisions. More broadly, it points to the role of foreign actors and
military recruitment in the process and outcomes of statebuilding efforts. Military
recruitment policies are a particularly important example of the many decisions states
must make when designing their militaries. These decisions, in turn, are often at the
forefront of statebuilding efforts. The world’s most recent new state, South Sudan, has
struggled since achieving independence in 2011 to find the best way to transition the
former rebel army and militias into a unified military. Similar questions shaped the
American Articles of Confederation and later the Constitution, as nationalists and
military reformists clashed with more conservative forces over the existence of a standing
national army, the method of its recruitment and relationship to state militias, and the
length of military service.16 While the former group thought the only way to protect the
country against external challengers was to maximize the authority of the federal
government to create a professional peacetime army, others feared that the existence of

16

Lawrence Delbert Cress, Citizens in Arms: The Army and the Militia in American Society to the
War of 1812 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 75–121; John Whiteclay
Chambers II, To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America (New York: The Free
Press, 1982), 23–28.
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such a permanent force would constitute an unacceptable threat to individual liberties and
democratic governance.
These cases highlight the significance states attach to questions of military design.
They also underscore the constraints many countries face when designing their militaries.
Each country’s statebuilders had to take into consideration how best to protect against
external and internal threats while staying true to the ideological principles that
legitimated their rule. This is one of the first and most important decisions confronting
any newly independent state. While the international condition of anarchy compels all
states to consider this question continuously, it is particularly pressing after moments of
independence, revolution, or major regime change. The reconfiguration of domestic
power in such contexts ushers in new threat perceptions and new ideas about how to
address them. However, policymakers working in these conditions may also lack the
prior experience or autonomy to make decisions about what existing institutions or
models are appropriate in their local context. These factors can make the process of
designing a military in new states particularly contentious, but they also constitute a
unique opportunity to adopt new military forms and shape the state’s security for years to
come.
This dissertation examines why states choose different policies in response to the
statebuilding imperatives described above. In particular, it addresses the question of why
states design militaries in different ways. While previous scholarship emphasized the
modern state’s convergence on the centralized and capital-intensive standing army, recent
research has identified considerable and significant variation in military design.17 States
17

Deborah Avant, “From Mercenary to Citizen Armies: Explaining Change in the Practice of
War,” International Organization 54 (2000): 41–72; Alexander Wendt and Michael M. Barnett,

6

often adopt different forms of military organization, despite the need for militaries to
achieve similar security goals in new states. Military isomorphism is hardly the norm in
the developing world, where many states prefer to decentralize command and control to
militias or warlords.18 Recent studies have also shown how authoritarian leaders
manipulate personnel, training, and chain of command to deter or fend off domestic
threats to their control.19 Even among developed countries and democracies, local
economies and organizational cultural lead to different military practices.20 In short,
militaries are complex institutions that can be designed in different ways to meet a variety
of goals. What explains the wide variation we see in how states design their militaries?
The focus in this dissertation is specifically on variation in the reliance on
different recruitment methods: why do some states decide to employ only volunteers,
while others choose to draft troops, often in the face of widespread resistance from their
population? Military recruitment is an understudied aspect of military organization,
despite the fact that scholarship has long argued that it can be especially important for

“Dependent State Formation and Third World militarization,” Review of International Studies 19
(1993): 321–347; Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-building and
Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1994).
18
Kimberly Marten, Warlords: Strong-arm Brokers in Weak States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2010); Ariel I. Ahram, Proxy Warriors: The Rise and Fall of State-Sponsored
Militias (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011); Paul Staniland, “Militias, Ideology, and
the State.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59 (2015): 770–793.
19
Aaron Belkin, United We Stand: Divide-and-Conquer Politics and the Logic of International
Hostility. (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2006); Sheena Greitens,
“Coercive Institutions and State Violence under Authoritarianism” (PhD diss. Harvard
University, 2013); Caitlin Talmadge, “The Puzzle of Personalist Performance: Iraqi Battlefield
Effectiveness in the Iran-Iraq War,” Security Studies 22 (2013): 180–221.
20
Lindsay P. Cohn, “Who Will Serve? Education, Labor Markets, and Military Personnel Policy”
(PhD diss., Duke University, 2007); Todd S. Sechser and Elizabeth N. Saunders, “The Army You
Have: The Determinants of Military Mechanization, 1979-2001,” International Studies Quarterly
54 (2010): 481–511; Austin Long, The Soul of Armies: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Military
Culture in the US and UK, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016).
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domestic politics and security, especially regarding a country’s civil-military relations
and identity. Thus, understanding the determinants of military recruitment can provide
important insights for an array of other characteristics of states’ political institutions and
behaviors, as described below. Given this, it us unsurprising that many existing studies
characterize military recruitment policies as intimately related to and determined by
specific social and cultural features within a country.
Contrary to this account, I argue that new states rarely have full control over how
they recruit for their militaries. Rather, more powerful states often influence their
decisions—either directly, by ensuring sympathetic people are in charge of decisions
related to military design, or indirectly, by making necessary assistance contingent on the
adoption of specific military policies. In still other cases, more powerful states may
simply use military-to-military ties to model appropriate and effective forms of military
organization that new states then learn to emulate. New states are unlikely to have
developed the resources and skills that would enable them to guarantee their own security
or to ward off unwelcome external interference. More powerful states, in turn, are all too
eager to take advantage of this dependence, when it is in their interest, to ensure that the
weaker state’s military can do what they need it to. Furthermore, these decisions by
foreign states often overpower local evaluations of external threat environments. The
result can best be described as the development of a patron-client relationship, in which
new states that are dependent on military assistance from a patron end up complying with
many of the patron’s preferences, including on issues of military design.21
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This argument highlights a significant disconnect between research on security
sector reform, post-conflict development, and statebuilding, on the one hand, and existing
literature on military organization and recruitment. While the former often stresses the
importance of external stakeholders who can incentivize development and provide
enforcement mechanisms, the latter tends to focus on more developed states and domestic
or organizational factors that enable reform. As a result, it is difficult to judge the relative
importance of external and internal factors in determining military design, or how similar
developed and developing countries are when it comes to these issues. By integrating a
better understanding of the contexts in which militaries are designed and develop with the
statebuilding literature’s emphasis on the importance of international actors in weak
states, my theory provides a more accurate and generalizable explanation for observed
variation in recruitment patterns across states.
The remainder of this chapter frames my dissertation, focusing particularly on the
necessity and added-value of a systemic study exclusively of military recruitment
policies. I begin by describing military recruitment policies, specifically conscription, and
their consequences for an array of military, political, and social outcomes. I elaborate on
the theoretical and methodological advantages of studying recruitment, as opposed to
other aspects of military design. From there, I discuss other methodological decisions that
were necessary for this study, and justify the tradeoffs these decisions entailed. The
chapter concludes with a preview of the dissertation, a discussion of case selection, and
its potential policy contributions.
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II. Why Study Military Recruitment?
Recruitment and personnel policies are among the most important and diverse
tools at a state’s disposal for manipulating the character and role of its armed forces.
Although recruitment policies include all the formal and informal guidelines states
employ to affect what groups of people join the military, I am specifically interested in
cross-national variation in the use of conscription versus all-volunteer armies. There are
other aspects of military organization worth studying. However, the decision to use
conscription or not is arguably the most fundamental distinction between different
recruitment policies, and has immediate and drastic effects on other aspects of military
organization.
A. What is Conscription?
Whereas volunteer armies rely on incentives such as salaries, employment
benefits, and appeals to patriotism to attract individuals who agree to serve according to
contractually-specific provisions, conscript armies are characterized by the use of
compulsion—ultimately backed by legal or extralegal punishment and the threat of
violence—to enlist individuals who would not otherwise have volunteered. At the most
basic level, states that use volunteer recruitment cannot choose who joins their armed
forces. They can filter undesirable entrants through various criteria, often based on
criminal records, educational attainment and gender. However, they cannot choose who
enlists among those that meet their criteria. They must do their best to attract the types of
recruits they prefer or need, but can do little if they are not forthcoming—besides attempt
to improve the terms of service or try a new marketing strategy. Conscription can allow
states to circumvent this problem. If a state is willing to tell people they have no choice
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but to serve, it can quickly recruit large numbers of personnel and sort them into their
optimal roles. Whereas effective conscript armies must focus on building sufficient
administrative infrastructure to ensure compliance, continually train new classes of
recruits, and build unit cohesion, volunteer armies must be able to get enough qualified
recruits not only to achieve their missions, but also to do so at a reasonable cost.
For most states, this becomes a tradeoff between quantity and quality. Volunteer
armies tend to be smaller because recruits must be paid wages that are competitive with
private sector civilian jobs, but modern conscripts are not as specialized or professional,
because they typically do not serve long enough to learn the necessary skills.
Furthermore, while conscript armies can acquire troops more easily, they also require
larger civil and military staffs to administer the greater number of recruits and the large
reserve force they turn into. These downsides can be overcome to an extent if volunteer
armies can improve terms of service to attract more recruits or if conscript armies can
enhance training and administrative resources, allowing either type of army to be equally
effective. However, this is beyond the resources of most states. Consequently, the choice
between conscription and volunteers has repercussions throughout their military system,
forcing them ultimately to sacrifice some degree of size, cost, or effectiveness. States
must then implement different policies to compensate for these tradeoffs. As Jeremy
Black writes, “systems reliant on conscription face different problems in terms of
incorporation, in particular with reference to training and discipline, to those confronting
militaries reliant on voluntary service.”22 Conscript armies, for example, may be more
likely to suffer from unit cohesion problems, requiring efforts to create cohesion that
22

Jeremy Black, “Military Organisations and Military Change in Historical Perspective,” The
Journal of Military History 62 (1998): 886.

11

would not be necessary among volunteers.23 This is not intended to imply that the first
decision a state makes is whether to use conscription, but does suggest that that decision
is intimately connected to other important defense decisions.
One might question the utility of examining conscription as a homogeneous
category. In reality, recruitment policies resemble more of a continuum than a dichotomy.
Conscription policies can vary along factors including the length of service terms, the use
of press-ganging versus institutionalized selective service, the proportion of the enlistees
who are conscripts, and the proportion or segments of society to which conscription
applies. It can be centrally implemented, through formal procedures that are legally
codified and equally applied throughout the national territory, or it can be decentralized,
with different provinces, local draft boards, or regional commanders having their own
procedures for selecting draftees. Many states also allow conscripts to perform their
service in alternative civilian positions instead of in the military. These different policies
mean that the experience of conscription can be starkly different from state to state, with
appropriately distinct sociopolitical consequences.
While this has led many scholars to call for studying the disaggregation of
recruitment policies, the dichotomous distinction between the use of volunteers or
conscripts is still an important one.24 This is true even for states that conscript in very
small numbers. For many states, the advantage of conscription is chiefly in its ability to
persuade people to volunteer before they are conscripted—an option that often affords
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enhanced occupational benefits. During the period of Selective Service in the United
States, for example, the main rationalizations for the draft were based on the numbers it
induced to volunteer or re-enlist. Among combat personnel alone, the number of draftinduced enlistees for the year 1970—the year the Gates Commission issued its
recommendation to end conscription—was equivalent to the total number of volunteers,
constituting 16 percent of enlistees.25 This suggests that the consequences or necessity of
a conscript policy would be difficult to deduce by a simple bean count of draftees. While
conscription can take many forms and affect either a large or small proportion of the
population, it is still worth studying its determinants more generally.
Furthermore, there are data limitations that prevent deeper cross-national
comparisons of different types of conscript systems. Understandably, many authoritarian
states do not publicize information about the composition of the military or nature of
military recruitment. Such disclosures could undermine official narratives about military
service and risk fomenting public unrest, or could reveal private information about
military capabilities. Some states may also lack the administrative capacity to institute
consistent recruitment policies throughout their territory, or to publicize these policies at
all. Additional research on different ways conscription is implemented would provide
valuable information on the role of the military in external defense and internal security,
but would require substantial investments in time and money to have even a chance of
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feasibility. Nonetheless, there is substantial room in which to enhance existing theories
about recruitment without distinguishing between conscript systems. As I discuss more in
Chapter 2, few scholars have offered explanations for cross-national variation in the use
of conscription and volunteer recruitment. And, as I discuss more below, this distinction
remains an important one.
B. Consequences of Conscription
Recent research has argued that method of recruitment affects many military,
political, and social outcomes. In the realm of international conflict, scholars have linked
recruitment to the frequency with which states initiate conflict.26 Recruitment method
may also affect military effectiveness in several ways. For one, it may affect how
governments use their armies in campaign and battles, and may alter how those armies
behave in combat. Eliot Cohen attributes this to the differing abilities of short-term
conscripts versus long-term professionals.27 Long-term professionals, he argued, are
better able to address the requirements of counterinsurgency, including the length of
enlistment required by longer campaigns and technical expertise. The shorter service
periods of most conscripts, on the other hand, are better suited to situations of major
conventional warfare where replacements are needed en masse and quickly; they rarely
serve long enough to be effective in counterinsurgencies. Alternatively, others have
argued that differences in combat effectiveness come down to the relationship between
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conscription and casualty-sensitivity, particularly in democracies: states are more likely
to take risks with conscripts because they are a less-costly investment than volunteers.28
However, because conscription also implies that many recruits may be serving against
their will and with people with whom they have little in common—except a desire to be
somewhere else—it creates challenges for achieving unit cohesion and discipline, which
have an important influence on military effectiveness, among other behaviors.29
Aside from its direct effect on the battlefield, conscription may improve a state’s
chances in war by contributing to state capacity. States that conscript often do so as a
self-conscious effort to expand the central government’s ability to extract vital
resources—manpower, and often, in substitution, revenue—thereby increasing their
ability to mobilize for warfare.30 Finally, conscription affects states’ ability to win wars
through its impact on public opinion.31 As the United States learned in Vietnam, or
Russia learned in World War I, popular support is not only a helpful ingredient for
initiating conflict, but is also necessary to continue to wage war when success does not
arrive quickly and costlessly.
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Conscription can also have many unanticipated consequences for domestic
society. While little research has examined the long-term effects of conscription on
regime stability, there are several mechanisms through which such effects could occur.
First, it is not uncommon for the leaders of states to institute conscription in an effort to
unify the population and expand their support basis by treating the army as a “school for
the nation.”32 Although the effectiveness of the army as a tool for socialization is open to
question, this theory suggests that conscription, when applied widely enough, can
cultivate a national identity and eliminate competing ethnic or regional loyalties. This is
consistent with popular accounts that cite conscription as creating a true “citizen’s army,”
which can be an important factor limiting the army’s ability to use violence against its
own citizens—a theory several news agencies suggested during the rapid failure of the
2016 Turkish coup attempt.33 Similarly, Margaret Levi has shown that unfair conscription
can lead to mass demonstrations and unrest—a threat not only to regime stability, but
also to any concurrent war effort.34 Antonis Adam, on the other hand, suggests that
conscription may prevent coups if it creates a large, short-service military, which would
disrupt connections among recruits and between the military and political power.35
Finally, conscription can encourage loyalty by acting as a form of patronage: it can tie a
larger portion of the population to the regime by treating the army as a source of
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employment (assuming that recruits are paid a reasonable wage), by providing people
who complete their term of service with certain societal advantages, and by providing
cheap labor and other rents to staff officers.36
The rotation of more people through the military inevitably creates more veterans.
Many scholars have shown that veterans have different policy preferences and can play
important roles in social movements, suggesting that conscription is important to the
extent that it tends to result in higher rates of military participation in society.37 When
conscription exposes a larger portion of the population to military life and values, it
decreases the distance between the military and society, which may improve civilmilitary relations.38 Socialization processes and opportunities may differ in conscript and
volunteer armies, with at least one study finding differences in racial attitudes among
white civilians and veterans, depending on the era in which they served in the U.S.
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army.39 Similarly, there are micro-level effects for individuals who perform conscript
service, which in addition to having important personal consequences, can produce
drastic societal consequences when aggregated across large portions of a state’s
population. These studies have analyzed the effects on veterans of lost wages or
education due to military service, as well as enhanced skills or opportunities afforded to
veterans.40 Recent feminist critiques of conscription have also examined the extent to
which the state uses recruitment policies and the benefits associated with them to
manipulate and reinforce dominant conceptions of the family and a woman’s place in
society, as well as race relations.41
Finally, the use of conscription may have an impact on state development over an
even longer duration. The advent of conscription has often been viewed as part of a larger
military revolution that not only shaped how states fight wars, but the very organization
of the state. The rise of large, standing armies and the enhanced demands of states upon
their citizens—as well as how states compensated for and imposed these demands—
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influenced whether states developed along liberal or illiberal lines.42 Frequently, this
process entailed a new bargain between state and society, in which the state provided new
benefits in exchange for military service.43 Consequently, extensive social reforms often
followed the end of wars and the demobilization of the masses. Such reforms are
necessary to reflect the new social roles and awareness that accompany mass
mobilization, as people from diverse social backgrounds and classes mingle for the first
time in the armed forces, as well as to provide socio-economic safety nets for individuals
and their families who were affected by conflict.
To paraphrase Lindsay Cohn, if we believe that who serves in the military is
important for operational, political, and social outcomes, then the processes by which
people are recruited matters, too.44 While conscription is not the only important aspect of
military organization, the decision to recruit using conscripts or volunteers should not be
overlooked. I do not suggest that conscription is necessarily more important than other
aspects of military structure, such as the size of the principal unit of operation or the
inclusivity of the armed forces. However, because it has not traditionally been
emphasized in studies of military innovation and reform, its determinants are less wellunderstood. Thus, this dissertation builds on a substantial literature on military design,
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innovation, and reform, that not only privileges other military policies, but different
explanatory variables.
C. Conscription in the Context of Military Design
There are of course numerous other aspects of military organization with
important implications for social development and military effectiveness. A large
literature examines how various military innovations have significantly changed the way
militaries fight and win, often with significant consequences for society more generally.45
The decision to organize the military around corps, divisions, or smaller units, the use of
meritocratic rather than personal or ethnic criterion for service and promotion, and the
nature of military doctrine constitute just a few of the most prominent examples of
military policies cited in this literature. However, studies of military design frequently
single out the use of conscription as distinct from these other organizational decisions.46
As I show below, it is often described as more isolated from threat considerations, or
more reflective of broader domestic ideologies, civilian culture, and societal concerns.
The choice of specific operational doctrines and the development of
professionalization are two prominent examples of more typically studied military
characteristics. Numerous studies attribute these outcomes to either threat environments,
military culture, or some combination of the two.47 Elizabeth Kier, for example, argues
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that military doctrines in interwar France and the United Kingdom were influenced by the
strategic culture of their respective militaries—notably, in response to predetermined
state recruitment policies. These arguments describe militaries as insular organizations,
with cultures that are often distinct from that of the rest of society, as well as with the
ability to more or less oversee their own institutional design and internal policies.
However, scholars who focus on recruitment argue that it is dependent on the
culture within the broader civilian population. John Lynn, for example, argues that
recruitment “is more tightly bound up with a state’s basic values and institutions” than
other military structures, such as unit organization.48 Any decisions about which
individuals should serve in the armed forces inherently invokes questions about ideology
and nationality: it entails “broader questions about what should be protected by whom
and in which context.”49 These questions may be widely debated, as in the early United
States or in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, or they may not be addressed explicitly
during debates or policymaking processes because their answers are so obvious to
domestic policymakers that addressing them explicitly is unnecessary.
In contrast to these studies, which view recruitment choices as arising out of
internal debates and pressures, I argue that new states’ recruitment practices are largely
driven by external preferences, especially of stronger foreign powers. The above
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literature suggests strong reasons to study recruitment separately from other aspects of
military organization. My dissertation allows for an examination of whether recruitment
should continue to be viewed so differently. Rather, my theory suggests that the
determinants of military recruitment and conscription resemble other aspects of military
structure much more closely than has commonly been assumed. By showing how
external influences can explain the decision to use conscription, which has often been
viewed as a military structure most likely to be immune to such factors, my dissertation
suggests that my theory is also likely to be able to explain many other aspects of military
organization as well. While the broader literature on military design and reform—with
the exception of the subfield of security sector reform—has largely neglected the role of
external actors—my dissertation shows that such actors can have important explanatory
value.

III. Methodology
To this point I have justified my exclusive focus on conscription over other
aspects of military design. However, my dissertation also applies a new methodological
approach to the study of conscription. Rather than attempt to explain why any state uses
conscripts or volunteers in any given year, I examine what factors determine this decision
during processes of state and military formation. Thus, I build and test my theory in
contexts that might be best described as “new states.”
New states are those that, having previously been under the administrative control
of another polity, have gained responsibility for administering their own security forces
and defense policies for the first time. The most common way for this to happen is
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through processes of decolonization or independence. However, similar outcomes can
also arise through certain types of regime change. Social revolutions, for example,
transform societal structures and bring new groups to domestic political power, without
necessarily previously being under the control of another polity.50 The termination of
major conflicts can also disrupt domestic power relationships, whether due to externally
imposed regime change or successful internal rebellions.51 The important condition these
scenarios have in common is a unique opportunity to design or restructure the state’s
armed forces. Because new states are relatively unconstrained by existing institutions—
which are often weak, if they exist at all—they are more free to adopt a different
recruitment system than the actor that previously governed their territory. Moreover, they
are also likely to have dramatically different preferences from their predecessors, and
thus have motivations to pursue major institutional reform—especially in the military,
which may otherwise be a threat to their new regime. In fact, states change their
recruitment system more frequently after social revolutions and post-conflict
reconstruction than do more stable states. Whereas recruitment systems only change in
1.39 percent of country years between 1918 and 2016, they change 11 percent of the time
within two years after the year of a social revolution or situation of post-conflict
reconstruction (8 out of 68 cases).
Thus, independence, social revolution, and post-conflict reconstruction are
opportunities to design new security institutions and constitute a critical juncture, or a
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period in time during which major institutional changes are possible.52 The choices
become self-reinforcing and continue to have outsized effects, long after the
circumstances that shaped their initial adoption have passed.53 This means military
recruitment systems tend to be best analyzed as a path-dependent outcome. Once in
place, initial decisions about recruitment systems are self-reinforcing for several reasons.
First, as described earlier, other decisions about the intensity and frequency of training
and induction, length of service, and other manpower and organizational policies follow
directly from the decision to use either conscription or volunteer systems. This means that
changing recruitment systems requires changing many other aspects of military
organization as well. Second, recruitment systems can empower certain actors and give
them a stake in the existing system. For example, conscription can produce bloated but
influential military staffs and cheap surplus labor in the form of enlisted personnel. This
has contributed to the inability of the Russian military to successfully transform to an allvolunteer force, despite repeated civilian-led efforts to instigate such change.54
Recruitment can also influence cultural or organizational understandings about
what type of manpower systems are appropriate or effective. While a policy elite’s
ideological preferences and beliefs regarding the optimal relationship between the
military and society can influence initial military design, once implemented these beliefs
become embedded not only within military culture, but also within domestic society more
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broadly, regardless of their initial or continued efficacy. Thus certain myths about the
utility of conscription often allow the system to continue in the face of increasing
evidence that it does not have the desired social or military effects.55 Societies that
conscript can come to believe that universal military service is a vital element in young
men’s (and, more rarely, women’s) socialization and work force preparation—that
without it, the population’s sense of civic responsibility and national identity would
decline. Conversely, scholars attribute the traditional British reliance on volunteers, even
during periods of heightened British intervention on the continent amongst European
states that had all accepted conscription as the most preferable recruitment system, to a
widespread ideology, traced back to the English Civil War, that distrusted large standing
armies.56 Finally, any uncertainty regarding a different system’s ability to “do better,”
combined with the inherent costs and learning curve associated with any transition, can
create reluctance to try a new recruitment system.
This is supported by existing cross-national statistical analyses of the
determinants of conscription. States rarely change their method of recruitment, even
when they expect to fight a major war.57 Asal et al. identified only 59 instances of states

55

Anna Leander, “Drafting Community: Understanding the Fate of Conscription,” Armed Forces
and Society 30 (2004): 571–599; See also Kerry Longhurst and Bastien Irondelle for explicit
arguments about path dependence in German and French acceptance of conscription: Kerry
Longhurst, “Why Aren’t the Germans Debating the Draft? Path Dependency and the Persistence
of Conscription” German Politics 12 (2003): 147–165; Bastien Irondelle, “Civil-Military
Relations and the End of Conscription in France,” Security Studies 12 (2003): 157–187.
56
Victor Asal, Justin Conrad, and Nathan Toronto., “I Want You! The Determinants of Military
Conscription” Journal of Conflict Resolution (2015); Richard H Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The
Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783–1802 (New York,
NY: The Free Press, 1975); Cress, Citizens in Arms; Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers.
57
Horowitz et al, “Domestic Institutions,” See also, Yael Hadass, “On the Causes of Military
Conscription,” June 21, 2004. Available at SSRN:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=564062.

25

switching systems in 6759 country years between 1969 and 2008.58 My data analysis is
consistent with this previous work. Collectively, there were only 71 recruitment system
changes for the 205 cases of new states and major regime change for which I found
available recruitment data between 1918 and 2005, with some of these new states
changing recruitment multiple times. Furthermore, only 53 of those changes occurred
more than five years after independence, indicating that a notable proportion of
changes—roughly 25 percent—might be associated with early processes of institutional
consolidation and strategic defense assessments. In short, the conditions in which many
new states must make decisions about their militaries is fundamentally different from the
conditions for effecting military reform in more established militaries. Other types of
regime change may also offer relatively unconstrained opportunities for redesigning
military institutions. By adopting a stricter definition for the unit of analysis, I increase
my ability to isolate the immediate factors affecting military design from the inertia of
existing military practices.
This focus on new states allows me to isolate the factors that lead states to adopt
their initial recruitment systems, which then sets them down a path that makes them more
likely to maintain certain military practices. I studied what factors affect these initial
military recruitment decisions in two ways. First, I created a dataset of these new states to
test existing arguments about military recruitment determinants against my theory of
patron-client relations using statistical analysis, which allows me to establish
correlational relationships and the generalizability of my argument. These tests can be
seen in Chapter 3. Second, I tested the causal mechanisms described in my theory
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through several process-tracing case study chapters. Each case study chapter examines a
new state from the quantitative analysis that represents a different causal pathway by
which states determine their military recruitment systems. While many states have
patrons, other states must design their military on their own, either in contexts of high or
low international threat. My qualitative analysis in each of these chapters allows me to
identify who they key actors in each case of military design were, what their preferences
were, and why some actors’ preferences became policy. This allows me to verify that the
theorized mechanism is actually behind the correlations established in Chapter 3.
A. Scope
Since even before the innovation of the professional standing army by the Dutch
in the seventeenth century—and its subsequent spread across Europe, and later, the
world—rulers have in theory had the option of raising their armies through market
incentives or physical coercion.59 Indeed, some people have identified evidence of
practices resembling compulsory military service in the Old Testament.60 However, I do
not suggest I can explain the use of conscription at all times and by all actors. I focus
specifically on two scope conditions: the actors whose behavior I attempt to explain are
states as opposed to non-state actors, and they are relatively modern.
First, many rebel groups can equally practice forced military service—indeed,
many scholars and humanitarian groups have written on the use of child soldiers by states
and rebels alike. Yet rebel groups face unique circumstances influencing their military
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practices that may not apply to states, most notably, an enhanced collective action
problem, absence of international legitimacy, and fewer resources. Even rebel groups
with patrons may be less likely to emulate their patrons due to an enhanced principalagent problem and greater obstacles to high levels of patronage. Not only are there good
reasons to expect rebel military practices to be motivated by different factors than state
militaries, but it is worth also worth studying recruitment as an important and
understudied component of state policies in its own right.
The second important caveat is about the time period in which my argument
should be applicable. Contemporary conscription practices are generally traced back only
to the levée en masse of the French Revolution. Indeed, Andrew Krepinevich identifies
the levée en masse as a vital component of the military innovation that he terms the
Napoleonic Revolution.61 Furthermore, it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that
technological and social conditions enabled rulers to compel large portions of their
population into prolonged military service.62 This study truncates the period under
analysis even further, focusing on how states design their militaries since the end of
World War I.
While many of the dynamics I describe are likely applicable to earlier periods of
state creation as well, focusing on military recruitment in the last hundred years offers
certain advantages. Most importantly, it is difficult to get reliable data on a wide set of
cases before this period. In addition, cases after this period are comparable for several
reasons. For one, the end of World War I produced a major shift toward norms of respect
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for self-determination and territorial sovereignty, with corresponding changes in the
relationship between citizens and the state. Thus, state creation before and after World
War I took place in distinct contexts that limit the nature of insights that can be drawn
from comparing cases across the two time periods. It is no coincidence that the majority
of independent states today gained independence after 1918. Second, beginning my
analysis in 1918 allows me to better hold the technological context constant. Although
the innovation of conscription was developed a century earlier and truly demonstrated by
Prussia in the mid-1860s, World War I was in many ways the culmination of warfighting
principles associated with the mass army and conscription more generally. By the end of
World War I, much of the world had been exposed to a system of compulsory military
service, and thus was able to observe its consequences both in combat and for society
more generally. Thus, limiting my analysis to post-1918 state creation increases the
similarities across instances of military design to allow for comparison, while still
providing a large enough sample size to make those comparisons generalizable.

IV. Preview of Dissertation
In this chapter I have established the importance of reexamining the factors that
lead states to adopt either volunteer or conscript recruitment systems, and have situated
this study within the broader process of designing militaries in new states. In the next
chapter, I review existing explanations for why some states rely on conscription,
including those based on individual case studies, systematic cross-national study, and
untested but hypothesized relationships. I argue that this literature fails to account for
observed variation in recruitment, and moreover makes certain unfounded assumptions
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that are inappropriate with respect to the actual process of military design in new states.
More specifically, the most widely accepted arguments downplay the functional
advantages of conscription even in the age of modern warfare, and assume too much
domestic autonomy over military affairs. Instead, I argue that foreign powers often
intervene in new state military design to implement or encourage the use of a recruitment
system that suits their security interests.
I argue that military recruitment decisions result from one of three causal
pathways. First, when there is a foreign military patron to guide recruitment decisions,
states pursue the preferences of the patron, leading to emulation. When there is no patron,
one of two things happens, depending on the external threat environment. In the second
pathway, a low external threat environment and absence of a patron leaves states
unconstrained in the recruitment options they can pursue. In these circumstances, the
idiosyncrasies of historical experience, domestic politics, or leadership preference will
dominate the policymaking process. In the third pathway, if there is a major external
threat to the new state’s territorial integrity, it will usually conscript in order to ensure it
can defend its borders, especially in consideration of the inability of new states to build
effective volunteer forces.
Chapter 3 uses quantitative methods to systematically test the arguments I
advance in Chapter 2. I collected original data on foreign intervention in new states,
including the presence of military training and advisory missions, foreign contract
officers, and troop deployments. Logistic regression shows that indicators of foreign state
intervention have a strong effect on military design. In addition, they show that external
territorial threats exert a strong functional pressure on new states to adopt conscription, at
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least when states have no patron. This is true even when tests control for the cultural
legacy or nature of foreign influence in new states. The findings in this chapter contrast
with the expectations of many popular alternative hypotheses, and provide broad support
for my argument.
Demonstrating my primary proposed mechanism, though—that foreign states
actively intervene to enforce their preferences—requires further, in-depth analysis. The
next three chapters examine the process of military design in specific cases, focusing on
the debates—implicit or explicit—surrounding the use of conscription. Each one of these
chapters process-traces the creation of the military in a different one of my causal
pathways. Chapter 4 describes the process of military recruitment policy development in
a state with a powerful patron, Jordan. Chapter 5 demonstrates what happens when there
is neither a foreign patron nor major external threat to constrain decision making, as was
the case in Iraq during the inter-war period. Furthermore, these chapters offer a
comparison of Jordan and Iraq that can establish the causal role of British patronage
through a most-similar cases research design. Both were strongly influenced by British
military culture in the years after World War I, though they both had previously been
under Ottoman control and had experience with conscription during that period.
Additionally, both Jordan and Iraq envisaged the same types of threats—mainly, those
arising out of weak domestic legitimacy and cleavages within society. However, whereas
Iraqi domestic leaders strongly preferred to use conscription and implemented this system
almost as soon as they were independent, Jordan continued to use a volunteer system.
These chapters examine the reasons why despite these ostensibly similar contexts, British
influence and a volunteer system prevailed in Jordan but not in Iraq. I argue and show
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that the reason is largely due to the difference in a British desire to intervene in military
design across the two cases, and hence in the level of British intervention and patronage.
Chapter 6 illustrates the third causal pathway: no patronage in the context of high
external threats. It also tests this theory in a more contemporary case of state formation
and military design: Bosnia and Herzegovina during its post-independence statebuilding
effort that began in 1995. The end of the Bosnian Civil War and the Dayton Accords
resulted in a fractured Bosnian state under an international administration. However, the
historic experience of Bosnia with conscription seemed to lead to institutional inertia,
with all armed actors continuing to conscript despite international intervention and
security guarantees. Beginning in 2002, though, the international community essentially
enforced several rounds of defense reform on Bosnia. This defense reform concluded
with the sudden and complete abolition of conscription at the end of 2005, despite similar
levels of international presence and a largely unchanged international environment. I
conducted interviews with American and Bosnian officials involved in the defense
reform process to determine what changed between 1995 and 2005. This allows me to
better understand whether local or international actors matter most for determining
military design. It also demonstrates the applicability of my argument that international
patrons matter most in different cultural and temporal contexts, including in modern
instances of state creation and military design.
My final chapter concludes by discussing the implications of the dissertation’s
findings for contemporary international relations theory and for policy practitioners. This
research highlights the role of hierarchy and patron-client relations in international
relations. It also provides insight for policymakers in government or elsewhere who work
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with other countries to support these security goals. It provides insight into how states
define their security interests. For example, it is often assumed that militaries are
designed to be experts in violence, so that states emulate best practices in military
effectiveness. My research indicates that states may sacrifice military effectiveness for
other goals, such as social integration, or because they lack the capacity to make an
effective defense. By addressing the circumstances in which states prefer these goals, my
research illuminates how states understand and respond to their strategic environments
using military design. In turn, this provides advice for policymakers seeking to help states
design their militaries.
This is especially relevant for new states or those restructuring their military after
major regime change or civil war. These are unique opportunities to change military
design and organizational culture, and consequently military effectiveness and regime
stability. Thus, military training and power-sharing were integral to the peace process in
Bosnia, and a failure to adequately rebuild Iraq’s army is often blamed for the rise of the
Islamic State. My dissertation contributes to efforts to understand how to better design
such post-conflict militaries to support peace, reconstruction, and broader security
policies. By highlighting when and why states are likely to view conscripts as
contributing to security, I suggest what tools policymakers should focus on to achieve
desired security goals.
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CHAPTER 2: A NEW THEORY OF MILITARY DESIGN
In December 2002, high ranking members of the international community met at
the Hotel Petersberg in Bonn, Germany, to discuss the future of Afghanistan’s armed
forces. A general agreement had already been reached on the importance of developing
the Afghan armed forces at the previous year’s Bonn conference, which set in motion the
transitional process that would result in Afghanistan’s new constitution. It was at
Petersberg in 2002, however, that the specific processes to establish a new Afghan
National Army (ANA) were decided. Of particular note was the decision to recruit on a
solely volunteer basis, with training to be “jointly designed by Afghanistan and the
United States or other designated lead nations” and with American responsibility for
reviewing the progress of ANA recruitment and training.63
In 2010, amidst heightened security demands that had recently led the United
States to commit 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan, Afghan President Hamid Karzai
considered adopting conscription.64 Such a change would have been consistent with
historical practices, as the army had previously used conscription for decades before the
civil war of the 1990s and the rise of the Taliban. However, there was no change in
recruitment practices. Despite changing security environments, the Afghan army
continues to be recruited on a volunteer basis more than sixteen years after its modern refounding.
This chapter offers a new theory to explain why countries like Afghanistan and
Iraq, which have undergone major changes in domestic regimes and constitute examples
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of “new states,” use volunteers instead of conscription by examining the sources of
recruitment policies. The recruitment policies used in these cases are particularly
puzzling given the contrast to their historically dominant recruitment practices. The
fundamental problem addressed by this study is that of military design: how do states
determine the form that their military will take, particularly with respect to volunteer or
conscript forces? There are many factors that affect what a state’s military will look like.
Which ones are most important? To what extent are these factors that states control as
opposed to external forces or circumstances? I argue that any effort to understand what
recruitment policies a state adopts must account for variation in the identity of the actors
who make recruitment decisions and what factors motivate their military goals.
More specifically, two variables define the environment that structures
recruitment decisions. First, either domestic or foreign policymakers can dominate the
decision-making process. In other words, states can be constrained by a patron-client
relationship, in which a stronger outside actor influences their policy choices. This
matters because these actors often have different perceptions about the military’s most
important goals and the appropriate organizational practices for achieving them. When
foreign powers view new or weak states as important enough to their interests to engage
them with an extensive military presence or security assistance, recruitment policies
reflect their preferences, rather than those of domestic policymakers. Second, if there is
no foreign state influence to guide emulation, threat perceptions affect military
recruitment. Major external threats to the new state’s territory constrain recruitment
options in the interest of immediate defense, while lower threat environments permit
more freedom to adopt different practices.
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The effects of both variables can be seen in the description of military design in
Afghanistan. Several agreements reinforced the United States’ role as a foundational
patron of the ANA’s development. At a meeting of the Group of Eight (G8) in Geneva in
Spring 2003 it was determined that the United States would take the lead on Afghan
military reform.65 The United States government also appointed American brigadier
general John Eikenberry to be U.S. Security Coordinator, a position responsible for,
among other things, the “synchronization of the Afghan National Army building program
and DDR plans to ensure they were politically and logistically feasible.” Eikenberry was
dual-hatted as the Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan, the office
responsible for developing the ANA.66 The United States made many other important
decisions in its capacity as lead nation in the process of Afghan military design, including
to dismantle and rebuild all Afghan security institutions, “from the Ministry of Defense to
the ground units.”67 However, as threat levels increased, domestic elites including
President Hamid Karzai began to see conscription as the only way to maintain Afghan
security. Without American influence and coalition support, it is much more likely that
the Afghan army would have returned to conscription to meet its perceived security
needs.
I argue that the dynamics that determined military recruitment in Afghanistan are
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not the exception but the norm. My argument describes three pathways of the
development of military recruitment practices. In the first pathway, foreign powers
intervene in military design to prop up their preferred vision for the new state’s security,
whether that is primarily defined by external threats or to reinforce a friendly or
strategically important regime. In either case, new states end up emulating the
recruitment system the foreign power uses at the time. In the second and third pathways,
foreign powers do not see an advantage to intervening in the new state’s military design,
leaving the decision to domestic actors. In the second pathway there are neither
international powers to intervene nor major external threats. These conditions mean
domestic leaders have the most freedom to design their military. Here it is most difficult
to predict how they will recruit because they may be influenced by a number of cultural
considerations and they need not design the military with traditional notions of external
defense in mind. Finally, the third option for the development of a recruitment system is
that domestic leaders who control military policy perceive high levels of external threat,
leading them to use conscription. The three pathways are best summarized in Table 2.1,
below.
Table 2.1 Summary of Hypotheses
High Patronage
Low/No Patronage

Low Threat
Path 1:
Emulate
Path 2:
Freedom from Constraints

High Threat
Path 1:
Emulate
Path 3:
Conscript for Defense

The remainder of this chapter elaborates on this theory and argues for its greater
ability to explain military recruitment practices compared to existing theories that
emphasize military effectiveness or domestic politics and historical legacy. It first

37

addresses the limitations of existing approaches to studying military recruitment. The first
of these approaches contends that domestic politics, especially as determined by
historical legacies, determines recruitment, while the second holds that military
effectiveness alone determines recruitment. Second, it describes the reasons for and
means of military patronage and details the logic behind each of the predictive pathways.
Finally, it responds to potential counterarguments to my theory.

I. Limitations of Existing Approaches to Recruitment
Existing theories emphasize two main sources of military recruitment policy. One
set of theories argues that domestic politics determines how states recruit for their
militaries. This approach expects deeply ingrained social and cultural factors or domestic
institutions to influence state preferences. In particular, the most persuasive arguments in
this school of thought locate the origins of domestic recruitment preferences in prior
colonial institutions.68 However, these theories also argue more generally that different
domestic institutions and norms support specific recruitment practices. National
ideologies, political institutions, and local norms can all lead states to adopt either
conscription or volunteer recruitment.
Thus, these arguments maintain that “culturally and organizationally driven prior
beliefs about what a military system is supposed to look like” drive recruitment
decisions. 69 These arguments tend to divorce threat perceptions from military recruitment
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altogether, arguing that states may view the military as an inappropriate tool for dealing
with some of their threats, or that states knowingly sacrifice military effectiveness in
order to pursue goals related to domestic stability. Otherwise, recruitment systems may
reflect practices or values so deeply ingrained that there appears to be only one
recruitment option—alternatives would be unthinkable. As Maury Feld wrote, “The
decisions—about who is to serve, in what capacity, and for what sort of compensation—
describe the social policies of a political system, often long before it is itself aware of the
need for or the existence of such a concept.”70
A second group of theories predicts that whatever contributes to military
effectiveness is the most important variable for understanding military recruitment. These
theories often stress the combination of threat environments and available resources to
meet those threats. Military recruitment policies, like other facets of military
organizations, are influenced by what Samuel Huntington called the functional
imperative, which requires the military to be capable of effectively employing physical
violence to provide security in the face of external threats.71
This is particularly the case in Realist theories, which highlight the securitymaximizing tendencies of states. In particular, they emphasize the structural effects of
anarchy, which lead to a system of self-help that conditions states to guard against
external threats to their security. One way states do this is through internal balancing,
which, in contrast to external balancing via alliances, aims to decrease reliance on other
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states and increase one’s own power and military capabilities.72 States must always
engage in internal balancing to some degree, because, as many realists argue, it offers a
more reliable safeguard given the inherent uncertainty of anarchy.73 Moreover, internal
balancing tends to reinforce external balancing efforts, since states that have more
capable militaries and that are better able to provide for their own defense inspire greater
confidence among potential allies.74 Thus, these theories contend, states should rationally
design their militaries and choose the method of recruitment that does the most to
increase their security, particularly against other states that might threaten them with
invasion. However, these theories often lack a clear statement of why a given recruitment
system would be more effective.
These theories of domestic politics and military effectiveness suffer from two
main shortcomings. First, they assume states maintain autonomy over their own military
policies. Both sets of explanations emphasize the military or political preferences of
domestic policymakers, ignoring the role that international actors often play in military
design. Second, and partially as a result of the failure to acknowledge the role of outside
actors, they fail to identify realistic processes by which states pursue their preferred
recruitment policies. Domestic political theories paint an overly deterministic relationship
between political institutions, ideologies, and preferences, on the one hand, and military
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recruitment on the other. Similarly, theories that emphasize military effectiveness and
threats assume too much efficiency in the way states make decisions; they ignore the
diverse ways states interpret security environments and the sub-optimal ways they often
respond to them. I return to these shortcomings and address the potential
counterarguments these theories propose after introducing my argument, below.
The next section argues that military influence from stronger countries can
explain recruitment policy decisions better than either threat or domestic political
explanation. It first demonstrates the role of patron-client relations in military policies,
then describes how these relationships are created and perpetuated by encouraging
emulation or using direct control. It then discusses the causal pathways through which
recruitment systems are often adopted, before the final section that details objections
derived from existing theories.

II. International Hierarchy and Patron-Client Relations in Military Design
In a 2010 article in Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
described security assistance as a fundamental pillar of American foreign policy, by
“helping others countries defend themselves or, if necessary, fight alongside U.S. forces
by providing them with equipment, training, or other forms of security assistance.”75
Indeed, foreign powers often have a determinative influence on many aspects of
development and domestic policy in weaker states.76 As David Lake and others have
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convincingly demonstrated, relationships between many states are characterized not by
anarchy but by hierarchy: the degree to which a subordinate, or client, state endows a
dominant, or patron, state with authority over its affairs.77 I demonstrate that in many
cases these hierarchical relationships extend specifically to military policies. This
indicates the need to view the international system as one in which hierarchy, rather than
anarchy and the associated drive to self-help, conditions many states’ behavior.
Relationships that reflect hierarchy in the international system are characterized
by shared sovereignty. Thus, the more overlap there is in authority over particular issues
between two states, the more one can describe their relationship as hierarchical.
Similarly, the more hierarchical states dyads there are, the more the international system
can be said to be characterized by hierarchy. A particular form of international hierarchy
is the patron-client relationship. In a patron-client relationship, one state voluntarily
shares autonomy with or abdicates some autonomy to another state in exchange for
certain benefits. Patron-client relationships are distinct from other forms of hierarchy in
several ways. In particular, Christopher Carney argues that patron-client relations reflect
a degree of affinity between patron and client that may not exist in other dependent
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relationships.78 In addition, patron-client relations entail a degree of reciprocity: while
one state may benefit more than the other, both receive benefits from the relationship.79
More broadly, though, a relationship of patronage requires that a patron attempts
to gain compliance from a client state by distributing favors.80 According to Shoemaker
and Spanier, “the patron, whatever its specific objectives in the relationship might be,
seeks to exert some degree of control over the client. This control can take many forms,
but in general, it implies the surrendering of some measure of the client’s autonomy to
the patron.”81 Importantly, there is an asymmetry in power between the patron and the
client: the “client cannot, by itself, become a major military power in the international
community; nor can it, by itself, guarantee its own security.”82 As a result, the patron
tends to provide the client with security or security-related goods in exchange for
political support. This desire for support from the client gives the client some influence
over the patron. However, the client is also fairly dependent on the patron’s support,
given the asymmetrical military capabilities. As Carney writes, “the exercise of influence
and/or control over a client is one of the patron’s primary concerns and is one of the key
features of the cliency relationship.”83
While patron-client relationships entail a two-way transfer of benefits—generally
security assistance to the client and political support to the patron—it is the patron’s
actions and influence that are most relevant for my purposes. As defined above,
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patronage entails the provision of goods by a stronger actor to a weaker actor. In
particular, I am interested in the provision of goods to bolster the military capabilities of
weaker states. The fact that there are benefits to both the client and the patron explain
why these relationships may be so common. However, it is the patron’s provision of
security goods to a state that becomes dependent on these goods that best explains the
influence patrons gain in the realm of military design. Thus it is less important to
distinguish patron-client relationships from other relationships of dependency for my
purposes. Rather, a patron is simply a state that gains leverage over a client state through
the provision of military assistance. The dependency of the client on the patron then
endows the patron with greater influence on many aspects of the client state’s policies,
including military design.
External interest in how other states organize their armed forces can be motivated
by a number of factors. Foreign powers may perceive that helping to develop another
state’s military endows them with some security advantage. There may be an interest in
creating a strong military to protect the state against external or internal threats because
the state offers something of strategic value, whether that is control of or access to
resources or the geographic location of the state itself. For example, US military support
to Jamaica enhances the Jamaica Defense Force’s ability to maintain internal security and
participate in joint operations, which the United States maintains is important “because of
[Jamaica’s] location along vital sea lanes, the ability of its government to influence
opinion in the English Caribbean, and its role as a major source of bauxite and
marijuana.”84 Foreign powers often find it simpler and less risky to build up local forces
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in this fashion than to maintain a direct presence. Indeed, local collaboration was the
bedrock of European imperial strategy.85 In short, foreign powers assist in military design
to ensure the continued survival of a friendly regime in states that they view as
strategically important.
Sometimes, the foreign actor may not necessarily care about actually building a
strong military, but rather views developing the relationship between it and the new
state’s regime as an end in itself. In these circumstances, outside actors may provide
military advice and assistance to create or reinforce a dependent relationship that will
provide leverage for pursuing other policy goals. Or it might simply constitute a signal of
support or a confidence-building measure that can lead to improved relations. In some
cases, the security interest the outside power is pursuing is actually a decrease in the
client-state’s dependency. Thus, the United Kingdom sought to strengthen Kuwait’s
armed forces in the years after Kuwaiti independence so that it could minimize its
commitment to Kuwaiti security.86 In the words of Alexander Wendt and Michael
Barnett, strong states create informal empires through “dependent militarization, in effect
encouraging the development of certain security means to reinforce hegemonic security
ends.”87
Normative preferences can also lead outside actors to intervene in another state’s
military design. Many people believe the military can be an effective venue through

85

Ash Rossiter, “Britain and the Development of Professional Security Forces in the Gulf Arab
States, 1921–1971: Local Forces and Informal Empire (PhD diss, University of Exeter, 2014): 1516.
86
Rossiter, “Britain and the Development of Professional Security Forces,” 164-175
87
Emphasis in original. Wendt and Barnett, “Dependent State Formation,” 336.

45

which values can be transmitted to the rest of society.88 Thus, military reform efforts are
often part of broader projects to redefine the domestic political institutions of other states.
For example, the OECD describes security sector reform as “based on democratic norms
and human rights principles and the rule of law, seeking to provide freedom from fear
and measurable reductions in armed violence and crime.”89 Despite rhetoric emphasizing
local ownership of these processes, security sector reform is typically externally-driven,
with experts from a handful of countries—typically, the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France—leading evaluation and advisory teams.90 While there can be
strategic benefits for engaging in security sector reform, these principles indicate that
donor states are undoubtedly also motivated by a normative desire to improve the
standard of living in target countries.
The importance of client military practices suggests that foreign powers would
also care about client recruitment policies. For one, the decision to use conscription or not
is fundamental to many other aspects of military organization, as described in chapter 1.
Creating effective colonial and post-colonial militaries is not just a matter of training and
weapons, but of determining the best ways to recruit manpower for the intended
missions. For example, peacetime conscription can entail risks to domestic stability that
undermine the patron’s goals in exerting military influence in the first place. The British
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Defence Attaché’s annual report for 1979 on Saudi Arabian military development
articulated such a rationale against using conscripts to address manpower shortages:
Conscription could play a less than helpful part in maintaining the morale
and loyalty of the armed forces. It could introduce into the services numbers
of resentful men who could subvert some of the regular elements. Their
training requirements would affect the competence of the regular soldiers
and dilute the expertise now being built up. When the conscripts left they
would take away both some rudimentary military skill and a knowledge of
the many weaknesses in the command and logistical structure of the armed
forces. And they would leave behind regular soldiers better able to compare
their own pay and conditions with those offered by companies in the
commercial field.91
Similarly, American officials during the conflicts in both Korea and Vietnam took an
interest in the recruitment policies of their local allies. The United States viewed South
Korean mobilization policies as a delicate balancing act between defeating the North and
placating the Japanese fear of any increase in military power on the Korean peninsula.92
This led to frequent American efforts to restrain South Korean conscription efforts. The
United States also viewed conscription policies as vital to its success in Vietnam. In the
1950s, American proposals delayed Vietnamese conscription until local infrastructure
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was better established, while they repeatedly sought to enhance mobilization by asking
the South Vietnamese government to reduce the draft age after 1964.93
While these examples highlight that foreign powers often care about the
recruitment policies that their clients use, this is not necessary in order for the patron’s
recruitment policy to matter. Weaker states can also seek out the advice and assistance of
stronger outside powers when setting up their militaries. In many cases, creating military
dependency is not only viewed as an effective foreign policy tool by stronger states, but
also as potentially advantageous for weaker states: it can allow weaker states to focus on
statebuilding, provide regime security, and create alliance interdependence.94 The
Ottoman Empire sought foreign assistance in implementing European-style military
reforms throughout the nineteenth century.95 More recently, the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement that ended Liberia’s civil war in 2003 explicitly asked that the United States
“play a lead role in organising this restructuring programme [of Liberia’s armed
forces].”96 In these cases, local recruitment practices may not be fundamentally important
to patron state interests. Nonetheless, foreign advisors may transmit their recruitment
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preferences, based on their own experience of what works, when their military assistance
is requested.
A. Methods of Foreign Influence
Foreign influence can take many forms. Outside powers can directly determine a
state’s security interests and strategic orientation, they can set manpower requirements
for contribution to alliances or defense pacts, and they can provide or constrain the
resources a state has at its disposal to make its own military policies. These direct and
indirect methods of control all allow great powers to leverage a weak state’s dependence
on it to influence its military design.
At the least intrusive level, foreign powers can hope to influence a state’s military
practices through cultural diffusion and the attraction of soft power. Though this provides
no control over the practices states will actually adopt, foreign powers can foster high
exposure for their own militaries and hope they model good practices that others will
want to adopt. They can try to improve the likelihood that other states will perceive their
practices in a positive light by deepening their military-to-military ties, including through
joint military operations, contracting or exchanging officers and instructors, and military
training missions.97 Thus the high number of British army veterans serving in the postindependence Irish Army had a strong impact on the latter’s organizational practices.98
However, this was through their effect on organizational culture, which led to the general
acceptance of British professional norms, not through the active manipulation of policies
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by foreign agents.
While this can properly be described as foreign influence, it falls short of more
active experiences of foreign intervention that characterize military development in many
new states. Some powerful states take direct responsibility for creating and governing
weaker states’ military institutions. One way they do this is by appointing or providing
people who have the power to make these decisions. This was a favorite technique of the
British, who would frequently decide on or provide the new states’ top military or
civilian defense officials. For example, the first two heads of the Ghana Armed Forces
were British army officers. Perhaps the most famous modern instance of a foreign
military commander is John Bagot Glubb, the former British army officer who led the
Arab Legion—Jordan’s national armed forces—from 1939 until 1956.
These experts do not serve as official representatives of their home country, but
they frequently pursued policies that were consistent with their home government’s
preferences, and maintained extensive contacts there. In other cases, foreign powers
provide formal advisors, who, though they may lack institutionalized authority in the new
state, can have even greater de facto power arising from their official capacity back
home. This can include extensive military training missions, often beginning before
independence, such as the American KMAG in South Korea. It can also take the form of
a specific individual who is tasked with providing advice to new rulers. For example, a
Military Liaison Officer—Freddie De Butts—was the formal military link between the
newly independent United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom, tasked with
recommending the “shape and size on Independence Day to the Rulers, and to estimate
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what it would cost as they and not [the United Kingdom] would be paying.”99
While the British typically built small, if weak, native military establishments
before independence, former French colonies frequently gained independence with no
native armed forces.100 As a result, France was more likely to exert control over client
defense policies through the implicit threat of intervention it maintained by keeping
French troops within newly independent states. This patron-dependence was often
formalized in Defence Agreements.101 Indeed, France exercised its intervention
capabilities numerous times throughout the Cold War—and since then—to maintain
“existing patterns of relations” and favorable defense policies.102 Regardless of their
exact colonial heritages, many postcolonial countries gained independence with only low
ranking military officers and no qualified people to lead defense establishments. As a
result, they often voluntarily ceded early important defense decisions to foreign experts,
especially from former colonizers.
Although the relatively small number of states gaining independence in the last
two decades makes more contemporary examples fewer and farther between, similar
modern methods of foreigners controlling military design are easy to identify. Military
design efforts feature prominently in post-Cold War post-conflict peacebuilding and
democratization efforts. For examples, decisions about the reconstruction of the Afghan
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and Iraqi militaries in the mid-2000s were made at international conferences held outside
those countries’ territories and sponsored by the occupying powers, suggesting locals
were unlikely to be the dominant voice in the process. Similarly, a Rwandan general
formed the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s army in 1997, while Russia formed a
committee in Tajikistan’s Ministry of Defense to assist with operational training after the
civil war there, also in 1997. Changing international norms may make it impractical for
great powers to install their own representatives at the head of foreign armies or for new
states to hire foreign nationals to prominent governmental positions. However, it is not
uncommon for new states or foreigners engaged in security sector reform to hire private
security companies to advise on or implement defense policies.103 Since these companies
are mostly composed of foreign nationals with experience in foreign militaries, it should
be no surprise that they bring with them their prior ideas about effective military
organization.104
Foreign influence can come through one more, indirect mechanism. New states
that are aware of their precarious strategic position and their dependence on foreigners
for security often adopt the preferences of stronger, potential patron states. By
subordinating their own beliefs and preferences about defense preparations to those they
expect a foreigner to want for them, they hope to maintain the support of a patron and
avoid more disruptive and direct foreign intervention. This second face of power effect
on military design is most clearly evident during the process of West German
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rearmament.105 The Adenauer government, initially reticent to rearm at all, quickly
internalized the need to contribute to NATO’s conventional defense in Europe once it
became clear that their previous sources of defense manpower—the United States and
France—were intent on drawing down their human and financial contributions. While
NATO allies pressured West Germany to increase its contributions to its own defense,
there is no obvious evidence to indicate that they cared what recruitment method
Germany used to do this. However, Adenauer feared that a German failure to meet its
expected contribution to collective defense would weaken NATO’s security
commitments. Thus, despite domestic opposition, he instituted conscription as a way to
increase NATO’s commitment to Germany security.106
The promise of NATO membership and support has continued to shape states’
military organization practices, even though the alliance may not exert direct pressure on
them to change their recruitment practices. Force modernization requirements for NATO
membership often require expensive reforms that could be difficult for new states to
meet, especially for former Warsaw Pact states. For most of these states, acquiring
capital-intensive technologies and undertaking the necessary organizational reforms
while simultaneously maintaining force levels through higher-paid volunteers was
prohibitively expensive. Faced with this tradeoff, states like the Czech Republic chose to
focus its efforts on NATO accession. The government’s Concept for the Development of
the Army, approved in June 1993, determined that Czech security would be best served
with a smaller, more professional force that could better integrate with NATO. However,
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the early 1990s saw smaller enlistments that expected, which “reduced the armed forces’
combat readiness, damaged the moral of the military and added to the difficulties
involved in military planning and management.”107 Thus, reorganizing and retraining
around a new force structure would create an undermanned, underprepared force that was
unable to meet the goal of territorial defense. The demands of force modernization
presented by the anticipation of allied military preferences constrained the Czech
Republic’s ability to adopt its own recruitment preferences for more than a decade after
its independence.
B. When is there Foreign Influence in Military Design?
The many forms foreign intervention in military design can take makes it difficult
to predict exactly when such hierarchical relationships will occur. The amount of effort
that is needed to exert effective influence or control over military design may differ from
state to state based on the available resources of the patron, the perceived domestic and
international costs, the severity of opposition and associated risk within the potential
client state, and the degree of the advantage to be gained. This cost-benefit analysis can
lead the foreign power to intervene in military design even when the advantage to be
gained appears to be relatively low. Similarly, the form that foreign influence takes does
not determine its likelihood of success. While some of these avenues of influence may
inherently create more opportunity for the diffusion of military practices than others, the
receptivity of the client state to change must also be considered.108 When the power
imbalance between patron and client is large, or when their interests are well-aligned, it is
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possible to effect military change while expending few resources. How this relationship
between patron interest and client receptivity plays out in terms of the patron’s
investment in tools of influence can be seen below, in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2 Patterns of Patronage Investment

Not Receptive to Influence
Receptive to Influence

Not Strategically Important
No Foreign Patronage or very
Low Investment for Low
Influence
Low Foreign Patron
Investment for Low Influence

Strategically Important
Large Foreign Patron
Investment for Medium or
High Influence
Low Foreign Patron
Investment for Medium or
High Influence

My argument does not attempt to explain why foreign powers intervene in some
states’ military policies and not others, nor does it seek to predict their method of
intervention. Is it possible, therefore, that weak states actually tend to seek military
patrons who use recruitment policies that they already plan to implement? This is
unlikely, because military assistance is only one part of a larger relationship defined by
dependency in a number of policy fields. Geopolitics, economics, and ideology are just as
likely to shape the development of hierarchy as purely military concerns. Thus,
recruitment practices alone should not determine how these relationships develop. It is
even less likely that weaker states should be able to pick their patrons; great powers and
former colonizers are in a better position to control the development of hierarchical
relations with weak states. While new states may have a say in who influences them, it is
still up to the potential patron to reciprocate that interest. More importantly, goals of
emulation may not succeed without actual influence from a patron state. Thus the role of
foreign influence from the patron remains an important element in explaining military
recruitment practices.
Furthermore, outside powers and the states they are assisting often have different
55

preferences for what the military should be designed to do. As a result, even if weaker
states have a good deal of freedom in choosing their patron, there is no guarantee that the
recruitment policy that develops would be the one they hoped to achieve. While elites in
new states may have prior preferences about how to recruit, these are often overturned on
the advice or edict of a foreign power. In both Saudi Arabia and Jordan, for example,
local rulers believed conscription would be an effective way to address their internal and
external security threats.109 The influence of British military advisers, however,
convinced them otherwise, or at least prevented them from implementing conscription.
American policy in South Korea after World War II also downplayed the threat of
invasion from the North and prioritized internal threats to the government’s stability.110
Consequently, South Korea’s armed forces—tellingly named the Constabulary Force—
was designed more as a police force than as a military capable of territorial defense. The
potential for divergent threat perceptions between patron and client states underscores the
importance of identifying who controls military policy in a given case.
Similarly, the number of states that have the potential to influence military policy
in new states is also fairly limited. The ability to affect another state’s military policy
requires substantial power projection. Patron states must not only have important
strategic interests that extend beyond their borders, but also the resources to incentivize
compliance from their clients. As a result, the states that can exert influence in the design
of other states’ militaries are generally limited to great powers, former colonial powers,
and, less frequently, rising regional powers.
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III. Patronage, Threat Perception, and Military Recruitment
The examples above suggest that it is necessary to examine the effects that
foreign powers have when they intervene in weaker states’ domestic affairs to influence
military design. In fact, foreign influence in weaker states’ military policies are
common—more than 70 percent of the 205 post-1918 cases I analyze exhibit some sign
of foreign influence in military affairs in the first few years after their independence. This
indicates that the majority of the variation in recruitment policies can be explained
through the processes described by Path 1 in Table 2.1.
I argue that threat perception is the most important variable differentiating how
domestic policymakers states view whether conscription will be advantageous. However,
I make no prior assumptions about the types of threat that any given actor will prioritize.
Rather, I follow other recent scholarship in assuming that whoever is making military
policy—whether the new state itself or its patron—will make recruitment decisions based
on the greatest threat they perceive at that time.111 The most important distinction
between threat types for recruitment decisions is whether the state’s primary threat is
major territorial warfare, most likely arising from invasion from outside its borders. Such
existential threats require particularly high levels of military preparation, while nearly
any other threat—external or domestic—can be addressed in a number of ways. Thus,
major territorial threats constrain recruitment choices so that states without patrons feel
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they must use conscription to guarantee their security. I define such major territorial
threats as a high external threat environment.
A. Path 1: Foreign Military Design
Regardless of threat environment, foreign influence is likely to lead to emulation,
the imitation or replication of another actor’s—in this case, the patron’s--practices. As
described earlier in the chapter, the presence of foreign support allows the
implementation of military design goals in a more stable, secure environment. There are
several reasons why a foreign power might prefer to implement its own recruitment
system in its client state. One argument follows a cultural logic. Outsiders providing
military assistance are more likely to recommend practices that they know best because
they view these as better based on a logic of appropriateness—effectiveness is a
secondary concern. Alternatively, the patron state may care about effectiveness, and
attempt to enact its own recruitment system for bureaucratic reasons. This logic implies
that the technicians and policymakers who are actually engaged in military design know
that their expertise is limited to the recruitment system with which they are most familiar.
They know that the new state’s army will be most effective in the long run if they design
a system based on the patron’s policies. Similarly, they may believe that armies based on
similar recruitment systems are better able to work together, also strengthening the
patron-client ties in the long run.
Furthermore, many case studies have demonstrated that emulation through
security assistance does happen. Latin American countries attempting to enhance their
war-fighting capabilities in the late 1800s and early 1900s ended up with an array of new
military policies that largely reflected the beliefs of the French and Prussian advisors they
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hired, including on conscription.112 During the same period, David Ralston shows how
non-Western armies sought the advice of dominant European powers to learn how to
implement effective military reforms. More recently, Theo Farrell argues that
professional military ties between states may lead to military emulation through the
diffusion of cultural norms. Thus ties to the UK and United States influenced Irish
notions about what an army should look like.113
However, emulation can also derive from a more coercive relationship. In weaker
cases of hierarchy the client may adopt recruitment practices because of its exposure to
experts from the patron state, as described above. Thus, the greater the professional or
political connections between patron and client, the more likely emulation will happen.
When the patron has higher levels of authority over the client, though, the patron may
actually enforce its preferred recruitment policy regardless of the wishes of the client
state—especially if the two actors disagree. This is still likely to result in the adoption of
the patron’s system, for the reasons described above.
This pathway suggests three testable hypotheses. The first two hypotheses state
that the method of military recruitment in new states should be the same as in their patron
state. In other words:
H1: New states influenced by conscript-patrons should be more likely to
recruit conscripts than volunteers.
H2: New states influenced by volunteer-patrons should be more likely to
recruit volunteers than conscripts.
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The third hypothesis emphasizes the extent to which having a patron should lead
to emulation despite other pressures. When states have patrons, incentives to
emulate should overpower other factors, such as threat. In other words:
H3: Threat environment should have a greater effect on states without a
foreign patron than on states that have either a volunteer-patron or a
conscript-patron.
B. Path 2: Domestic Military Design with Low External Threats
When no foreign power intervenes in military design, domestic policymakers can
make recruitment decisions based on their own threat perceptions. The second pathway
describes how recruitment policy is made in the absence of either a foreign patron or
major external threats. When there are major external threats, states face constraints in
terms of the different types of uses to which they can put their military; they must design
the military to protect their sovereignty. However, when these threats do not exist,
alternative military purposes are possible. This means domestic policymakers have fewer
constraints in how they design their military. There are many other states they could
potentially use as a model, and leaders’ beliefs about what is effective or appropriate may
be decisive. Because these conditions give new states significantly more freedom in
designing their militaries, it is more difficult to predict what recruitment system they will
use.
In the absence of a major external threat or foreign patron, specific domestic
circumstances within each state that can affect recruitment practices will not be
overpowered by external circumstances. Thus, when states or regimes perceive that the
primary threat to their rule does not come from major external territorial threats, it is less
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clear whether conscription or volunteers are more effective. Historical experience and
domestic ideologies can shape domestic beliefs about the effectiveness or appropriateness
of military practices.114 Jeremy Black extends this argument to recruitment specifically,
noting that recruitment systems reflect different strategies for or cultures of establishing
security more than any operational function.115 Elizabeth Kier’s book on French and
British military doctrine, for example, demonstrates the difficulty of predicting cultural
responses to recruitment systems in different states: historical experiences led the Left
and Right in the United Kingdom to develop a cultural mistrust of arming the people at
large, while the French Left feared a long-term service, professional standing army and
viewed “the people in arms” as a safeguard against tyranny.116 Depending on historical
experiences, ideological biases, and cultural preferences, then, leaders will develop
different beliefs about whether volunteers or conscripts will better protect them against
low-level external threats or internal threats.
Notably, Kier argues that the perception that the military’s relationship to society
was the most pressing threat that shaped recruitment practices in the interwar period in
each of these countries. Unlike massive external threats that require conscription, the
internal threats that a state would focus on in lower threat environments do not suggest
clear recruitment logics to maximize security. On the one hand, literature on ethnic
politics and coup-proofing in authoritarian regimes would lead us to believe that elites
who view the greatest threat as coming from within the state should be reluctant to arm
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large portions of the population because their loyalty to the regime is dubious.117 Leaders
may therefore prefer to eschew conscription and stack the military with loyalists, relying
on violent repression to stay in power. Conversely, leaders can try to address any of these
threats by preempting them: they can use the military as a “school for the nation” in an
attempt to create broad-based support for the regime.118 Which they choose depends on
how conceptions of security and national identity are constructed in different societies or
by individual leaders.119 Thus, without external guidance or an major external threat,
manpower preferences may be fundamentally unpredictable: they are “contingent on the
particulars of the case and on the creativity of that leadership as it seeks to navigate
between contending images of the nation.”120 While it may be possible to predict how
different domestic ideologies and circumstances affect recruitment—discussed more
below—which domestic factors a new state’s leadership will adopt or respond to may be
more difficult to predict.
This pathway does not suggest hypotheses about what should predict military
recruitment in the absence of either threat or patrons. Rather, it argues that recruitment
becomes difficult to predict in these circumstances, and is subject to the idiosyncrasies of
a state’s particular domestic politics, history, and leaders’ preferences. Given the
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frequency with which the data indicate that foreign patrons control military policy in new
states, relatively few cases are likely to exhibit such unpredictable and contingent
recruitment practices.121 Indeed, the next chapter shows that foreign influence, and in its
absence, threat perception, explain observable variation in military recruitment.
C. Path 3: Domestic Military Design with High External Threats
In the final pathway, however, the threat of major territorial conflict creates
constraints on domestic military designers. In these circumstances, new states implement
conscription as the recruitment system that is most likely to allow them to maintain an
effective defense in what has the potential to be a lengthy struggle with a powerful
adversary. The absence of a military patron would only exacerbate the challenges that
weak and developing new states must face when mounting a defense against an
existential challenge. Thus, states conceptualize their threat environment in one of two
ways: if there are clear threats to the state’s territorial integrity or the regime’s control
over significant national territory, states perceive a need to engage in territorial defense.
Otherwise, they are free to design the military to engage in other types of missions—for
example, expeditionary or peacekeeping missions abroad, or population control
domestically—that enable them to adopt a freer hand in designing their recruitment
policies.
There are two reasons why major external, territorial threats are likely to lead to
conscription. First, despite advances in the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of capitalintensive technologies, manpower-intensive strategies remain necessary for territorial
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defense. Warfare today is still predicated on successful use of what Stephen Biddle has
termed the modern system, the “combination of cover and concealment that can allow
defenders, though battered, to survive modern firepower in sufficient numbers to mount
serious resistance.”122 While Biddle’s modern system requires well-trained recruits,
which may be lacking under conscription, his emphasis on modern warfare’s continued
focus on holding and defending territory in the face of invasion still requires sufficient
manpower. Conscription provides a greater guarantee of security against major territorialbased threats than volunteers, who may not be forthcoming in sufficient numbers in a
sudden crisis or prolonged conflict. In other words, given the nature of modern warfare,
new states may prefer to ensure they have enough soldiers to than to ensure that they are
highly trained. This is particularly true in new states, which may lack the resources to
effectively train soldiers in the use of the modern system, as described below. Thus states
are likely to perceive conscription as the only way they will have sufficient active and
reserve forces to defend or deter aggression, at least in the face of existential conflict in
which they will likely suffer heavy casualties and need many replacements. Even if they
believe volunteers make better soldiers, conscription allows them to hedge their bets for a
longer, potentially existential struggle.
The second reason reinforces the necessity of relying on manpower intensive
strategies to defend against invasion. Contrary to existing arguments that describe
conscription as more difficult and requiring greater state capacity to implement, I argue
that it is actually volunteer armies that require higher levels of state capacity—at least if
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they are to be effective.123 It is particularly difficult for new states to create highly
effective volunteer armies. New states are less likely to have the resources to attract
recruits in sufficient numbers or the technical capacity and ability to train volunteers
proficiently in capital-intensive technologies and modern military techniques.124 They are
also less likely to be able to acquire such technologies in sufficient numbers as to be able
to make a difference on the battlefield. This magnifies the perception that new or weak
states will need to rely on large numbers of troops to mount an effective defense.
Recent events seem to support the notion that states perceive conscription as a
safer recruitment option when they are faced with potentially major external conflict. For
the first time since their independence in 1971, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar have
introduced compulsory military service.125 Though other motivating factors are also
possible, many officials in these countries seem to fear an increasing threat from Iran.
This is reflected in the emphasis in each country’s conscription legislation on protecting
“the homeland and its borders.”126 Similarly, Sweden recently reinstituted conscription
only seven years after abolishing it, citing “a deteriorating security environment” in
Europe.127 Sweden’s defense minister explicitly compared the country’s defense
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readiness under both systems: “The all-volunteer recruitment hasn’t provided the armed
forces with enough personnel. The reactivating of conscription is needed for military
readiness.”128 These examples suggest that the perception that there may be a major
challenge to a state’s territorial integrity can lead states to adopt conscription despite
domestic cultural pressures toward volunteerism.
Furthermore, the above examples are states whose governments have relatively
high capacity and access to resources. This means that, compared to most new states or
those transitioning after regime change, these states should be better able to address
threats using volunteers. That they nonetheless chose to switch to a conscript system
indicates the continued perceived advantages of conscription in high threat scenarios.
States facing high threats with low resources should be even more likely to use
conscription, particularly if they control little territory and therefore have a smaller
population from which to recruit. This pathway can be summarized by the following
hypothesis:
H4: New states without a foreign patron should be more likely to recruit
conscripts than to recruit volunteers if they face a dangerous (high external)
threat environment than if they face a permissive (low external) threat
environment.
Before the statistical tests of these hypotheses, however, the remainder of this
chapter demonstrates why existing theories do not provide satisfactory explanations for
military recruitment decisions.
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IV. Alternative Explanations
Theories based in both domestic politics and military effectiveness offer
alternative explanations for when states will adopt specific military recruitment policies. I
address each of these in turn, below.
A. Domestic Politics
Arguments based in domestic politics suggest that states may have preferences for
specific recruitment policies because they fit with domestic institutions rather than due to
any functional logic. In other words, recruitment policies should reflect the way
policymakers think about the role of the military in society. For example, countries with
governments that are rooted in republican notions of citizenship adopt conscript
militaries, while those that support more liberal ideologies use volunteers.129 The
republican ethos conceptualizes military service as a requirement of citizenship; the
liberal ideals of individual rights, meanwhile, should decrease the state’s willingness and
ability to use conscription, a form of property taking.
This is also consistent with the notion that states intentionally use recruitment to
reinforce domestic values. Recruitment policies that are inconsistent with domestic
values could undermine support for the regime, the military, or both. Because military
service makes such extreme demands on individuals, policymakers tend to be particularly
concerned with whether the policies that determine who serves are fair. Thus, states often
find it convenient to adopt military recruitment policies that reflect broader norms or
ideologies, which legitimate the existing government and political system.
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How do domestic preferences for recruitment practices arise? Many scholars have
argued that colonial experiences endow states with different conceptions of citizenship or
norms of appropriateness, particularly in relation to the proper role of the military in
society. In particular, scholars have found that distinctive British colonial practices have
important consequences for political development compared to the practices of other
colonizers.130 This is also true for military practices, including the development of
volunteer military recruitment. One way this could be the case is if colonial histories
affect the ideology on which national identity and citizenship are founded. Asal et al.
argue that a uniquely English tradition of individual liberties explains the general absence
of conscription in former British colonies, while Yael Hadass finds that states with
British legal systems are also more likely to use volunteers.131 Thus, the causal arrow
runs from colonization, to domestic culture or institutions, to recruitment.
The colonial legacy argument differs from my argument in several ways. First, as
is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, patrons and colonizers are not always the same.
Because independence or major regime change is a critical juncture, new actors can
become patrons, even if they have no prior relationship with the client state. More
specifically, though, the colonial legacy argument highlights the role of things that
happened before independence. The colonial legacy argument maintains that what the
colonizer did yesterday matters for military design today; my argument is that what the
patron does today matters for military design today. Thus, independence and major
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regime change is less of a critical juncture for the colonial legacy argument, as historical
practices continue to influence contemporary policies.
There are compelling reasons not to expect colonial legacies to transfer norms of
military behavior to former colonies, though. New states and transitions often emerge
through violent social upheavals or war, which create incentives for dissociation from the
prior power.132 Even when the transfer of power is peaceful, the diffusion of political
culture or institutions is often weak. While they may have adopted elements of the British
legal system or culture, it hardly seems the case that governments of the Persian Gulf
monarchies, Rhodesia, or Nyerere’s Tanzania were deeply concerned with individual
liberties, as these arguments about colonial emulation maintain. Similarly, there is little
evidence to suggest that the British themselves considered conscription to be innately
inappropriate in their colonies. Europeans living in colonies were conscripted to the
British army during the period of National Service in the early 1950s.133 The British also
supported conscription for both labor use and the army in Egypt, even after the end of the
First World War.134 Colonial correspondence shows that the British took a pragmatic
approach to military recruitment in Malaya, Singapore, and Cyprus, often considering
conscription and enforcing national registration even when compulsion was deemed
ultimately not necessary.135 Even when the outcome is still a recruitment system that is
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consistent with the prior ruler’s domestic values, this is often only achieved after highly
contentious debates both within the new state and between the new state and its former
colonizer. The critical juncture created at independence or major regime change limits
any continued effect of colonial institutions and culture. However, where colonial
patterns of hierarchy remain due to the continued reliance on security assistance from
former colonizers, emulation still occurs.
Existing colonial legacy theories often fail to specify the mechanism through
which British domestic preferences would be diffused to its colonies. Indeed, Cohn and
Toronto argue that “more work needs to be done on why British origin affects military
manpower choices; more detailed case studies and process tracing are required to unpack
exactly how the British origin effect came about.”136 My argument provides such an
explanation by pointing to the overlap between colonial and post-colonial foreign
influence. Colonial legacies may matter, but they are most likely to matter by providing a
basis for post-independence foreign influence. This could explain important differences
across countries in the implementation of colonial preferences. Rates of emulation of
colonial practices vary across colonizers, while not all states colonized by the same
power adopted the same recruitment system (Table 2.3).137 States including Cyprus,
Israel, and Singapore were governed by the United Kingdom prior to their independence
but did not adopt traditional British recruitment policies, while states with a French
colonial legacy were nearly as likely to select volunteer systems over the more typicallyFrench conscription. Indeed, scholars have found that the British and French took
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different approaches in their strategies of military assistance in their former colonies.138
Thus, the lack of volunteerism in states colonized by the United Kingdom could be due to
lower levels of British involvement as a patron after independence. Similarly, Eisenstadt
and Pollack show that Soviet military influence overpowered colonial legacies of military
culture in some Arab countries but not others.139 This suggests that these differing rates
of emulation could be due to the different post-colonial strategies for maintaining
hierarchy that colonizers adopted in specific colonies.
Table 2.3 Colonial Legacy and Recruitment Emulation

French Colonial Legacy
French Independence
British Colonial Legacy
British Independence
Russian Colonial Legacy
Russian Independence

Volunteer Army
N (%)
15 (46.9%)
9 (39.1%)
43 (78.2%)
39 (79.6%)
3 (16.7%)
4 (20.0%)

Conscript Army
N (%)
17 (53.1)
14 (60.9%)
12 (21.8%)
10 (20.4%)
15 (83.3%)
16 (80.0%)

Total
N (%)
32 (100%)
23 (100%)
55 (100%)
49 (100%)
18 (100%)
20 (100%)

Legitimating ideologies and domestic preferences do not necessarily derive from
colonial practices. However, other arguments about how domestic institutions affect
military recruitment are often indeterminate or contradictory. For example, at the most
general level, some scholars have expected there to be a relationship between democracy
and conscription. However, the exact direction of this relationship, if any, is disputed.
Conscription may reflect democratic notions of equal citizenship or it may conflict with
democratic notions of individual rights, as described above.140 We may also expect
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authoritarian regimes to be more likely to suppress individual rights in a way that allows
them to use conscription more easily, though they equally could be hesitant to arm the
public.
Another way that democracy or regime type can affect recruitment system is by
giving voice or creating accountability to the public. The average citizen prefers to pay
for a volunteer force than to risk being conscripted.141 Thus, regimes that are more
responsive to the population should be more likely to use volunteers. However, domestic
ideology can also generate mass support for the use of conscription. Lee and Parker show
that, throughout the 1960s, more than 50 percent of public opinion supported the
continuation of the draft in the United States, while less than 40 percent was opposed.142
This was true despite the fact that more than 40 percent thought the draft was unfair.
Most tellingly, in March 1969, the same month that President Nixon created a
Commission on the Volunteer Force, only 38 percent of respondents to a Gallup poll
wanted the U.S. military to be based solely on volunteers. Thus, it is not clear whether
institutions that support public accountability should lead states to adopt conscription or
not. Indeed, Lee and Parker conclude that the President led public opinion on the draft.143
In addition, some scholars argue that revolutionary ideology, particularly that
espoused by Marxism, requires universal conscription: Marxist ideology makes it clear
that “as long as there are evil capitalists to fight, socialists are duty-bound to arm
themselves, and they are expected to use military force to advance the cause of socialism
whenever they can.” Similarly, militaristic ideologies can also support conscription. Chris
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Payne argues that “Regimes that place a high value on the military believe it is proper to
compel long periods of military service,” while voluntary systems are more common “in
countries where the military is given less importance.”144 Victor Asal et al. find mixed
support linking conscription to militarization, despite evidence that states using
conscription may be more likely to initiate the use of force.145 However, it is difficult to
disentangle whether militarism leads to conscription, or conscription makes states more
militaristic. Furthermore, militarism can also manifest itself in the establishment of an
exclusive military class, as in pre-Meiji Japan.146 While these examples indicate
policymakers seem to believe that recruitment systems must reinforce domestic social
systems, exactly how they do this differs from state to state.
These explanations run into problems by assuming that the general population
extends its normative preferences about the state to its beliefs about military service, or
that the government is responsive to popular culture and preferences. Often, domestic
ideology is thrown out the window to pursue more pressing or functional goals. Despite
the revolutionary and egalitarian rhetoric of Soviet communists, Trotsky’s initial
preference for the defense establishment was to rely solely on highly-motivated urban
militiamen, in part because mass conscription was associated with the old regime.147
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Similarly, some advocates of the effect of institutions and ideology on recruitment argue
that “new forces of revolutionary regimes [are] not formed from colonial forces.”148
However, a desire to have experienced security forces frequently trumps such ideological
goals, and revolutionary leaders find themselves needing to rely on ancien regime forces.
This happened after successful rebellions in cases as diverse as the Russian Revolution,
Irish Independence, and the post-World War II German rearmament.149
This does not imply that pre-independence legacies determine military
recruitment. On the contrary, the point is that policymakers are not constrained by
domestic institutions, and may ignore revolutionary sentiments and popular ideologies
favoring the establishment of new military practices when they see fit. In fact, states often
impose conscription on an unwilling and resisting population. In her classic study,
Margaret Levi argued that perceptions of fairness determined the extent of popular
opposition and noncompliance with wartime drafts.150 Yet even in cases where the draft
was viewed as extremely unfair—or, inconsistent with cultural perceptions of the
legitimate demands the state could make on citizens—it was still enforced. Similarly,
George Flynn argues that there is a division between Anglo-Saxon and French
conceptions of military service, but that “despite fundamental differences in culture,” the
United States, United Kingdom, and France all used conscription in the twentieth
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century.”151 For Flynn, as for Levi, national cultures may affect the ease with which a
recruitment system can be implemented, but cannot override the preferences of a
determined elite.
Indeed, there are often competing cultures within a country, or even within a
policymaking elite. Elizabeth Kier’s book on French and British military doctrine, for
example, highlights the existence of competing ideas about military recruitment,
particularly in France, where the Left and Right had different views on how conscription
would contribute to national security.152 Her argument demonstrates the difficulty of
predicting cultural responses to recruitment systems in different states. Anna Leander
similarly argues that culture is malleable, and that the use of conscription depends on the
ability to frame legitimizing ideologies about the rights and obligations of citizenship.153
Such cultural factors may determine the legitimacy of the demands the state can make on
the population, as well as what is viewed as a legitimate and necessary mobilization
strategy for war. This makes them good at explaining continuity in recruitment practices
despite new threat environments because culture and institutions are difficult to change.
However, changes in recruitment system can be a problem for these explanations: it is
difficult to imagine that French notions of egalitarianism were strong in 1995 and had
disappeared in 1997, as would be necessary to believe that recruitment systems are tied to
domestic ideology. My theory avoids these problems emphasizing the way national
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culture affects the perceptions and interests of the actors who actually make policy at a
given place and time.
Finally, states may also use the military to achieve domestic goals besides
ideological consistency—most notably, full or high employment. In this way,
conscription can enhance domestic security through non-military means by acting as a
form of patronage: it can tie a larger portion of the population to the regime by treating
the army as a source of employment, by providing people who complete their term of
service with certain societal advantages, and by providing cheap labor and other rents to
staff officers.154 By relying on cheap labor through conscription, especially coupled with
a smaller military force, the state may also be able to spend more money buying support
from the population (through additional social welfare, economic development projects)
or the military (through capital-intensive weapons acquisition, which increases military
prestige). In Norway, for example, conscription supports the welfare state: it could
increase employment by demanding new military bases “in areas that needed the
employment offered by auxiliary services” and offering careers for diverse segments of
the population.155 In these cases, the regime is primarily electing for a security strategy
that would minimize the likelihood of popular dissent and that may not require the
military to be able to perform well in combat roles. However, this also makes sense from
a rational choice perspective: the cost of repressing the population and quelling uprisings
increases with the size of the opposition expected to revolt.
If states sometimes appear to use conscription to address chronic unemployment,
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how do domestic labor movements affect this relationship? One study argues that states
with strong labor movements are more likely to use conscription. Unions, according to
this theory, should advocate for conscription because it takes more people out of the labor
force, thereby reducing labor competition for current union members.156 While consistent
with expectations about how states use recruitment policies to meet employment goals,
there are even stronger reasons to believe unions should oppose conscription. Most
significantly, the average worker wants to avoid being drafted. This is not merely because
of the personal risk it entails in times of war. Even during peacetime, uncertainty over the
timing of a draft notice inhibits long-term career and family planning, and disrupts
employment when it does come. Thus, policies pertaining to length of service, age of
call-up, and exemptions typically aim to make conscription as tolerable as possible to the
groups most likely to be affected by it: students and young people who are entering the
workforce and starting families.157 In fact, labor support is usually problematic for
democratic governments seeking to implement conscription, even during major
conflict.158
While there are diverse arguments about what aspects of cultural and
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organizational practices matter, in what ways, and where they come from, they make
little room for foreign actors to affect military recruitment after independence. Thus these
theories ignore not only the actors that make important recruitment decisions, but also the
process by which those decisions are made.
B. Military Effectiveness and Recruitment
Military effectiveness arguments assume that states will adopt the recruitment
practice that is most effective given specific military goals. What is the optimal method
of recruitment for enhancing a state’s military capabilities? The problem is that there is
no immediately obvious prescription for states to follow. Volunteer militaries tend to
incur fewer casualties, but this may be due less to any inherent advantage in using
volunteers and more to the greater care and efficiency with which states deploy them as a
costly resource—characteristics that states using conscript armies could theoretically
adopt as well, regardless of cost.159 However, there are good reasons to believe volunteers
are also more effective on the battlefield. For one, they tend to be better trained and have
higher levels of expertise, due in large part to their ability to serve for longer periods of
time.160 They also have higher morale because recruits all serve by choice. This in turn
gives them an advantage when it comes to unit cohesion, which many scholars have
argued is among the most important components of military effectiveness.161 Conscript
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armies are more likely to have lower levels of cohesion, or at least face greater obstacles
to achieving cohesion, due to the fact that recruits often have little in common beyond
low morale and a shared desire to be doing something else.162 Thus, the evidence
suggests that volunteer armies may be more combat-effective.
On the other hand, many people argue that labor-intensive military strategies—
which provide cheaper manpower through conscription—make just as much sense for
states facing high levels of external threat. The anticipation of major conflict may lead
states to build conscript armies that provide a steady supply of replacements over larger
fronts and for longer periods of time. In other words, while volunteer armies may be the
more effective choice based on individual or even unit-level performance, states may
prefer to respond to the functional imperative by adopting a strategy of attrition, for
which conscription may provide a safer, long-term recruitment basis and a deeper
defense. The view that conscription increases the chances of state survival is well
represented in the existing literature.163 Scholars have argued that involvement in
interstate wars or rivalries, or the perception of potential threats based on geographical
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conditions, like the number of states on its borders and the favorability of terrain for
defense or isolation, may lead states to use conscription.
These diverse arguments about volunteer and conscript effectiveness have led
many scholars to argue that there is no natural advantage to using one or the other.
Lindsay Cohn, for example, has shown that volunteer armies in Europe exhibit wide
variation in their levels of effectiveness according to the specific personnel policies
countries use, which are in turn determined by the domestic economy and labor
markets.164 Similarly, states can rely on conscripts and volunteers in different numbers
and for different missions, which would indicate that “there are no technical or economic
imperatives” that would require states to use exclusively one system or the other to be
effective.165 This can even take the extreme form of dual military establishments, often
combining a national conscript service for territorial defense with an ideological militia
for regime protection.166 As a result, states often come to different conclusions regarding
what recruitment strategies are best, even when they face the same functional
imperatives.
Even if there is an advantage to using volunteer or conscripts, policymakers may
not agree on what that advantage is. Thus, leaders of states in similar threat environments
may adopt different recruitment practices because they believe their decisions will create
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the most effective military. As Alastair Iain Johnston has convincingly demonstrated, the
subjective perceptions of policymakers, particularly across distinct historical and cultural
contexts, lead to differences in strategic evaluations.167 Jeremy Black extends this
argument to recruitment specifically, noting that recruitment systems reflect different
strategies for or cultures of establishing security more than any operational function.168
This is consistent with the argument in this dissertation, which suggests that the
preferences and expectations of influential patron states affect military design. Except in
the face of existential threats, the pursuit of military effectiveness may lead states to
adopt either volunteer or conscript systems.
It may be the case that different national-level characteristics determine an
individual state’s optimal recruitment strategy. This view is not well-developed in crossnational research, but is prevalent in many case study accounts of military design. To an
extent, it is a logical extension and modification of arguments that describe how
technology affects warfighting practices: if volunteer militaries are better adapted to
using capital-intensive technologies and strategies, then it makes sense that states seeking
to maximize their military effectiveness will use conscription if they lack access to or the
ability to take advantage of existing technology. Developments including the rise of
expeditionary and coalition-based military operations, occupational trends in military
organization, and decreased public support for military spending may lead to
convergence on smaller, volunteer forces.169 Using volunteers without the necessary
capital-intensive resources would be inefficient and less effective.
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Factor endowments are one way to understand how technology affects the
efficiency of military design in response to the functional imperative. Alexander Wendt
and Michael Barnett note that capital-intensive military organization in the most
industrialized countries of the West “makes sense from the standpoint of factor
endowments,” but nonetheless poses many challenges and is “almost impossible for the
capital-poor states of the Third World.”170 Thus, the fact that new, under-developed states
pursue inefficient, capital-intensive military practices poses a puzzle. They argue that this
is due in part to the fact that the international environment in which they exist is less
competitive, dampening or changing the focus of military design to internal security.
Other ways to explain the technological role in the functional imperative are
based in specific aspects of social and economic development. For example, scholars
have argued that conscription requires larger populations and higher levels of education,
or greater gender imbalances.171 Others focus on a more general administrative capacity
as a necessity for conscription. Sometimes, this refers to the coercive aspects of
conscription, underscoring the extent to which it requires the state to have greater levels
of centralization and a well-developed bureaucracy. Mulligan and Shliefer identify
several ways in which conscription has higher fixed costs than volunteer systems such as
by requiring: “deriving algorithms for enumerating the population subject to the draft,
setting up and staffing offices throughout the country to administer the draft, verifying
qualifications for exemptions, including medical ones, establishing institutions
specializing in catching draft dodgers, and policing the system itself to assure fairness
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and avoid corruption.”172 Similarly, Hillel Soifer argues that systematic and legalized
conscription emerged among Latin American states that employed more effective
bureaucratic policies. Without this greater coercive capacity, colonial officials were
unable to implement conscription successfully.173 For others, state capacity provides
necessary political stability. Amos Perlmutter writes that “public authority must be stable
in order to pursue consistent educational policies and to keep alive the popular will to
participate in state-sponsored activities, including the military.”174 Legitimacy is
commonly cited as the most important component of capacity and stability.175 Without
legitimacy, states have too much reason to fear opposition and rebellion in response to
conscription: any efforts to institute conscription would by necessity be short-lived. It
provides a valuable resources states need for coercing their citizens into military service.
However, these supply-side explanations of when states use conscription are
insufficient. Their major shortcoming is their failure to consider demand-side
considerations. They assume that states that can implement conscription will want to do
so, without addressing the purpose of conscription. They also imply that states are more
likely to conscript when they have the resources to do it successfully. However, there are
many examples, particularly outside of Europe, where state-building rulers instituted
conscription despite their weak legitimacy, underdeveloped economies, and unqualified
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native officers.176 It is difficult to imagine a more challenging environment in which to
implement conscription than Afghanistan in the 1880s or Iraq in the 1930s, yet the
governments in each of these states tried to nonetheless. In many cases, universal
conscription was actually viewed as the remedy for low literacy and poor development;
the army was to be a school for the nation in both ideology and basic education. Such
attempts vary in their success, but they nearly universally experience initial extensive
opposition, often resulting in high levels of desertion or even rebellion.177 While
economic development likely facilitated the ease with which rulers could enforce
conscription, there is no evidence to suggest that states only implement conscription
where they consider it feasible. In short, we should not expect that states will adopt the
most efficient military design, any more than we would expect them to adopt other
institutions based on optimal efficiency.178

V. Conclusion
To sum up, existing literature has expected recruitment policies to be determined
primarily by domestic factors. One school of thought argues that domestic politics and
ideology exert the greatest impact on recruitment, while another maintains that how states
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view their recruitment system will allow them to face certain threats. I argue that both
sets of explanations overlook the path-dependent process by which new states design
their militaries. As a result, they omit the important role that foreign patrons often play in
influencing military design in new states. Thus, I make two arguments. First, I argue that
when new states have a foreign patron they will emulate its recruitment practices.
Second, I argue threat matters when there is no patron, because policymakers continue to
believe that conscription is the best way to secure their territory when they face large
threats and have no external patron. This demonstrates that hierarchical relationships
between states play out in the realm of military policy, despite the fact that this has
traditionally been viewed as a bastion of national autonomy.
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CHAPTER 3: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
This chapter uses original cross-sectional data to test the hypotheses about
military recruitment preferences that I generated in the previous chapter: specifically, that
the presence of foreign military intervention and threat environments predict whether
states design militaries based on conscripts or volunteers. The quantitative analysis in this
chapter tests this theory by isolating cases in which states make military recruitment
decisions after their independence or other major changes in their domestic political
regimes—what I refer to for shorthand as new states. Formally, my hypotheses state that:
H1: New states influenced by conscript-patrons should be more likely to
recruit conscripts than volunteers.
H2: New states influenced by volunteer-patrons should be more likely to
recruit volunteers than conscripts.
H3: Threat environment should have a greater effect on states without a
foreign patron than on states that have either a volunteer-patron or a
conscript-patron.
H4: New states without a foreign patron should be more likely to recruit
conscripts than to recruit volunteers if they face a dangerous (high external)
threat environment than if they face a permissive (low external) threat
environment.
The results presented in this chapter demonstrate that, as predicted, the influence
of foreign actors after independence has an important effect on new state military design
that is exerted through pathways of professional emulation. First, the results show that
patron-state influence affects military design even when models account for a new state’s
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colonial legacy. States tend to emulate the practices of their patrons, especially when
their patron uses conscription. Second, this effect does not depend on the threat
environment; in other words, patron states support the adoption of their own practices
regardless of how threatening the international security environment is. Third, dangerous
external threat environments lead states to adopt conscription when they do not have a
patron.
In addition, the results demonstrate several more findings beyond those that I
hypothesized. First, despite changing technological and economic conditions that others
have suggested should have a determinative effect on recruitment practices, the findings
in this chapter show that the causes of recruitment do not statistically vary in the period
under examination. Second, both internal and external threats affect military design under
certain conditions. Finally, while existing research has pointed to unique characteristics
of the British volunteer tradition as motivating states to adopt volunteer militaries, this
chapter finds little support for this effect.

I. Research Design
The unit of analysis in this chapter is universe of new states created since 1918.
New states are states that have recently undergone major changes in their domestic
political regimes; there is little or no continuity between new states and the political
entities that controlled their territory the previous year. The most obvious examples of
new states are those that, having recently been a colony, recently gained independence
and are entering the international system for the first time, or those that recently seceded
from another state.
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However, this is not the only situation in which states are likely to completely
redesign their political institutions. Thus, my universe of cases includes two additional
types of cases in which states’ domestic politics should have changed substantially
enough to demand and allow the redesign of military institutions. Such major changes in
domestic politics makes these types of cases comparable to new states that recently
gained independence for the purpose of testing my theory.179 First, I included cases of
social revolution based on Goodwin’s description of a social revolution as entailing “a
significant change in the control and organization of state power.”180 Second, civil war
termination can constitute an important period for the reorganization of security
institutions.181 Post-conflict reconstruction may include a formal process of security
sector reform, or bring new actors to power who want to use their own armies. Even if
neither of these is the case or the incumbent remains in power, internal conflict can create
incentives to restructure existing institutions and may lead to changes in military
practices. Thus, I also included cases of civil wars that ended in rebel victory or
negotiated settlement, since these forms of conflict termination are most likely to create
similar conditions to those that define my other observations. These are the most drastic
types of changes in domestic institutions and thus are most comparable to new states.
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Indeed, 8 out of 68 of the cases that were not cases that entered my dataset through their
membership in the ICOW dataset change their recruitment system within two years after
the year of the critical juncture. Since a critical juncture does not require that a state
changes its recruitment system, merely that the opportunity to do so is greatly increased,
the higher rate of change for these cases indicates that they are also likely to be a critical
juncture.
In total, the dataset includes 224 observations of new state creation since 1918.
The baseline criterion used to populate the dataset was the existence of an observation in
the Issues Correlates of War (ICOW) Colonial History dataset with an independence date
of 1918 or later. This constitutes 141 observations, which represent a state’s first entrance
into the international system. This dataset defines and dates independence according to
when a state gains de facto control of its own foreign policy.182 This definition better
captures the assumption that independence creates institutional freedom in military
design compared to the Correlates of War (COW) State Membership dataset, which
adopts a more formal definition based on international recognition and population size.
There are in fact few differences between these two datasets during the period
under examination. COW includes additional observations because it permits states to
enter and exit the system multiple times, in accordance with the loss of sovereignty due to
conquest or occupation. For example, France enters the COW dataset at the end of the
period of German occupation, in 1944, while the Baltic countries each appear twice in the
dataset, at their independence in 1918 and again after the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991. To supplement the 141 cases in the ICOW dataset, I added to the dataset 22 COW
182
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observations that were originally excluded from ICOW on the basis of being the reentry
of a prior state whose international system membership was interrupted.183 This adds new
states as diverse as post-liberation France in 1944, Morocco in 1956, and reunified
Germany in 1990. I also included Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) after the US-led
invasions as instances of state creation; although their institutions—including the
military—were built essentially from the ground up, they were not in the other datasets I
used to populate my own. Finally, there are 12 cases of Goodwin’s social revolution that
were not already in my dataset, as well as 47 cases from the COW Intra-State Wars
dataset that ended in rebel victory or negotiated settlements. Observations in the dataset
are distinguished by the name of the state and the year of its creation.
While in principle my argument should be able to explain recruitment decisions in
a given state at any point in time, I limited my empirical tests to new states starting in the
year 1918 for both practical and methodological reasons. My use of novel independent
variables made data collection a time-consuming enterprise. Acquiring reliable measures
for all country-years in the period I examine was not a feasible undertaking and will have
to wait to be completed in a future project. Concerns about data availability, reliability,
and comparability—especially for data on state capacity—also led me to use 1918 as the
cut-off point for my quantitative tests.
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In addition, there are methodological reasons to focus on the initial period of
military design rather than recruitment at any point in time for a given state. Even if data
were available for all country-years, recruitment systems create institutional
dependencies that make them difficult to change once they are well established. As a
result, the values for the dependent variable would be serially correlated, resulting in
severely suppressed standard errors. Other studies have nonetheless attempted to explain
recruitment choices in any country-year through time-series analysis by using various
strategies to address temporal dependence of their dependent variable values, including
lagged dependent variables, count variables to control for the consecutive years a state
has used the same recruitment system, time-period average values for the dependent
variable, extrapolating from or averaging across regression results from individual years,
or country-fixed effects.184 However, because my theory is primarily about how new
states make decisions, none of these alternative approaches is appropriate. Given the
extensive findings about recruitment’s path dependence, I am less interested in explaining
how states make decisions long after independence, which is more likely to be
determined by factors that enable military change more generally. My approach, while
reducing the number of observations, circumvents the problem of serial correlation by
examining the factors that lead states to adopt initial recruitment systems. Thus, my
empirical strategy identifies the conditions that lead states to start down certain self-
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reinforcing paths of military recruitment policies. It also permits me to test an argument
specific to new states, which make decisions in a distinct institutional context compared
to states with more developed institutions.

II. Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this chapter measures whether a new state developed a
military that used conscripts or volunteers. I updated and revised existing data on
conscription from Horowitz, Simpson, and Stam (2011) and Nathan Toronto’s Military
Recruitment Dataset.185 I followed their coding rules, which treats conscription as a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 when a state uses any form of a draft to recruit any
quantity of its military personnel and zero otherwise. I discuss the reasons for examining
conscription as a dichotomous variable in Chapter 1. To summarize, however, the
difference between conscription and volunteerism remains an important one that affects
other aspects of military design and other sociopolitical outcomes of interest.
My revisions relied on three types of source material whenever possible to verify
the coding of these datasets. First, I referenced some of the sources that these datasets
used for their coding to verify their accuracy. This included John Keegan’s World Armies
(1983), as well as documentation from War Resisters’ International (WRI), an
international non-profit organization that has periodically published information about
military recruitment policies, with a particular focus on conscientious objection
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policies.186 The WRI-published Conscription: A World Survey: Compulsory Military
Service and Resistance to It, by Devi Prasad and Tony Smythe (1968), as well as a more
recent survey of country conscription policies found on their website, are the two sources
that are most commonly referenced in the quantitative study of conscription.187 Second, I
referred to the U.S. Library of Congress’s Country Studies, whenever available. Finally, I
often resorted to additional secondary source case studies, especially when Toronto and
Horowitz et al.’s codings differed from each other.188
Because this chapter seeks to explain choices about military design, and it often
takes time to establish sufficient control to evaluate defense policies military needs, it is
important to make sure the dependent variable coding actually represents the recruitment
policies that a new state uses. Therefore, the coding allows for a grace period of two
years after the year of independence in which states could finalize their recruitment
system. There was insufficient data to code the value of the dependent variable in 19
cases, limiting the dataset to 205 observations.189
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This coding scheme minimizes the risk of mischaracterizing a country, for
example, as using volunteers when strategic or ideological realignment in the first year of
its independence led it to institute conscription the following year and it never changed its
recruitment policy after that.190 For example, West Germany is coded as using volunteers
in its first year of independence. However, policymakers enacted conscription in 1956,
the year after independence, and never changed its recruitment again. Characterizing
West Germany as a volunteer state because of its original recruitment choice would have
been highly misleading.
As can be seen in Table 3.1, new states’ choice of recruitment system after two
years is split almost exactly equally between conscription (105, or 51% of cases) and
volunteer (100, or 49% of cases) across all instances of state creation in my dataset. This
proportion is similar regardless of whether I allow no grace period for military
reorganization in new regimes (106 states chose volunteer versus 99 that chose conscript)
or a five-year grace period (100 chose volunteer versus 105 chose conscript). The same is
true among cases that meet different definitions of state creation, as can be seen in Table
3.2. Among those cases that that meet the ICOW definition for initial state independence,
55 percent (67 cases) adopted volunteer recruitment compared to 45 percent (55) that
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adopted conscription.191 This gap narrows even further to 50 percent each, or 72 out of
144 total, when COW’s states that reentered the system after membership interruptions
are included. The 47 post-civil war states included in the sample also exhibit nearly equal
variation, with 23 of them electing to use only volunteers compared to 24 that employed
conscription. The distribution of values for the dependent variable is roughly the same
when I expand the dataset to include these cases. We should not expect the post-civil war
or post-revolution cases to change the results.192
Table 3.1: Variation in Recruitment at Different Times after Independence

Volunteer
Conscription
Total

Year of
Independence
106 (51.7%)
99 (48.3%)
205 (100)

2 Years After
Independence
100 (48.8%)
105 (51.2%)
205 (100)

5 Years After
Independence
100 (48.8%)
105 (51.2%)
205 (100)

Table 3.2: Variation in Recruitment Among Different Types of New States
All New States
Volunteer
Conscription
Total

100 (48.8%)
105 (51.2%)
205 (100)

Post-Independence
States
67 (54.9%)
55 (45.1%)
122 (100%)

Post-Civil War
States
23 (48.9%)
24 (51.1%)
47 (100%)

III. Independent Variables
Given the theoretical focus on how foreign intervention influences state design of
militaries, a key task involves capturing whether a foreign state controls or exerts a
determinative effect on security policies in new states. There are many challenges to
identifying the actor (or set of actors) who has the greatest influence on policy
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decisions. 193 For example, it may not be necessary for a patron state to overtly pressure
the emulation of certain military policies because the client knows its patron’s support is
contingent on its adopting the right practices. Thus, in many cases identifying whether
there is in fact a foreign influence on military practices is best left to in-depth qualitative
analysis, as undertaken in the coming case study chapters. The key obstacle to obtaining a
definitive indicator of foreign control over military design is that the level of intervention
needed to affect a new state’s security policies depends on a variety of circumstances in
both the patron and client state. How important is the client to the patron’s interests? How
much do their interests overlap? What are the competing domestic and international
agendas that may limit available resources for projecting power?
Patrons must consider these questions when they weigh the likelihood of
successfully influencing policy against the potential strategic payoffs or losses given
limited resources. Thus, patrons may be able to achieve strategic goals with minimal
resources—for example, a small military advisory mission or weapons transfers—in
particularly weak new states with friendly domestic populations. However, patrons may
require a more resource-intensive strategy involving forward-deployed troops and
extensive training operations if a new state is viewed as strategically vital but resistant to
outside interference in its affairs. In some cases, patrons may view the potential security
payoffs of contributing such costly military design interventions as necessary. In other
situations, potential patrons may decide the level of intervention necessary for policy
success is not worth the trouble it could cause at home or in the new state. This could be
because the security payoff is not high enough, the risks are too high, or there are
193
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alternative client states that offer similar security advantages in the vicinity. The effects
of these considerations on the likelihood of patronage can be seen in Table 3.3, below.
Table 3.3: Patterns of Patronage
Not Strategically Important
Not Receptive to
Influence

No Foreign Patronage

Receptive to Influence

Low/Medium Levels of
Patronage if costs sufficiently
low

Strategically Important
Low/Medium Levels of
Patronage if costs sufficiently
low
High Levels of Patronage

The preceding discussion demonstrates plausible variation in strategies of patronclient control. Preferred methods of influence change depending on preferred goals and
available resources both across patrons and for individual patrons over time. In his study
of U.S. military assistance, for example, William Mott describes how US preferences for
securing its interests throughout the Cold War emphasized arms sales, military training,
and military guarantees at varying times and in varying regions.194 Similarly, patrons
often “develop strategies of force projection and crisis response” outside of “purely
military solutions” such as troop deployments to minimize risks of escalation.195
A. Foreign Patronage
While military patronage is difficult to measure, it is possible to identify policy
practices that are highly likely to be correlated with or indicate control or influence over
military policy. Therefore, I collected original data that measure the tools foreign powers
may use to influence military design in new states, which became my variables
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measuring the presence and nature of military patronage.196 As described in Chapter 2, a
defining feature of patron-client relationships is the provision of goods—in particular,
security assistance—to the client state. Thus, a measure of patronage should capture
whether a strong state provides certain goods to a client that can improve the client’s
security situation. Patrons use a variety of methods to influence defense and military
policy in client states. I identified the presence of military advisory missions, seconded or
contract officers, and troop deployments as the three factors that suggest a foreign power
is influencing a new state’s military. Below, I explain why I chose each of these factors. I
coded each of these factors based on publicly available government assessments, official
background documents, and historical accounts focusing on new states’ independence
and the history of their armed forces.
The first method of military control I looked for, and arguably the most obvious
or effective method, is the presence of troop deployments. This can have a particularly
powerful influence through the implicit or explicit threat of withdrawal or aggression,
because external forces are often helpful for helping regimes stay in power in the face of
internal or external threats. Consequently, overseas troop deployments are frequently
used as an indicator of hierarchical, patron-client relations.197 David Lake, for example,
uses deployments as an indicator of hierarchy, arguing that American troop deployments
in South Korea, West Germany, and Japan in the early years of the Cold War gave the
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United States some control over those countries’ security policies.198
These troops can affect an array of policies in both combat and noncombat
situations, including economic development, human rights, and foreign policy.199 While
troop deployments are important tools for influencing policy, it would be insufficient to
rely solely on this as an indicator. Not only would this limit military influence to those
great powers with sufficiently global force projection capabilities, but it is also the case
that patrons may view troop deployment as overkill: sufficient influence might be
achieved with tools that are cheaper and less likely to risk unnecessary escalation.
Therefore, I also looked for additional indicators of foreign military influence.
The second indicator that the existing literature identifies is the presence of foreign
military training missions. These missions allow great powers to reach a large proportion
of the target country’s troops—as opposed to military exchange or education programs
that provide for smaller numbers of officers to travel to a patron state for training—and
thus have a greater influence on whether states successfully adopt new military
doctrines.200 While often difficult to identify and highly secretive by nature, there is a
nascent literature exploring the role of American military education and advisory
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programs on politics in other beneficiary states.201 Much of this emphasizes the most
public of these programs, the American International Military Education and Training
(IMET) program. However, IMET brings foreign military officers to the United States for
training—and thus would not be expansive enough based on my coding rules, following
Ryan Grauer’s definition of a foreign military mission, in which a state sends:
“a group of officers to serve as trainers, instructors, and advisors….well
versed in the military state of the art, [and] are then afforded varying levels
of power and influence in the contracting state’s armed forces. Often,
members of the mission are assigned to faculty and administrative posts in
military educational institutions. Others advise field- and high-level
commanders. Still others may act as consultants to the political elite and
suggest national-level reforms that might bolster the state’s military
capability.”202
Modern examples are common in post-conflict construction and security sector reform,
include the United Kingdom-led IMATT effort in Sierra Leone. Similarly, military
missions like that under British Major General Stephen Butler following Ethiopia’s
independence in 1941 demonstrated an important commitment from the United Kingdom
by providing finance, training, and equipment for the Ethiopian army and placing British
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officers in all battalions.203
I also code influence along this dimension as a 1 if a private military corporation
(PMC) based in another country plays a significant role in the new state’s security sector
reform. This makes sense given the importance of emulation as a potential avenue of
indirect influence for my argument. Members of a PMC are often veterans of the country
in which the company is based. Therefore they are likely to have internalized many of the
same military practices as would trainers who are still active in a patron country’s
military. The only case where this coding decision changes the outcome of the variable is
Liberia’s post-conflict security sector reform project in 2003, in which the predominantly
U.S.-veteran manned DynCorp mission provided both trainers and the American
contingent of peacekeepers—though the United States had a role in determining the
vetting process for recruits.204 The influence of the PMC in this case is comparable to that
of the ex-British soldiers and officers who took on contracts as private individuals in
Jordan’s army in the 1940s and 1950s, whose relationship to British policy preferences
can only be described as independent in the most technical sense of the word.205
Another case in which PMCs mattered was during the security sector reform
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process that followed the Bicesse Accords in Angola. Executive Outcomes provided
advising and training for the newly united Angolan Armed Forces beginning in early
1993.206 However, because veterans came from multiple countries—South Africa,
Namibia, and Angola—the influence from Executive Outcomes does not clearly reflect
the experience of a single country’s military tradition, and so it was coded as having no
patron.
Third, numerous case studies demonstrate that the presence of seconded or
independently contracted officers can also permit foreign powers extensive influence,
since they may have formal or informal loyalties to their home state. Such forms of
control are often part and parcel of larger military advisory missions, as in the above
example of the British mission to Ethiopia. In these cases, it may be difficult to
distinguish between whether foreign officers are acting in an advisory or leadership role.
For example, after Chad’s independence, hundreds of French troops stayed in the country
as advisors, but many also served as commissioned and noncommissioned officers in the
small Chadian armed forces.207 Military missions can also be so large and so important to
the client state that their leader effectively—or occasionally, even de jure—assumes
command of all the new state’s armed forces. Conversely, a single military figure
contracted to lead the development of a new state’s army may be all that is necessary to
establish effective control. Some combination of these different methods of assigning
foreigners to combat leadership roles—as opposed to merely a training capacity—has
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been used frequently in post-colonial settings to continue patterns of dominance.208 Allan
Millett, for example, lists the following foreign figures who led military reform efforts,
many of which are included in my dataset’s scope conditions:
“William Carr Beresford in Portugal, Charles George Gordon in China, Ivor
Herbert in Canada, H.H. Kitchner in Egypt, Orde Wingate in Jewish
Palestine, John Bagot Glubb in Jordan, Joseph-Simon Gallieni in Indochina,
Huburt Louis Lyautey in Morocco, Colmar von der Goltz and Liman von
Sanders in Turkey, Emil Körner in Chile, Hans Kundt in Bolivia, and Max
Bauer and Hans von Seeckt in China….Charles P. Stone in Egypt, William
McEntyre in the Kingdom of Choson (Korea), Herbert J. Slocum in Cuba,
Charles Young in Liberia, Smedley D. Butler in Haiti, Henry T. Allen and
Edward G. Lansdale in the Philippines, and Joseph W. Stilwell in China.”209
Whether through taking command positions in combat units or developing militaries
from scratch, the presence of foreigners in new states’ militaries is an important indicator
of outside control. Often it is difficult from historical records, especially of smaller states,
to establish the activities with which military figures were primarily tasked. In either
case, though, these advisors and officers likely brought their own biases, preferences, and
organizational practices with them to their new roles and the institutions to which they
were assigned, as happened with John Bagot Glubb in Jordan (see Chapter 4).
As described above, no single measure can adequately capture a foreign power’s
intervention in domestic policy in all cases. Therefore, I coded foreign influence as a 1
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wherever one of these factors was present, and zero otherwise.210 Data on these measures
of foreign influence in the first few years after independence was available in 205
observations, with some form of foreign influence present in 65 percent of all cases (146
out of 224 total cases). Of these, 115 new states had either foreign trainers or seconded
officers—only nine cases had seconded officers but no trainers. 87 new states were
created with foreign troops on their soil, and in 34 of these cases no foreign military
advisory or training mission accompanied those troops. The constituent elements of the
foreign influence variable and the frequency of their use over the period analyzed by this
dissertation can be seen in Tables 3.4 and 3.5.
Table 3.4: Percent of New States Experiencing Different Types of Foreign Influence
(number in parentheses)
Foreign Trainers
Pre-Cold War
Cold War
Post-Cold War
Total

39.4% (13)
59.7% (71)
41.5% (22)
47.3% (106)

Seconded
Officers
9.1% (3)
32.4% (36)
15.1% (8)
21.0% (47)

Deployed
Troops
39.4% (13)
33.6% (40)
64.2% (34)
38.8% (87)

Any Foreign
Influence
63.6% (21)
65.9% (89)
64.3% (36)
65.2% (146)

The next step to creating the independent variable was identifying the patron
country for each instance of foreign influence and whether that country used volunteers
or conscripts at the time of the new state’s independence. Thus, new states influenced by
the United Kingdom were coded as having been influenced by a conscript state during the
period of the United Kingdom’s National Service, from 1939–1957, as were states
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influenced by the United States when it used conscription.211 In most cases identifying
the primary military influence on a new state was straightforward: one country was the
sole or clearly lead influence on all dimensions of foreign influence. However, coding
was more complex when there was more than one patron country exerting military
influence. Such efforts by multiple patrons were noticeable in 14 cases. For these cases, I
was guided in my coding by the logic used in datasets that code colonial influence: I
looked for evidence of which potential patron had the largest and most influential effect
on military design.212
Table 3.5: Number and Type of Foreign Influence Strategies Across States
Only One Type
Only One Type

Only Trainers
Only Officers
Only Troops

37 (17%)
6 (3%)
31 (14%)

Trainers and Officers
Trainers and Troops
Officers and Troops

16 (7%)
31 (14%)
3 (1%)

74 (33%)
Only Two Types

Two Types

All Three Types

Trainers, Officers, and
Troops

22 (10%)

Any Influence

50 (22%)
All Three Types
22 (10%)
146 (65%)

For example, Uganda was influenced by both Israel and the United Kingdom at
the time of its 1962 independence. Deciding which of these potential patrons had the
greatest effect on Ugandan military design is particularly important because their
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organizational preferences were opposite: while Israelis used conscripts, the United
Kingdom had decided to return to its traditional system of volunteers several years
earlier. Available sources show that the post-independence army was still largely under
British command—including the position of army commander—during a period in which
there were only two native lieutenants. Meanwhile, Israeli influence was secondary—
while Israel seconded fifty instructors to Uganda, they appear to have focused on pilots,
artillery, and paratroopers, rather than the main forces. Thus, I coded Uganda as
experiencing influence primarily from a volunteer-recruiting patron—the United
Kingdom—at independence.
Conversely, Lithuania had a strong Russian influence in the first two years after
its independence in 1991, but by August 1993 Russian troops had withdrawn and
Lithuania had replaced them with more NATO contacts, including a small American
military advisory team. In this case, the early Russian influence seemed most formative.
Training courses continued to be taught primarily by former Soviet officers, and many
former Soviet officers joined Lithuania’s armed forces. The small size of the American
mission (four members) seemed intended to reinforce a local preference for the existing
conscript-influence on Lithuanian military design, as it consisted of selective service
specialists. Thus, I coded Lithuania’s 1991 experience of state creation as occurring
under influence of a patron using conscription.213
Similarly, I coded cases in which the only foreign influence on any of the three
constituent influence measures was from an international organization like the UN or
NATO as having no foreign influence, because it is unlikely that such diverse
213
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multinational actors would be able to exert unified pressures on military design. As
Michel Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis write, “multilateral peacebuilding, because of its
impartial character will not be the choice that states that seek unilateral advantages will
choose. It is not the favored means to impose neo-imperial clients, acquire military bases
or garner economic concessions.”214 The competing interests within multilateral missions
makes it more difficult for the client state to emulate a single set of practices.
For example, the UN peacekeeping mission in Burundi after the settlement of its
civil war in 2003 was tasked with creating an integrated national defense force. Ethiopia,
Mozambique, and South Africa were all key contributing nations, and it is not
immediately clear that the experience of one country would dominate military reform. In
many such missions, the contributors also frequently change, further complicating the
identification of a primary influencer. The 1992 UNPROFOR deployment in Macedonia,
for example, was first supplied by a dispatch of 500 Canadians—a volunteer country—in
January 1993. They were withdrawn in February to be replaced by a 700-strong Nordic
battalion, which was in turn supplemented by several hundred American infantrymen in
July.215 One case I examine in detail, Bosnia and Herzegovina, is coded as having no
foreign military influence at independence, despite extensive international involvement in
statebuilding there. This is an issue I address further in Chapter 6. However, the diverse
interests of actors that were involved as a result of the international nature of military
patronage in this case reflects my broader logic for not coding international organizations
as having a clear influence on recruitment practices. In total, there were only 15 cases in
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which a multinational institution was the primary influencer on one of the dimensions of
foreign influence. However, as can be seen in Appendix B, tests using alternative codings
for cases of multinational institution influence do not change the results.
The coding process above resulted in a trichotomous, categorical independent
variable that coded separate categories if a new state had a primary patron that used
volunteers, if it used conscripts, and if there was no military patron or no clear influence.
This captures the fact that volunteer influence is expected to decrease the likelihood of
conscription (and increase the likelihood of using volunteers) to the same extent as
conscript influence is likely to increase the probability that a new state will use
conscripts. The absence of foreign influence serves as a reference category for which
there is no expected effect on a new state’s military recruitment practices. However, to
aid with the interpretation of interactive hypotheses I transformed this variable into two
dichotomous variables, coded 1 in the presence of volunteer influence or conscript
influence, respectively.
Of the 205 cases for which I was able to gather data on foreign military
influences, roughly 20 percent have volunteer influence, 36 percent have no influence,
and 44 percent have conscript influence, for a total of 131 foreign-influenced new states.
This variation is nearly identical if post-civil war state creation is dropped from the
sample, with a breakdown of 20 percent volunteer, 31 percent no influence, and 49
percent conscript influence. The four most common influencers constituting the patron
state in 85 percent of states experiencing foreign influence: the United Kingdom (34),
Russia (28), the United States (27) and France (22).
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B. Threat Variables
According to my theory, another key variable is the extent to which policymakers
in the new state perceive major external threats. Threat perception is inherently
subjective. Leaders prioritize threats differently depending on their ideology and
cognitive biases, so that something that is perceived as highly threatening to the leaders
of one state may be benign to others. Fortunately, my theory expects only certain types of
threats to have a clear effect on conscription. It is only necessary to distinguish major,
external, land-based threats from other types of threat, since these are the only types of
threat that should create clear and overriding incentives to conscript their military
personnel. Furthermore, there are many existing variables that political scientists use to
identify such major threats for cross-national analysis. I employ several of these variables
to proxy for potentially-existential threats that are likely to create pressures toward
conscription.
First, one way to directly measure a new state’s threat perceptions is its number of
contiguous land borders. This measure captures a broader, more accurate
conceptualization of external threats compared to the actual existence of conflict at
independence. However, it has also repeatedly been linked to interstate conflict, and so
also constitutes an appropriate proxy variable.216 This variable represents a similar
argument to Eliot Cohen’s speculation that land border length is “perhaps the best (if
crudest) predictor” of whether [states] will use conscription.”217 In other words, the more
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land neighbors a state has, the more likely it is to have territorial disputes that can
escalate or enemies that may threaten it.
Another way to measure threat is the number of militarized interstate disputes it is
involved in at the time of its independence. MIDs data codes any instance in which states
threaten or use military force against each other. Because MIDs include shows of force
that fall short of war, it provides a more complete conceptualization of threat
environments than a variable that only counts major open war—a relatively rare
occurrence. In addition, MIDs data includes descriptions of the severity of individual
disputes, ranging from “no militarized action” to “war.” This allows for the coding of
alternative measures of threat environments that only count disputes that are the most
likely to require the type of major military preparations provided by conscription.
I created a threat measure that is coded 1 if the state was involved in any MIDs in
the first two years after a state’s independence—to match the threshold I used for
identifying finalized recruitment policies—and zero otherwise.218 The inclusion of MIDs
after the year of independence means my threat variables may include disputes that occur
after some states made their initial military decisions. However, post-independence MIDs
should still lead to accurate threat codings. Militarized interstate disputes do not arise
from nowhere, and so will generally be the culmination of prior conflictual and
threatening relationships. However, the longer the post-independence time period for
which my threat variables count MIDs, the more likely it is that the variables will include
disputes that are unforeseeable at the time of independence and military design. While I
also examine alternative codings that allow for longer time-horizons, I assume that new

218

Results are robust to using alternative MIDs time periods (see the Appendix).

110

states will be most concerned with—and better able to predict—threats the closer they are
to the year of independence.
C. Alternative Hypotheses
The main hypothesis competing with my theory is that domestic politics, through
local culture, ideology or previous experiences, has the biggest effect on recruitment
practices. In other words, critics would contend that foreign influence after independence
should have no effect on recruitment after controlling for historical experiences favoring
or disfavoring conscription. Rather than contemporary influence from foreign patrons
affecting military recruitment, events from before independence matter most. I control for
these arguments in two ways. First, following previous studies of conscription I include
dichotomous variables of a new state’s colonial legacy based on Paul Hensel’s Colonial
History dataset.219 This approach uses dummy variables to identify whether a state’s
primary colonial/pre-independence power was either the United Kingdom, France,
Russia, or Turkey/the Ottoman Empire.220
While including these dummy variables allows me to test the effects of specific
colonizers, I also created and tested models using a separate dichotomous colonial history
variable. This second approach measures whether a new state’s most important prior
colonial power traditionally used volunteers, with a coding of one indicating that it did
and zero indicating that it did not have this colonial legacy. In practice, this captures
whether the state was colonized by the UK (the Pearson R coefficient for the correlation
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between conscript tradition and UK colonization is -0.87). Specific colonizer dummies
are advantageous because they directly capture some of the existing hypotheses about the
relationship between specific colonizers and conscription. However, using all of these
dummies also substantially reduces my degrees of freedom, which should be avoided due
to my small sample size. As a result, I adopt the dichotomous variable that measures
whether there is a history of colonial volunteer recruitment in most models, though the
results using specific country dummies can be seen in the robustness checks section.

IV. Descriptive Statistics
A broad overview of my dataset supports the patterns described by my theory.
Overall, states that have no land borders—and thus are more secure against land
invasions—are more likely to adopt a volunteer system. As Table 3.6 shows, 76 percent
of states with no borders rely on volunteers, while only 43 percent of new states that have
land borders do. Moreover, all seven states that are both unconstrained by foreign patrons
and have no borders use volunteers.221 Table 3.7 shows that the percentage of patron-less
states that use volunteers when they have borders remains roughly the same, at 46
percent. This shows that when states face threats and have no patron, they are more likely
to use conscription than to use volunteers, but not by much. New states facing threats also
become much more likely to use conscription or volunteers if they are influenced by a
conscript or volunteer patron, respectively.222 Among states with land borders that also
have a volunteer patron, 75 percent use conscription. However, among states with land
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borders that have a conscript patron, 71 percent use conscription. This suggests that the
effect of threat environment is drowned out by the influence of patron states. This is
consistent with my argument that in cases with an external patron, new states should
adopt the patron’s recruitment system, even when the threat is high.
Table 3.6: Frequency of Recruitment System by Threat Environment

Volunteer
Conscript
Total

No Land
Borders
76% (26)
24% (8)
100% (34)

Any Land
Borders
43% (74)
57% (97)
100% (171)

No MIDs

Any MIDs

52% (64)
48% (59)
100% (123)

44% (36)
56% (46)
100% (82)

Table 3.7: Patron Influence in States with Borders/MIDs

Volunteer
Conscript
Total

No Influence
Borders
46% (30)
54% (35)
100%

MIDs
40% (12)
60% (18)
100%

Volunteer Influence
Borders
MIDs
75% (18)
73% (8)
25% (6)
27% (3)
100%
100%

Conscript Influence
Borders
MIDs
29% (23)
36% (14)
71% (56)
64% (25)
100%
100%

The data looks similar when we used MIDs as a measure of threat. States without
a patron and that also experience any MIDs are more likely to use conscripts than
volunteers, by 60 to 40 percent. The proportion of states adopting conscription is similar
when states face external threats and have patron that uses conscription (64 percent).
Unsurprisingly, and consistent with Hypothesis 2, volunteer patrons again manage to
drown out the effects of threat, with 73 percent of states with volunteer patrons and
facing high threats using volunteer recruitment.
Out of 61 new states that were colonized by a state that has a history of using
volunteers, 80 percent use volunteers—roughly the same as the 82 percent of the 38 new
states that experience post-independence volunteer influence that choose to use
volunteers. Similarly, nearly 69 percent of 89 new states influenced by conscript patrons
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design conscript militaries, compared to 66 percent of those that have been influenced by
a conscript colonizer in the past. This demonstrates that influence by patron states after
independence is at least as plausible a predictor of recruitment policies as historical
practices.
Furthermore, patrons are often different from colonizers. States with foreign
patrons that were colonized by the United Kingdom had a different foreign patron in 13
out of 41 cases, while French colonizers had a different foreign patron in 11 out of 29
cases. Former Russian colonies with patrons were patronized by Russia in all but one
case, but Turkish colonies always had a different patron. This is further evidence of the
need to analyze patrons separately from colonizers.
The distribution of patron influences over different threat level in the new state is
also notable (see Appendix B). In particular, patrons that use volunteers appear less likely
to get involved in military design in states that experience high levels of threat. Only 28
percent of states with volunteer patrons experience any MIDs, while roughly 40 percent
of states with either a conscript patron or no patron experience at least one MID.223 This
amounts to only 11 states in the sample that experience MIDs and have a volunteer
patron, compared to 70 other states that face high threat levels. This should not
necessarily be surprising. A reasonable explanation is that volunteer patrons are less
likely to devote resources to states experiencing higher levels of major conflict, because
they realize it increases the chance that their own forces will get dragged into it. In fact,
this is consistent with my theory: volunteer states recognize both that volunteer
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recruitment is less-suited to high risk environments and that it is difficult to change
recruitment systems, and thus they try to avoid scenarios that might require conscription.
Conversely, it is possible that high levels of patronage deter threats from arising in the
first place.
Overall, patron states are more likely to influence states that have a low threat
environment, with nearly two-third of states with patrons experiencing no MIDs.
Additional summary statistics for the dataset can be seen in Table 3.8. Just over a third of
the observations (36 percent, n=74) have no foreign patron, while 19 percent have a
volunteer patron (n=39) and 45 percent (n=91) have a conscript patron. However, 33
percent (n=74) have a history of colonization by a state that used volunteers, while 65
percent (n=141) have a history of colonization by a state that used conscription—nine
states have no colonial legacy. Nearly 40 percent of observations exhibit a high threat
environment as measured by MIDs, and nearly 80 percent have at least one contiguous
land border.
Table 3.8: Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Obs.

Mean

Conscription
Land Borders
MIDs
Hostile MIDs
Volunteer Legacy
Volunteer
Influence
Conscript Influence

205
223
224
224
224
204

0.51
2.80
0.83
0.55
0.33
0.19

Std.
Dev.
0.50
2.26
1.44
1.07
0.47
0.39

204

0.45

0.50

Min.

Max.

0
0
0
0
0
0

1
14
7
5
1
1

Years
Available
1918–2008
1918–2008
1918–2008
1918–2008
1918–2008
1918–2008

0

1

1918–2008

No variables are highly correlated with each other, with the highest Pearson’s R
correlation statistic (Table 3.9) for any two variables that would be included in the same
model being -0.46, for the relationship between having an historical legacy of volunteer
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usage and being influenced by a state that uses volunteers after independence. This is
particularly important for my ability to distinguish between the colonial legacy and
patronage arguments.
Table 3.9: Pearson's R Correlation Matrix
Variables

Conscription

Land
MIDs
Borders

Hostile
MIDs

Volunteer Volunteer Conscript
Legacy
Influence Influence

Conscription 1.00
Land
Borders

0.3163

1.00

MIDs

0.0990

0.3698

1.00

0.1535

0.3030

0.8861

1.00

-0.4176

-0.2830

-0.1448

-0.1205

1.00

-0.3241

-0.2045

-0.0660

-0.0683

-0.4609

1.00

0.3021

0.0884

-0.0699

-0.0152

0.3267

-0.4370

Hostile
MIDs
Volunteer
Legacy
Volunteer
Influence
Conscript
Influence

1.00

V. Model Testing
Having found support for my theory in the raw data, I turn to regression analysis.
In my main models, I use logistic regression because the dependent variable is binary. I
also use clustered standard errors to address the possibility that observations of the same
country at different times are correlated with each other. Additional models using OLS
regression are available in Appendix B, though results are the same.
A. Base Models
I begin by testing models designed to reveal the impact of foreign influence and
threat on military recruitment choice, controlling for recruitment legacy. All models test
Hypotheses 1 and 2 by including two dichotomous variables measuring the type of
foreign patron influence in a new state during the period of military design. The included
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variables measure the presence of a volunteer patron and of a conscript patron, so that
having no patron is the excluded reference category. I would expect the volunteer
influence variable to be negatively correlated with the dependent variable: new states
influenced by volunteer-recruiting patrons should emulate their patron and therefore be
more likely to have a volunteer army, and vice versa. Hypotheses 3 and 4 are tested in
models that include interaction terms (see Table 3.12).
Table 3.10: The Effect of Patrons on the Probability of Conscription224
Variables
Patron
Influence
Volunteer
Legacy
Any Land
Borders

Model 1:
Without
Threat

Model 2:
Borders
Dummy

Model 3:
MIDs
Dummy

Model 4:
Forceful
MIDs
Dummy

Model 5:
Borders
Count

Model 6:
MIDs
Count

Model 7:
Forceful
MIDs
Count

0.726***
(0.246)
-1.602***
(0.451)

0.704***
(0.259)
-1.480***
(0.464)
1.335**
(0.533)

0.726***
(0.247)
-1.588***
(0.462)

0.723***
(0.248)
-1.593***
(0.454)

0.745***
(0.266)
-1.391***
(0.481)

0.753***
(0.251)
-1.552***
(0.461)

0.757***
(0.255)
-1.548***
(0.451)

0.0855
(0.344)

Any MIDs
Any
Forceful
MIDs
Total Land
Borders

0.125
(0.363)
0.253***
(0.0827)
0.101
(0.105)

Total MIDs

0.274*
(0.148)

Total
Forceful
MIDs
Constant

0.316
(0.237)

-0.875*
(0.527)

0.277
(0.272)

0.273
(0.264)

-0.526
(0.352)

0.199
(0.269)

0.127
(0.263)

Observations
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The first set of models test my non-interactive hypotheses, H1 and H2 (see Table
3.10). The first way I do this is measures patron influence using a trichotomous variable

224

Standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficient in each regression table.
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that takes the value of 1 if a state has a conscript patron, 0 if a state has no patron, and -1
if a state has a volunteer patron. This captures the fact that the effect of having a patron
who uses conscription is predicted to be symmetrical and in the opposite direction
compared to the effect of having a patron who uses volunteers. Thus this variable should
be positively associated with the probability that a state uses conscription. In Model 1, I
regress conscription on only my patron influence variables and an indicator that captures
the primary alternative hypothesis, a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the
state’s primary colonizer has a history of using volunteers and zero otherwise.
In Models 2 through 7, I include controls capturing different conceptualizations of
the international threat environment. Models 2–7 offer further tests for Hypotheses 1 and
2 by including another potentially important variable that is omitted from the previous
model: threat environment. Models 2–4 assume that threat environment is dichotomous.
A state may either perceive that its primary threat is a major territorial invasion, or it does
not. Thus the first of these models is a general measure of threat based on whether a state
has any land borders, while Models 3 and 4 measure threat using the presence of any
MIDs and any high hostility MIDs, respectively. Models 5–7 measure threat as a
continuum. This is consistent with the way states balance the various threats they often
face at the same time: the greater the likelihood of a major territorial threat, the more
likely that this will dominate the state’s military design process. Therefore, these three
models use continuous measures of the threat variables from Models 2–4. In Model 5,
more land borders equates to more potential adversaries and therefore to a greater
likelihood of perceiving a high threat environment, while more MIDs and more hostile
MIDs should similarly make states more wary of potential threats in Models 6 and 7,
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respectively. In all models the variable for patron influence is statistically significant at a
p=0.01 level, providing strong support in favor of hypotheses 1 and 2.
Table 3.11: The Effect of Patrons on the Probability of Conscription

Variables

Volunteer
Influence
Conscript
Influence
Volunteer
Legacy
Any Land
Borders

Model 8:
Without
Threat

Model 9:
Borders
Dummy

-0.823*
(0.441)
0.674*
(0.360)
-1.589***
(0.453)

-0.640
(0.461)
0.738**
(0.361)
-1.487***
(0.465)
1.343**
(0.532)

Model
10:
MIDs
Dummy
-0.820*
(0.443)
0.674*
(0.359)
-1.576***
(0.464)

Model
11:
Forceful
MIDs
Dummy
-0.817*
(0.446)
0.672*
(0.360)
-1.581***
(0.456)

Model
12:
Borders
Count

Model
13:
MIDs
Count

-0.772
(0.486)
0.731**
(0.362)
-1.388***
(0.484)

-0.817*
(0.452)
0.719**
(0.365)
-1.545***
(0.462)

0.0844
(0.344)

Any MIDs

0.123

Any
Forceful
MIDs
Total Land
Borders

(0.362)
0.253***
(0.0832)
0.0996
(0.106)

Total MIDs
Total
Forceful
MIDs
Constant
Observations

Model
14:
Forceful
MIDs
Count
-0.819*
(0.472)
0.723**
(0.363)
-1.540***
(0.455)

0.274*
(0.148)
0.350
(0.283)
199

-0.904
(0.551)
199

0.311
(0.316)
199

0.307
(0.303)
199

-0.516
(0.395)
199

0.222
(0.318)
199

0.149
(0.302)
199

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Models 8–14 repeat the analysis in Models 1–7 but splitting the patron influence
variable into its constituent parts, creating dummy variables for whether a state had a
conscript patron and whether a state had a volunteer patron. This allows me to better
examine whether the emulation effect is stronger for some type of patrons than for others.
The results, which can be seen in Table 3.11, show that the conscript and volunteer
influence variables are statistically significant at a 0.10 level. Both variables have
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substantive effects in the predicted directions, with conscript influence having a beta
coefficient of 0.67 and volunteer influence having a beta coefficient of -0.82 in Model 8,
which only includes a control variable for colonial legacy. This translates into odds ratios
that predict that states with a conscript patron are almost twice as likely as states without
a conscript patron to use conscription. Similarly, states with volunteer patrons are 0.44
times less likely to use conscription, though the effect is not significant at conventional
levels. The results are shown in Figure 3.1, below, with 95 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 3.1: The Effect of Patron Influence on Recruitment

While volunteer influence is statistically significant at a 0.10 level in all but two
of the models that include threat models, conscript influence remains statistically
significant at a 0.05 level in Model 2 and all models where threat is measured as a
continuum. It is significant at a 0.10 level in the other models. Furthermore, no form of
MIDs threat measurement is statistically significantly associated with military
recruitment at the conventional 0.05 level. Having any land borders, however, is
associated with an increase in the likelihood of conscription at a .05 level. The number of
forceful MIDs a state experiences is significant at a 0.10 level. Furthermore, the results
show that the more land borders that a state has, the more likely it is to use conscription,
with statistical significance at a 0.01 level. These somewhat conflicting results are likely
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due to two things. First, states with no land borders are islands and so may have much
less to fear in the way of territorial invasion than other states, regardless of the number of
their MIDs. Second, consistent with the theory, the emulation effect of foreign patrons
may be sufficiently strong and common as to drown out the effect of MIDs. Therefore it
is difficult to get a sense of the effect of threat unless we only look at those cases that do
not have foreign patrons, as suggested by Hypotheses 3 and 4.
These results suggest that conscript influencers have the predicted effects on
military recruitment. There is some effect of volunteer influences, and though there is
less confidence in what that effect is, signs point to it being in the predicted direction.225
This absence of an effect of volunteer influencers is in contrast to existing arguments that
emphasize the unique characteristics of the British volunteer recruitment culture, instead
suggesting that conscript militaries drive the emulation effect. In addition, threat
environments likely have some effect on military recruitment, and continuous measures
of threat may have more explanatory power than dichotomous ones.
However, in order to test the hypotheses about threat correctly, it is necessary to
use interactive statistical models. Recall that threat is only expected to have an effect on
recruitment practices in the absence of foreign patronage. Model 15 is the first of my
interactive hypotheses. Each of the Models 15 through 20 regress the use of conscription
on variables that interact threat environment with both conscript influence and volunteer
influence from a patron (Table 3.12). This allows me to evaluate Hypotheses 3 and 4. To
test Hypothesis 3, which says that threat does not matter when there is a patron, it is
necessary to perform a two-tailed difference in means test. This evaluates the difference
225

Volunteer influencers is statistically significant at a 0.1 level in all the models except the one
measuring threat as land borders when an alternative coding of recruitment legacy is used.
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between the volunteer patron-threat and conscript patron-threat interaction terms by
testing whether the coefficients for the two influence-threat interaction terms are jointly
equivalent to zero. In other words, when this t-test fails to reject the null hypothesis that
the coefficients for these two interaction terms are jointly equally to zero, there is support
for the hypothesis that threat has no effect on conscription when there is a patron state. If
there is support for Hypothesis 4, the coefficient for the threat variable will be
statistically significant in models that include variables that interact threat and patron
influence. In these models, the threat variable captures the effect of threat when there is
no patron, while each of the interaction terms captures of the effect of threat when there
is a patron. As in Tables 3.10 and 3.11, the first three of these models (15–17) measure
threat dichotomously, as the presence of any borders, any MIDs, and any forceful MIDs,
respectively.226 Models 18–20 employ continuous measures of these threat variables and
their interactions.
The threat variable is statistically significant at least at a 0.05 level in Models 15,
18, 19, and 20. The only models in which threat is not statistically significant are those
that include the presence of any MIDs or any forceful MIDs as threatening. However, it
makes sense that the presence of any MIDs would not necessarily be statistically
significant. The presence of a single MID does not necessarily reach a threat threshold
large enough to affect the design of security institutions, since MIDs can include not only
violent conflicts, but also disputes in which there was no militarized action, or in which
there were only threats to use force. Indeed, the effect of threats seem to be strongest

226

Due to the perfect prediction of outcomes for several variables, the results from logistic
analysis cannot be interpreted reliably in Model 8. OLS regression results for Model 8 are
available in the Appendix and should be used instead. The results from linear regression models
are still valid when the dependent variable is dichotomous.
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when they are violent and cumulative. The continuous forceful MIDs variable is
correlated with an increase in the probability of conscription at a 0.01 level. Each
additional high-level MID that a state has is associated with a 1.9 increase in the
probability of conscription, when there is no patron state. Substantive effects and odds
ratios for Model 20 can be seen in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b, below. Thus, there is support
for Hypothesis 4, that states without a patron are more likely to conscript when they face
high threats compared to when they face low threats.
Table 3.12 The Effect of Influence and Threat on the Probability of Conscription
in New States

Variables

Model 15:
Interaction
with
Borders
Dummy

Any Land
Borders

15.56***
(0.485)

Model 16:
Interaction
with MIDs
Dummy

Model 17:
Interaction
with
Forceful
MIDs
Dummy

Model 18:
Interaction
with
Borders
Count

Any Forceful
MIDs
Total Land
Borders

0.773
(0.523)
0.352***
(0.126)
0.300**
(0.147)

Total MIDs

Constant
Observations

Model 20:
Interaction
with
Forceful
MIDs
Count

0.574
(0.495)

Any MIDs

Total Forceful
MIDs
Volunteer
Influence
Conscript
Influence
Volunteer
Influence*Threat
Conscript
Influence*Threat
Volunteer
Legacy

Model 19:
Interaction
with MIDs
Count

13.60***
(1.104)
15.44***
(0.901)
-14.35***
(1.157)
-14.89***
(0.984)
-1.52***
(0.470)
-15.01***
(0.441)
199

-0.725
(0.586)
1.110**
(0.479)
-0.219
(1.110)
-0.987
(0.657)
-1.533***
(0.471)

-0.305
(0.536)
0.990**
(0.432)
-1.938
(1.466)
-0.936
(0.694)
-1.629***
(0.491)

-0.0415
(0.754)
1.133
(0.700)
-0.236
(0.178)
-0.130
(0.200)
-1.453***
(0.519)

0.0930
0.100
-0.817*
(0.350)
(0.325)
(0.467)
199
199
199
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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-0.316
(0.545)
1.084**
(0.428)
-0.497
(0.318)
-0.384*
(0.211)
-1.592***
(0.494)

0.619***
(0.217)
-0.306
(0.564)
1.009**
(0.408)
-0.877
(0.672)
-0.523*
(0.293)
-1.583***
(0.498)

0.0100
(0.331)
199

-0.0402
(0.322)
199

Figure 3.2a: Logit Coefficients for Model 20

Figure 3.2b: Odds Ratios for Model 20

There is also support for Hypothesis 3, which says that threat only has an effect
when there is no patron. If threat only has an effect on recruitment when states have no
patron and has no effect when there is a patron, then each of the interactions between
threat and conscript influence and threat and volunteer influence should be equal to zero.
As can be seen in Table 3.13, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that these variables are
jointly equal to zero at a 0.05 level in Models 16–20. This means that the effect of threat
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on military recruitment is greater for states without a patron than for states that have
either volunteer or conscript patrons.227
Table 3.13: Hypothesis Testing for Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis Tested
Model
𝛽 volunteerinfluence*anyborders = 𝛽 conscriptinfluence*anyborders=0
15
Model
𝛽 volunteerinfluence*anymids = 𝛽 conscriptinfluence*anymids=0
16
Model
𝛽 volunteerinfluence*anyhostmids = 𝛽
17
conscriptinfluence*anyhostmids=0
Model
𝛽 volunteerinfluence* totalborders = 𝛽 conscriptinfluence*totalborders=0
18
Model
𝛽 volunteerinfluence*totalmids = 𝛽 conscriptinfluence*totalmids=0
19
Model
𝛽 volunteerinfluence*totalhostilemids = 𝛽 conscriptinfluence*
20
totalhostilemids =0

𝜒2 Statistic P-value
328.34
0.00
2.37

0.31

2.95

0.22

1.80

0.41

4.62

0.10

3.93

0.14

Figures 3.3 and 3.4 shows the substantive effects of threat—measured as both the
number of land borders and the number of forceful MIDs—given no military patron.
Among states with no patrons, the predicted probability of using conscription increases
from 30 percent for those with no land borders, to 65 percent for those with five land
borders, like the post-Soviet states Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, and 97
percent for Russia, which has 14 land borders. Similarly, states with no forceful MIDs
have less than a 45 percent chance of adopting conscription. States with one forceful
MID, however, are more likely to conscript by 12 percentage points, while those with
three have a 77 percent likelihood of adopting conscription. China, which is one of five
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Splitting the sample into states that have patrons and those that do not provides similar results.
As can be seen in Appendix A, none of interactions between threat and volunteer influence is
statistically significant in any of the models that are limited to states that have patrons, while the
two stronger indicators of threat are statistically significant at a 0.05 level in the models that are
limited to those states without patrons.
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states with the most forceful MIDs at 5, had only a 10 percent probability of adopting a
volunteer military.
Figure 2.3: Marginal Effects of Land Borders on Probability of Conscription

Figure 3.3: Marginal Effects of Threat on Probability of Conscription

B. Additional Control Variables
While any model must include some measure for each of the variables described
above, existing literature on the determinants of recruitment practices is sufficiently
scarce and inconclusive as to leave open for interpretation the necessary additional
control variables. Below I discuss the available possibilities and reasons for the inclusion
or exclusion of various control variables from my final models. Additional variables that
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are said to affect military recruitment fall into two broad categories, depending on
whether they describe political institutions or economic factors and resource availability.
First, many scholars have argued that there should be a relationship between
democracy and military recruitment. However, the exact direction of this relationship, if
any, is disputed. Conscription may reflect egalitarian notions of citizenship or it may
conflict with liberal notions of individual rights—both of which are more likely to be
associated with democratic regimes.228 While it is possible that democracies are more
likely to use a particular recruitment system, the fact that they have successfully used
both conscript and volunteer recruitment systems—in war and in peacetime—at various
times over the last century should weaken the arguments that associate it with a particular
system.229 Similarly, we may also expect authoritarian regimes to be more likely to
suppress individual rights in a way that allows them to use conscription more easily,
though they equally could be hesitant to arm the public.
The most likely way political institutions can affect recruitment system is by
giving voice or creating accountability to the public. The average citizen prefers to pay
for a volunteer force over risking being conscripted.230 Thus, regimes that are more
responsive to the population may be more likely to use volunteers. Yet, states often
impose conscription on unwilling populations. For example, Margaret Levi argued that
perceptions of unfairness led to noncompliance with wartime drafts, though the draft was
still enforced in each of the five democracies she studied, even when it was perceived as

228

See Asal et al., “I Want You!” for a review of the literature. See also Pfaffenzaller,
“Conscription and Democracy.” Asal et al find that democracy decreases the likelihood of
conscription.
229
Kier, Imagining War; Leander, “Drafting Community.”
230
Caverley, Democratic Militarism, 32
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extremely unfair.231
Table 3.14: The Effect of Regime Type on Military Recruitment
Variables

Total Land Border
Volunteer Influence
Conscript Influence
Volunteer Legacy
Volunteer Influence*Borders
Conscript Influence*Borders
Democracy (dichotomous)

Model 21:
Democracy
Dummy
Control
0.392***
(0.139)
0.234
(0.855)
1.053
(0.761)
-1.660***
(0.569)
-0.332*
(0.194)
-0.0967
(0.222)
0.170
(0.405)

Model 22:
Democracy
Index Control
0.393***
(0.141)
0.246
(0.846)
1.071
(0.763)
-1.649***
(0.567)
-0.333*
(0.193)
-0.0940
(0.222)

Model 23:
Excluded
Ethnic
Groups
Control
0.394***
(0.132)
0.590
(0.836)
0.860
(0.757)
-1.677***
(0.588)
-0.371*
(0.194)
-0.0658
(0.215)

0.0120
(0.0284)

Democracy (continuous)
Total Excluded Ethnic
Groups

-0.0447
(0.0370)
0.378
(1.218)

Total Excluded Population
Constant
Observations

Model 24:
Excluded
Ethnic
Population
Control
0.336**
(0.151)
0.565
(0.859)
0.832
(0.789)
-1.722***
(0.598)
-0.343*
(0.204)
-0.0506
(0.229)

-0.878*
-0.986
-0.726
(0.506)
(0.609)
(0.506)
175
175
171
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.733
(0.521)
171

I tested two version of variables that represent arguments that there should be a
relationship between democracy or political accountability and conscription. First, I
included a control variable from the Polity IV dataset to measure how democratic a new
state is at independence. This variable was never statistically significant and did not
change the results of the basic model, whether measured as a continuous variable or as a
dichotomous variable with different cutoffs to define democracy. Second, I test the same
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Levi, Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism.
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models using the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset’s measurements for the number
of excluded groups and the size of the excluded population. Higher values on each value
should indicate that a state’s government is less responsive to the preferences of the
population. These variables may also proxy not for regime type but for perceived threat
environment, with states being less willing to take the many risks associated with
conscription if their hold on power requires excluding large portions of the population.
Although the EPR dataset’s more limited timeframe—it begins in 1946—reduces my
number of observations to 171, no specification of these domestic regime type variables
is statistically significant at a p=0.10 level (see Table 3.14).
Economic factors may also affect recruitment decisions. These theories emphasize
supply-side constraints on or prerequisites for conscription. Rational, power-maximizing
states should not want to implement a military personnel system unless they have the
tools to implement it successfully. Conscription may require the state to have greater
levels of centralization, better-developed bureaucracy, or greater domestic stability
compared to volunteer systems.232 States with lower capacity or fewer coercive resources
may fear opposition too much, and therefore, on average, not even try to implement
conscription. Conversely, states with greater economic or administrative capacity would
equally be better able to provide sufficient compensation to attract volunteers without
using coercion. Given the lower risks to stability volunteers entail, this option may be
more appealing to states that have high levels of resources.

232

Mulligan and Shleifer, “Conscription as Regulation”; Barnett, The Fragmentation of
Afghanistan; Wendt and Barnett, “Dependent State Formation”; Van Doorn, “The Decline of the
Mass Army in the West.”
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Table 3.15: The Effect of State Capacity on Military Recruitment
Model 25:
Urban
Population
Control
0.303**
(0.145)
-0.439
(0.834)
0.889
(0.722)
-1.376**
(0.557)
-0.219
(0.197)
-0.0853
(0.210)
3.217**
(1.468)

Variables
Total Land Borders
Volunteer Influence
Conscript Influence
Volunteer Legacy
Volunteer Influence*Borders
Conscript Influence*Borders
Urban Pop. Perc

Model 26:
State Capacity
Index Control

Model 27:
GDP Per Capita
Control

0.293**
(0.136)
-1.319
(1.037)
1.321
(1.029)
-1.159*
(0.595)
0.0217
(0.183)
-0.191
(0.271)

0.322**
(0.145)
-0.238
(0.952)
0.754
(0.812)
-1.941***
(0.631)
-0.274
(0.196)
-0.0848
(0.219)

1.344**
(0.604)

Capacity Index

0.000103
(6.93e-05)

GDP per capita
Constant
Observations

-1.017**
-1.857**
(0.488)
(0.916)
194
110
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.775
(0.582)
162

To test these competing hypotheses, I add different specifications of resource
capacity to my base models (see Table 3.15). Model 25 includes a variable measuring the
state’s urban population percentage. This variable is often used in modernization
literature to measure a state’s level of economic development, and consequently its
ability to control resources—which should aid in the implementation of conscription.233
Urban population percentage is statistically significant at a 0.01 level. Substantively, this
may offer support for the hypothesis that states are more likely to conscript where doing
so is easier. Large urban populations may indicate greater state ability to control the
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population. Rural recruitment is often challenging, especially in new states that are still
stablishing their authority, both because it is more difficult to extend control and
legitimacy the further from the state’s center and because cities offer a higher
concentration of potential recruits. Thus, another interpretation of this variable is as a
proxy for responses to certain threats: if states anticipate resistance to conscription among
populations they have less control over, then they would only conscript when they
perceive that resistance is manageable.
Similarly, a composite measure from the Relative Political Capacity dataset
measuring “the ability of governments to appropriate portions of the national output to
advance public goals,” is also statistically significant at a .05 level, as seen in Model
26.234 This is a more direct measure of governmental resources compared to GDP, which
is usually used as a measure of state capacity but is not statistically significant (Model
27). However, there is extensive missing data for the RPC variable, reducing the sample
by nearly half. Moreover, the missing data is likely not randomly distributed, as weaker
and poorer countries are less likely to have the data available that was used for coding.
The statistical significance of some of these control variables suggests the need to
test a single model including all control variables. Table 3.16 shows the results from this
logistic regression. Model 28 and Model 29 include controls for level of democracy,
number of excluded ethnic groups, and the urban population. In addition, I test whether
internal ethnic exclusion may function as a pressure on recruitment in the same way as
external threats do. This is important because many scholars have suggested that states
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are just as likely to design their security apparatuses in response to internal threats as in
response to external threats.235 Thus Model 28 tests whether Hypotheses 1 and 2 still find
support when all additional control variables are accounted for, Model 29 does the same
for Hypotheses 3 and 4, while Model 30 tests whether Hypotheses 3 and 4 also apply to
states’ perceptions of internal threats.
Table 3.16: Full Regression Table
Model 28:
No Interaction

Variables

0.298***
(0.111)
-1.355**
(0.668)
0.630
(0.392)
-1.586**
(0.626)

Total Land Borders
Volunteer Influence
Conscript Influence
Volunteer Legacy
Volunteer Influence*Borders
Conscript Influence*Borders

-0.0110
(0.0292)
-0.0366
(0.0360)
3.780*
(2.183)

Democracy (cont.)
Total Excluded Ethnic Groups
Urban Pop. Percent

Model 29:
External Threat
Interaction
0.351**
(0.164)
-0.153
(1.111)
0.570
(0.823)
-1.678**
(0.677)
-0.321
(0.243)
0.0227
(0.242)
-0.00786
(0.0291)
-0.0425
(0.0372)
3.900*
(2.116)

Volunteer Influence*Excluded Groups
Conscript Influence*Excluded Groups

Constant
Observations
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(0.625)
(0.651)
157
157
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Model 30:
Internal Threat
Interactions
0.527**
(0.224)
0.836
(1.351)
0.736
(0.839)
-1.760**
(0.734)
-0.456
(0.384)
-0.211
(0.285)
-0.00578
(0.0288)
-0.179**
(0.0849)
3.930*
(2.136)
-0.701
(0.477)
0.217*
(0.118)
-1.201*
(0.663)
157

The model without interactions still provides support for Hypothesis 2, but not for
Hypothesis 1. However, only the control variable for urban population is statistically
significant at greater than a 0.1 level. Model 29 shows similar results, though
unsurprisingly the patron influence variables are no longer significant when the
interaction terms are included. We also fail to reject null hypothesis that the interaction
terms are jointly equal to zero at a 0.35 level. Together this provides strong support for
Hypotheses 3 and 4.
Interestingly, there is also support that the perception of internal threat, defined by
the number of excluded ethnic groups, also affects military recruitment only in the
absence of a patron state. When interactions between the number of excluded groups and
patron influence are included in Model 30, a country with no patron has a lower
likelihood of using conscription with each additional ethnic group that it excludes. Such a
patron-less country with no excluded groups—like Yemen after reunification in 1990—is
associated with a 63 percent probability of using conscription. Meanwhile, one with ten
excluded groups—for example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2002—would
have only a 34 percent probability of using conscription. Furthermore, the interaction
terms between excluded groups and patron influence cannot be statistically distinguished
from each other and from zero at more than a 0.05 level. This demonstrates, consistent
with Hypotheses 3 and 4, that states are less likely to use conscription when they exclude
many groups from power, but not when there is patron influence to overpower local
threat perceptions.
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C. Robustness Checks
Finally, it is important to check that alternate specifications of my key
independent and dependent variables do not affect the model results. The results from the
base models remain fairly robust when I account for the possibility that the process of
military design may be different for some of the observations in my dataset. The
dichotomous variable indicating whether the observation is a new regime that emerged
after civil war is not statistically significant, demonstrating that the heterogeneity of my
sample is not a problem for my theory (Table 3.17). However, the patron influence
variables are also no longer significant at conventional levels.
Table 3.17: Robustness Checks
Variables
Total Land Borders
Civil War State
Volunteer Influence
Conscript Influence
Volunteer Legacy

Model 31: Civil Wars,
No Interaction
0.258***
(0.0824)
-0.0936
(0.355)
-0.782
(0.490)
0.713*
(0.373)
-1.383***
(0.483)

Volunteer Influence*Borders
Conscript Influence*Borders

Constant
Observations

-0.499
(0.400)
199
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Model 32: Civil Wars,
with Interaction
0.360***
(0.128)
-0.125
(0.356)
-0.0433
(0.751)
1.116
(0.700)
-1.447***
(0.517)
-0.240
(0.179)
-0.133
(0.201)
-0.799*
(0.465)
199

In Table 3.18, models 33 and 34 tests an alternative measure of foreign influence
on military design. I created an alternative variable that more directly measures the
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hypothesized process of professional emulation. This continuous variable measures the
proportion of a new state’s formal allies that use conscription, using data from the
Correlates of War Formal Alliance Dataset.236 Values closer to 1 indicate that a higher
proportion of a new state’s allies use conscription, while 0 would represent a case in
which all allies use volunteers.237 Frequent contact between allies should increase the
likelihood that norms of appropriateness regarding military recruitment practices diffuse
between them. Furthermore, because recruitment practices affect so many other aspects
of military design, allies may feel pressured to conform to the same military recruitment
practices, which may allow them to benefit from greater interoperability. Model 26
examines whether this measure of foreign influence affects military recruitment. As
expected, the ally recruitment variable is statistically significant. It also has a large
substantive effect—larger, in fact, than the effect of having a colonial legacy of
conscription: the predicted probability of adopting conscription increases from 4 percent
to 95 percent across the range of ally recruitment, while it only decreases from 59 percent
to 32 percent between states without and with a volunteer legacy.
Model 34 tests the interactive hypotheses 3 and 4 by including additional
variables to account for the possibility that a state has allies but no direct military patron.
It also includes interactions between these two influence variables and threat perception,
as measured by the number of land borders. The ally recruitment variable remains
statistically significant at a 0.01 level, providing support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. The
interaction between states with no patron and threat environment is statistically

236

Douglas M Gibler, International military alliances, 1648-2008. CQ Press, 2009.
States with no allies are coded 0.5, to indicate that they have an equal chance of going either
way.
237

135

significant at a 0.10 level, suggesting some support for Hypothesis 4. Moreover, the
effect is in the predicted direction: states without a patron that experience high threat
environments are more likely to use conscription. There is also support for Hypothesis 3,
as the interaction between ally recruitment and threat is not statistically significant.
Table 3.18: Robustness Checks
Model 33:
Alliance Emulation, no
Interaction
0.221**
(0.0857)
7.145***
(1.423)

Variables
Total Land Borders
Ally Conscription
No Patron
Ally Conscription*Land Borders
No Patron*Land Borders

-1.622***
(0.459)

Volunteer Legacy

Constant
Observations

-3.877***
(0.852)
203
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Model 34:
Alliance Emulation,
with Interaction
-0.219
(0.291)
5.297***
(1.778)
-1.457**
(0.686)
0.705
(0.539)
0.363*
(0.219)
-1.675***
(0.476)
-2.547**
(1.019)
203

Four final models replace the dichotomous variable for whether a new state’s
principal colonizer predominantly used conscripts with four dummy variables indicating
the specific identity of the colonizer as either the United Kingdom, France, Russia, or
Turkey/the Ottoman Empire (Table 3.19). This allows for an investigation of more
specific, cultural influences of colonizers, and thus is also a direct test of my hypotheses
against the common argument that British norms against using conscription led former
British colonies to use volunteer systems.
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Table 3.19: Robustness Checks
Variables

Total Land Borders

Model 35:
Colonizer
Dummies,
Borders/No
Interaction
0.244***
(0.0827)

Model 36:
Colonizer
Dummies,
Borders
Interaction
0.320**
(0.135)

Total Forceful MIDs
Volunteer Influence
Conscript Influence

-1.079**
(0.502)
0.983**
(0.390)

-0.515
(0.797)
1.293*
(0.687)
-0.179
(0.210)
-0.0991
(0.196)

Volunteer Influence*Borders
Conscript Influence*Borders

Model 37:
Colonizer
Dummies,
MIDs/No
Interaction

Model 38:
Colonizer
Dummies,
MIDs
Interaction

0.232
(0.148)
-1.017**
(0.509)
0.931**
(0.395)

0.481**
(0.190)
-0.634
(0.639)
1.178***
(0.446)

-0.987*
(0.523)
-0.354
(0.503)
0.990
(0.693)
1.222*
(0.647)

-0.626
(0.674)
-0.424
(0.268)
-1.008*
(0.565)
-0.382
(0.508)
0.908
(0.710)
1.180*
(0.659)

Volunteer Influence*MIDs
Conscript Influence*MIDs
British Colony
French Colony
Russian Colony
Turkish Colony
Constant
Observations

-0.721
(0.529)
-0.492
(0.472)
0.773
(0.713)
1.310**
(0.641)

-0.739
(0.541)
-0.486
(0.469)
0.777
(0.717)
1.320**
(0.646)

-0.907**
-1.147**
-0.241
(0.419)
(0.499)
(0.350)
195
195
195
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.377
(0.373)
195

In Models 35 and 36, threat is measured as the number of land borders, and an
Ottoman colonial legacy is statistically significant but a British one is not. This may cast
some doubt on arguments that emphasize a British cultural heritage as affecting military
recruitment. However, Models 37 and 38, which measure threat using the number of
forceful MIDs that a new state experiences, show slightly different results. Here, British
legacy is significant at a 0.1 level and Ottoman/Turkish legacy are both only significant
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at a 0.1 level. This indicates that colonial legacy may affect recruitment less through the
ideological or cultural traits of a particular colonizer being passed down to the colony,
and more through the way different colonizers interacted with threat environments or
behaved after independence. It also demonstrates the need for a reexamination of other
arguments that point to French or Russian origins as making conscription more likely.
Most importantly, however, there is stronger support for the effect of a conscript
colonizer—The Ottoman Empire/Turkey—than for the United Kingdom. Thus, there is
little evidence that specific colonizers endowed new states with cultural preferences that
led them to adopt certain recruitment practices after independence.
VI. Conclusion
This chapter has tested hypothesis that foreign influence after independence
affects how new states make military recruitment decisions. Importantly, the results
suggest that, while colonizer recruitment practice remains significant, so is foreign
influence after independence. In particular, states that have patrons interested in their
military design are likely to emulate the recruitment practices of their patron.
Independence acts as a critical juncture: patrons after independence can affect military
recruitment decisions.
Threat environments play a role in military recruitment policies, but the relative
effect of threat is highest when there is no foreign patron to dictate or otherwise influence
policy. This makes sense, not only because states with patrons have actors that may
directly guide their military design, but also because new states with foreign patrons can
more readily count on foreign help in the event of a major conflict. Having a patron
inevitably dampens the effect of threats, while patron-less states are more likely to need
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to rely on their own capabilities. It also seems that to the extent that threat perceptions
affect military recruitment practices in new states, it is through broad evaluations of the
state’s geostrategic position. Having more borders may make a state’s position more
precarious, leading to a greater willingness to take on the risks of conscription as a way to
increase security. More acute indicators of threat have a less consistent effect on military
recruitment practices.
In sum, this chapter has demonstrated an association between the recruitment
practices of new states and the recruitment practices of foreign states with influence in
the new state in the years after its independence. However, the statistical methods used in
this chapter leave several questions still in need of answers. For one, it is not yet clear
what role recruitment plays in determining or creating this association. Do new states
specifically look at and prioritize the recruitment practices of their patrons when
designing their own, or does emulation of recruitment follow from other emulated
practices? Does the interest in emulation originate in the new state, or does it occur
through a top-down process of pressure from the patron? In addition, it is important to
examine the particular logic motivating emulation: what purpose do states have in mind
when they adopt recruitment policies, and do these differ for patrons and their clients?
Finally, this chapter has only examined recruitment policies at a single moment in time—
during periods in which states are likely to be designing military institutions that they
expect will last a long time. It remains to be seen whether the initial effect of foreign
patrons continues to influence military recruitment policies after independence, as well.
To test these aspects of my theory, it is necessary to turn to case studies in the
following chapters. The case study chapters provide further evidence to support my
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argument that post-independence patrons affect military design through a mechanism of
emulation. While they continue my emphasis on new states, they also tease out the role of
my explanatory variables beyond initial periods of military design.
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CHAPTER 4: JORDAN
I. Introduction
The development of Jordan’s armed forces offers a quintessential case study of
foreign intervention in military design, as is described by my first causal pathway for the
development of recruitment policies. While there is no doubt that the British influenced
Jordanian military development, existing research has not established a clear causal
relationship between that influence and the country’s volunteer recruitment. This chapter
offers such a test. I find support for my first hypothesis: new states influenced by patrons
that prefer volunteer systems are more likely to develop volunteer armies. This chapter
also provides support for hypotheses 3 and 4 by showing that the Jordanian army was
developed in a high threat environment that influenced the recruitment preferences of
local Jordanian officials but did not affect how its British patrons perceived recruitment.
The British maintained high levels of influence on Jordanian military policy both
before and after independence. While the constant use of a volunteer military during this
period is consistent with an argument about cultural diffusion, I argue that it is actually
British policy itself that enforced volunteer military recruitment. The fact that British
influence can be interpreted as affecting either culture or military policy directly makes it
difficult to identify which mechanism is correct. However, I examine the policy
preferences of Jordanian and British officials in each period—before and after
independence—to show that a cultural opposition to conscription was unlikely to exist in
Jordan, despite British influence.
By contrast, the most common explanations of military recruitment would
attribute Jordan’s development of a volunteer army not to active British influence and
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control of military policy, but to either domestic factors or the international threat
environment. Such explanations emphasize that British influence during the Mandate
period diffused a cultural appreciation for individual rights, or, at the very least, the idea
that conscription was inappropriate. Thus, these theories predict that Jordan would have
developed a volunteer army even without British influence after independence because it
had become part of its domestic culture. If archival evidence supported these arguments,
there would be little evidence that Jordanian leaders debated whether to use conscription
or volunteers, because the cultural expectations would have made volunteer recruitment
the only permissible choice. Alternatively, if functional demands determined Jordanian
military recruitment, the debates would emphasize the internal security role of the
Jordanian army or the absence of a threatening international environment that would
require large amounts of manpower. Instead, archival evidence reveals consensus on an
external role for the Arab Legion, including debates on the use of conscription and size of
its forces.
In fact, a careful examination of the development of the Arab Legion—the name
of Jordan’s army until 1956—demonstrates that its volunteer army was far from
inevitable. British colonial practices in Jordan may have increased the likelihood that
volunteer recruitment would prevail after independence. However, the reason for this has
more to do with the way it set the stage for the British to foster a post-independence
patron-client relationship than the transmission of colonial values to the new state.
Whereas the latter explanation reflects a logic of normative isomorphism and cultural
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diffusion, I argue that the policymaking process was far more coercive.238 Rather, British
policymakers designed the Arab Legion. All evidence suggests that Jordanian leaders did
not fully internalize their colonizer’s cultural preference for volunteer militaries. Without
continued British intervention in military policy after independence, it is much more
likely that Jordan would have adopted a conscript recruitment system. Moreover, the
British decision to rely on volunteers was informed by a logic of consequences more than
by a logic of appropriateness, though one that was strongly influenced by British strategic
culture. Correspondence between Glubb and British government officials at the time
indicates that the British were reluctant to permit conscription in the Arab Legion despite
an increasingly dangerous external environment.
The chapter proceeds as follows, using documents from the British National
Archives in Kew, London and the John Bagot Glubb collection at St. Anthony’s College,
Oxford’s, Middle East Centre Archive to support my arguments throughout. These
archives contain first-hand reports that identify the key decision-makers during the period
of Jordanian military design, including the British Foreign Office, War Office, Chiefs of
Staff, General Headquarters of the Middle East Land Forces, and the Treasury, as well as
the commander of the Arab Legion, John Bagot Glubb. First, I briefly survey the
background and initial development of the Arab Legion to describe the extent to which
British military preferences dominated the client state. I examine the development of the
Arab Legion during the Mandate era and the early years of Jordanian independence, from
1946 through the end of the first Arab-Israeli War in 1949. This section establishes the
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high degree of control the British maintained over Jordan’s military policy as well as the
threat environment in which both local and British actors believed the Arab Legion
would initially operate. It uses archival sources to identify evidence that the important
debates and decisions about Jordanian military policy took place between Glubb and
officials in the United Kingdom. Second, I demonstrate that Jordanian actors did not
internalize the British preference for a volunteer system, and that without British
influence conscription may have been the most likely outcome. I find archival evidence
that Jordan’s leaders, including King Abdullah, considered implementing conscription
but were swayed by the greater influence of Jordan’s British patrons. This supports
Hypothesis 1, which argues that it is foreign influence, not cultural legacies, that
determine military recruitment. The third section demonstrates that, contrary to the
predictions of the colonial legacy, norms-driven argument, Glubb’s preferences for
Jordanian military design did adjust to changes in his perception of the threat
environment, though they remained dominated by a British preference for volunteer
militaries. Finally, I briefly summarize developments in military recruitment policies
after the decline of British influence. This section supports my second hypothesized
causal pathway, that a focus on internal threats rather than external ones, combined with
the absence of a clear patron interested in affecting military design, permitted greater
flexibility in recruitment policies. In sum, this chapter shows that it was British
domination of Jordanian security policy, rather than the diffusion of British cultural
practices, that influenced Jordanian military design.
The early development of the Arab Legion over the course of the two decades
before Jordanian independence, coupled with the continuity in its leadership under John
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Bagot Glubb after independence, means 1946 may constitute less of a critical juncture for
the purposes of military design than does independence for many other states. As P. J.
Vatikiotis writes, “one could argue in this case that the army created the state.”239 More
to the point, the British made the army, and continued making the army well after
independence. Whether military design in Jordan began in 1946 or earlier, it is clear that
the military practices of the United Kingdom and its proxies in Jordan determined that
country’s recruitment policies. As Kenneth Pollack wrote in his dissertation on military
effectiveness, “The British had built the Jordanian Army in their own image….Thus just
as Britain traditionally relied on a small, long-term service professional army, so too did
Jordan. Just as Britain had traditionally relied on a purely volunteer force so too did
Jordan.”240 This chapter will show that Jordan’s volunteer recruitment system was the
result of foreign security assistance and not of the diffusion of a British culture that
viewed conscription as contrary to an ideology of individual rights. Furthermore, it will
demonstrate that the dominant cultural tendencies in Jordan throughout the period of
British military influence would have been more likely to produce a conscript system in
the absence of that influence. In short, it was British influence after independence, not a
legacy of British influence from before independence, that led Jordan to emulate British
volunteer military recruitment.
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II. The Development of the Arab Legion
As Mark Heller writes, “it is impossible to overstate the British role in the history
of the Jordanian army.”241 Jordan’s military was subject to extensive influence from the
United Kingdom under the League of Nations Mandate system, as well as after its
independence in 1946. According to the Mandate system, territories whose populations
were not yet seen fit to govern themselves would be administered by more developed
states on behalf of the League. In the case of the former Ottoman territories, like Jordan,
the Mandatory system was intended to be temporary, “until such time as they are able to
stand alone.”242 Administrative control for the territory that became Jordan fell to the
United Kingdom under the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, in which the
United Kingdom and France divided their future control of the Ottoman Empire’s
territory in the Middle East. It was on this basis that the United Kingdom negotiated the
creation of a protectorate of Transjordan that, along with neighboring Palestine, would be
governed by the British Mandatory authorities.243 The British recognized Abdullah bin alHussein, son of the Sharif of Mecca, as Emir of Transjordan’s autonomous
administration, before he was crowned King following Jordan’s formal independence in
May 1946.
Nonetheless, Jordanian military affairs were essentially the sole preserve of the
British Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Peake from 1921 until 1939, when he was
succeeded by another British army officer, John Bagot Glubb, who retained control until
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his forced resignation on March 1, 1956. Given this British influence, it is not necessarily
surprising that Jordan developed a volunteer army—a recruitment choice it continued to
rely primarily on even after Glubb’s dismissal and replacement with local, Arab
commanders. British culture has traditionally had an uneasy relationship with
conscription, so it is only natural that a heavily British-influenced former colony like
Jordan would similarly oppose this recruitment system.244 Yet it is important to realize
that the development of a Jordanian volunteer army was based on this British influence
during the process of military design, not through vaguer cultural channels.
The forces that would later form the core of the Arab Legion were first raised by
Frederick Peake as the Mobile Force in 1921. In 1923, all security forces in Transjordan
merged into the Mobile Force and were renamed the Arab Legion; Abdullah appointed
Peake as its commander—a position he held as an employee of the Emirate.245 In 1926,
the British formed the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force (TJFF) and declared it responsible for
protecting Jordan’s frontiers. From that point until World War II, the British were
responsible for Jordan’s external security and the Arab Legion was relegated to providing
internal security.
The British maintained effective control over Jordanian military policy during this
period. While Peake (and later Glubb), were employed in a private capacity by Abdullah
and “technically were not instruments of British policy,” prior to independence they were
still “ultimately subordinate to the British Resident.”246 Furthermore, British financial aid
“furnished Abdullah with a solid economic base,” that made him ultimately dependent on
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the United Kingdom: “Annual British aid reached £100,000 by the mid-1920s [and] £2
million by the mid-1940s.”247 Nadav Safran writes that “the dependence of Jordan on
outside financial support has meant that outsiders have largely set the pace for the
development of its forces and limited its strategic choices.”248 Thus, this British
patronage was vital to the development of the Arab Legion, whose support Abdullah
relied upon for survival.
With the end of World War II, the beginning of the Cold War, and Jordan’s
looming independence, it became necessary for the British to reevaluate the role of the
Arab Legion. The British government, not Abdullah, both evaluated what these roles
would be and how the Arab Legion would be organized to achieve them. The British
actively discussed and determined the organization of the Arab Legion post-Jordanian
independence. In particular, throughout late 1945 representatives of different government
offices discussed who had financial responsibility for subsidizing the Arab Legion;
before the British evacuation of Palestine—in May 1948—the burden was borne by the
Foreign Office and War Office, while afterwards it would be only the Foreign Office that
paid.249 Until then, but even after independence, the Arab Legion was classified as a
“contingent force” by the British.250 This meant that “the War Office undertook to
‘maintain’ [it] and admit at least a certain amount of responsibility for making the
arrangements work.”251 Tellingly, the British government internally debated whether the
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Arab Legion should continue to be classified as a contingent force or rather as a foreign
army—and noted that in the case of the Arab Legion, it made little difference. One report
argued that “While ‘camouflaged’ as a foreign army, the Arab Legion is entirely paid for
by Great Britain, commanded by British Officers, and is essentially a British interest.”252
The size and structure of the Arab Legion was also often discussed in conjunction
with the cost of the subsidy, in ways that implied the British would have final say over
these issues. For example, in one meeting at the Treasury on March 6, 1946, British
Resident in Transjordan Alec Kirkbride is reported to have voiced that “apart from the
infantry formations which would be kept on as long as the War Office wanted them, the
permanent strength [of the Legion] would probably be two of the three existing
mechanized regiments.”253 Similarly, in April 1946 the Treasury wrote to the Foreign
Office to determine how many mechanized units should be the starting point for financial
assistance.254 Glubb’s plans for the reorganization of the Arab Legion in 1947 were also
reviewed by the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Land Forces before they received his
“full backing and approval.”255
During this time the British were planning the subsidy to an independent Jordan
based on primarily internal roles.256 While the British continued to plan that the Jordanian
army would have a “subsidiary role to the British army in the event of another world
war,” they deemed internal stability a more pressing and more likely mission.257 In
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particular, several internal security roles were envisioned. In March 1946 the British
assessed that the key tasks of the Arab Legion that determined the size of its subsidy
included “internal security,” “protection of the [Kirkuk-Haifa oil] Pipe Line,” which ran
from Iraq to Palestine, and “sealing off of the frontier with Palestine in the event of large
scale troubles,” as well as serving as Abdullah’s private army.258 The need to “keep the
tribes in order” to ensure that oil would continue to flow through the pipeline meant
stability in Transjordan was important in and of itself.259 However, Palestine was
considered the real vital territory within the British Middle East, and therefore stability in
Transjordan was also necessary because instability would inevitably have implications
for control over Palestine.260
The British perception of the security link between Palestine and Jordan would
only increase later. The increasingly uneasy situation in neighboring Mandatory Palestine
began to affect British strategic thinking about the Arab Legion. As an impending British
withdrawal from Palestine became clear, the long-term shape of the Arab Legion began
to be more organized around frontier defense. Glubb had been concerned about the
Palestine problem spilling over into Jordan in 1939, and by 1947 he was engaged in
comprehensive efforts to prepare for this threat once again.261 The British recognized that
the Arab Legion was vital for stability in Palestine and would need to be used in the event
of disturbances in Palestine, which would likely affect Jordan as well. The British
decided that “a long term reorganisation of the Arab Legion [was] connected closely with
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future developments in Palestine” and as a result, believe[d] it was “unwise to embark on
any sweeping changes in the strength or character of that force now.”262
The eruption of war with Israel in 1948 further changed the Arab Legion’s role
toward greater external defense. While the Arab Legion had always been trained to be
used in conventional conflict with external forces, by 1948 it had become a corps d’elite
fighting force among the Arab powers.263 This was a result of British planning and
reorganization. The British heavily supplemented the Arab Legion with more British
officers.264 Glubb, the only division commanders, both brigade commanders, three
battalion commanders, and nearly all other officers ranked major or higher were
British.265 During the war, “Abdullah was completely dependent on Glubb and the other
British officers who took orders not only from him but also from London.”266 This only
increased the extent to which the British controlled Jordanian military development.
The outcome of the war—which saw Jordan absorb the West Bank, more than
tripling its population—cemented this change in Jordan’s security environment. In early
1948, a meeting of the United Kingdom’s chiefs of staff noted that “Transjordan’s
strategic importance would increase if any parts of Palestine, which is of greater strategic
importance, were added to it.” Notably, they added that “This would similarly increase
the importance to us of the Arab Legion.”267 These predictions continued to hold true in
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1949, when discussions of Jordan’s subsidy focused on the new threat environment. In
June 1949, as a direct result of the end of hostilities in the Arab-Israel war. Glubb
assessed that the Arab Legion would likely have to deal with urban riots and rural
disturbances involving “actions by local gangs or gangs infiltrating from neighbouring
states,” such as Israel or Syria.268
The connection to Israel/Palestine and relations with Palestinians were not the
only external defense concerns of the United Kingdom at this time. The British also
envisioned a “national defense role” and “operational role in a major war.”269 The Chiefs
of Staff assessed that any major war in defense of Egypt would likely be conducted
mainly in Northern Palestine and Southern Syria, and thus Jordan could “scarcely fail to
be embroiled.”270 They also did not rule out the possibility of incursions from Iraq or
Saudi Arabia, with whom Jordan had a fraught history. Though some officials considered
external defense somewhat as a “bogey,” the Chiefs of Staff continued to plan for it.271
Thus, despite an increasing orientation toward territorial defense and external threats,
British policy continued to dominate Jordanian military design.

III. Jordanian Military Preferences
The above discussion supports my first hypothesis by demonstrating the British
maintained a decisive role in determining policies related to the size and organization of
the Arab Legion. Furthermore, that the Arab Legion remained a volunteer force despite
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the increasing British recognition of external threats to Jordan’s security supports
hypothesis 4—that threat perception is less likely to affect military recruitment when
there is a foreign patron. In this case the preferences of the foreign patron were most
decisive for determining recruitment.
This is all the more evident when the British role in military design is compared
to the Ottoman undercurrents in military culture, which could have influenced military
policy if there had been no British patronage. When Peake transferred control of the Arab
Legion to Glubb in 1939, it still had strong connections to the Ottoman army. As a result,
if there was any effect of colonial legacy on military recruitment in Jordan at the time, it
would have prejudiced the military toward a system of conscription—the system the
Ottomans employed when they ruled the territory of Jordan. Only 5 of the 47 officers in
the Arab Legion were British at the outbreak of World War II, and the following year
there were only two.272 Most of the rest were veterans of the Ottoman army and were
opposed to British influence.273 In 1944 there were still 15 officers of the former Ottoman
army serving in the Arab Legion, and while senior officers were all British after the war,
senior Arab officers were still primarily from the Ottoman era in 1946.274 Moreover, new
officers received little training under Peake.275 This lack of training, combined with the
small number of British officers, meant that there would have been little opportunity or
ability to transmit norms surrounding military recruitment to the old guard.
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This does not necessarily mean that the former Ottoman officers would have
preferred conscription. Indeed, many locals opposed conscription when it was
implemented during the brief period of Syrian rule before the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920.276
Conscription was enough of an issue to merit a promise from Herbert Samuel, first
British High Commissioner for Transjordan under the Mandate system, upon taking
office that Transjordanians would not be conscripted.277 However, it is possible that this
opposition was to the perception of enforcement of conscription by a foreign government,
rather than to conscription itself. The tribes of Transjordan enjoyed a high degree of
autonomy during the Mandate. Furthermore, it does not suggest that Abdullah would not
have tried to implement conscription anyway. In fact, Abdullah’s government sought to
extend its control over the tribes by implementing a census and election registrations,
which tribal leaders saw as the first steps to conscription.278 This resulted in domestic
unrest during registration campaigns in 1929. While it is not clear whether Abdullah
intended to use a national registry to enforce conscription—and he undoubtedly would
have had difficulty doing so—this would have been consistent with his broader goals of
extending his power and limiting the independence of the tribes. As Vatikiotis writes, “In
its earlier history the function of the Legion was mainly to extend and impose the
authority of Amman, i.e. of Prince Abdullah, over a fractious society.”279
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Furthermore, it is also likely that the ex-Ottoman officers of the early Arab
Legion shared the preferences of their similarly anti-British and nationalist former
colleagues in neighboring Iraq.280 There, conscription was strongly preferred over
volunteer recruitment. Similarly, Joseph Massad describes the anti-colonial nationalism
of non-Abdullah supporters as very similar to the nationalism in Iraq in ways that would
likely also create support for conscription. He argues that “for these nationalists, the army
was seen as a central institution to unify the nation. Its role was to integrate a varied
citizenry within the framework of national defense, the supreme duty of a nationalist.”281
Again, while not requiring conscription, contemporary nationalists tended to view
conscript service as a great unifier and source of support for the nation.
Similarly, Yoav Alon argues that the Jordanian “experience of statehood stemmed
from the Ottoman legacy.”282 He further argues that, while the Ottoman influence
weakened in the 1930s, there were nonetheless important cultural and institutional
continuities in the transition from Ottoman to Hashemite rule: “the authorities drew on
Ottoman methods of governing tribal society and further developed them.”283 Thus it
seems that Hashemite preferences, like those of the Ottomans before them, may have
been to use conscription as a way of weakening alternative sources of authority, despite
local opposition. In any event, the limited penetration of British military practices below
the leadership of the Arab Legion demonstrates that cultural diffusion would not have
been sufficient to influence military design toward a volunteer system. It could have been
just as likely to support conscription.
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It was not until the 1940s that British culture even started to take hold in the
Jordanian military. In 1939, Peake handed control of the Arab Legion over to another
British officer, John Bagot Glubb. Under Glubb and in wartime conditions, the make-up
of the Arab Legion shifted. Glubb began to promote officers slowly from within the
ranks, providing greater opportunity for professionalization.284 The Arab Legion was
greatly expanded, strengthened with more British officers, and sent to participate in
combat elsewhere in the Middle East.285 After the war, the British saw it necessary to
reorganize the Arab Legion to return to its prior focus on internal security—though as
shown above this would only be a temporary shift. In January 1946, High Commissioner
Sir Alan Cunningham noted that “the special use to which the Arab Legion was
successfully put during the war, and which justified its very large expansion, is now at an
end.”286 However, many British officers stayed with the Arab Legion after the war, which
provided for some continuity. In October 1947, 41 out of 191 officers were British.287
Thus, the British continued to influence policy through the provision of a subsidy and
officers and the presence of Glubb.
Despite the increase in British influence during World War II, and the substantial
continued British influence after independence, Jordanians were still not convinced
volunteer recruitment was the best way forward. The negotiations between the United
Kingdom and Jordan over the post-independence relationship demonstrates the continued
importance of a volunteer system to the United Kingdom, as well as the possibility that
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Jordanians would have implemented conscription if not for British patronage. Abdullah’s
concern for the continuation of support for the Arab Legion led him to secret discussions
with Iraq to provide an alternative source of patronage if terms with the British proved
unsatisfactory or if the British were to renege on their agreement.288 The British feared
that, just as British patronage created a British-style army, Iraqi patronage would lead the
army to develop more along Iraqi line. In a note on British-Jordanian negotiations, Glubb
wrote that Iraqi patronage would include the replacement of British officers with Iraqi
offices, and that as a result, conscription would probably be introduced.289 Thus, not only
did the British at the time view it likely that Jordan would adopt conscription if not for
British patronage, but the British were also strongly enough opposed to conscription to at
least note this as a negative consequence of loosening its grip on Jordanian military
policy.
Furthermore, even after independence, Jordanian leaders were not inherently
opposed to conscription. Indeed, without their dependence on Britain they are much more
likely to have implemented conscription. In May 1947, Glubb noted that Abdullah was
uneasy about his reliance on the British willingness to continue to supply a subsidy. He
wrote: “The Transjordanian government is extremely anxious to have an army of its
own….In my previous memorandum on the defence of Trans-Jordan I pointed out how
extremely small is the Trans-Jordan Army compared to those of it’s neighbours [sic].” In
response to this dilemma, Glubb noted, the Transjordanian government considered the
possibility of conscription. He “strongly opposed the proposal” because “Experience has
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shown that Arab conscript armies are no use…to transform it into a conscript army would
spoil it.”290 The British government made a similar assessment shortly before Jordanian
independence, arguing,
The Arab Legion is a long service well paid professional force. All other
Arab countries have made the fundamental mistake of introducing
conscription. Patriotism is not yet strong enough in any Arab country to
persuade men to serve willingly in an army without adequate pay. Well paid
armies of a fraction of the size of their present conscript armies would be
much more valuable to most Arab countries. As long as the other Arab
armies are recruited by conscription, the Arab Legion is likely to be the only
one efficient and loyal.291
These beliefs would continue to dominate British strategic thinking. This was the British
government’s assessment despite the belief that “the greater the contribution which
Transjordan can make to its own defence the smaller would be the British effort required
to fulfill [their] treaty obligations” to come to its aid.292 Thus, despite a perceived role in
a major conflict that might necessitate more manpower, the British influenced Jordan to
stay fast to the Arab Legion’s volunteer recruitment scheme.
The extensive pre-independence British influence on Jordan was clearly not
sufficient to convince Jordanians that the British preference for volunteers was correct. In
addition to Abdullah’s questions about conscription, Jordanian Prime Minister Samir alRifai also had concerns about the Arab Legion’s current ability to meet the threats it
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faced. British government correspondence notes that Rifai believed that “the Arab Legion
must be maintained at a reasonable strength as a measure for collective defence” and that
“the Arab Legion as now formed needs complete reorganisation.293 This is in direct
contrast to the British view, that saw reorganization as undesirable and maintained that
small, highly trained mobile forces were ideal. Indeed, there was extensive back and forth
among British officials regarding whether reorganization of the Arab Legion was
necessary, though ultimately they decided some reorganization would be beneficial.294
While this this does not show that Rifai or other Jordanian officials necessarily
would have implemented conscription had it not been for British influence, it does
suggest that they were more eager to engage in the types of military reform that would be
consistent with the goals of conscription than were the British. Without British influence
it is more likely that Jordan would have resorted to conscription to increase its defensive
capabilities. The next section will show that while the British influence kept the Arab
Legion itself volunteer, the high threat environment of Jordan’s early post-independence
years led to the development of auxiliary forces that would use alternative forms of
military recruitment.

IV. The Development of Jordan’s National Guard
Consistent with hypothesis 3, the Jordanian preference for conscription was at
least partially a response to their perception of a high external threat environment. Again,
this was especially true after the 1948 war with Israel. The West Bank, once absorbed by
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Jordan, was “certain to be the first objective of an Israeli attack.”295 Moreover, it was
clear that Jordan would be unable to prevent an Israeli breakthrough into the West
Bank.296
In fact, the external environment was so threatening that the British did permit a
form of compulsory recruitment to be implemented in Jordan. Notably, the Arab Legion,
as the principal military force of Jordan, was to remain purely based on volunteer
recruitment. However, Glubb proposed, and was permitted to implement, a National
Guard system that incorporated at least elements of conscript service. Glubb’s goal was
to develop an efficient, well-trained force capable of defending the West Bank.”297
However, as Kenneth Pollack writes, British officers were “completely opposed to
diluting the caliber of manpower by adopting large-scale conscription.”298 Instead, a
compromise emerged. The British would accept more volunteers at the same level of
training into the Arab Legion, but permit Glubb to implement his plan for a National
Guard to enhance readiness.
Glubb’s plan was influenced by the Israeli practice of ensuring that populations
living on the frontier were trained and armed well enough to defend themselves.299 In
June 1949 he proposed a plan to develop a “Home Guard” (later named the National
Guard) in which civilians in each village would be instructed on how to provide basic
training to other villagers.300 That instructor was then to give basic training for the whole
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of their village. In 1952 National Guard legislation was passed making one month of
training compulsory for every man in every village, without pay.301 The goal, according
to Glubb, was village defense and as a base of recruitment for the Arab Legion, and
would be “of far greater value in the event of a long war.”302
Consistent with my argument that British patronage led to British control over
recruitment policy, final approval on the development of the National Guard in 1949
seems to have rested with British officials. This is evident in a series of reports that
followed Glubb’s proposal to implement his National Guard plan. A first dispatch from
the British Legation in Amman, to Ernest Bevin, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
notes that Glubb required approval for his plan, which demanded the purchase of
additional rifles from the United Kingdom.303 The request was forwarded to the War
Office on September 9th, with the handwritten note “As the [Secretary of State] is away, I
think that I ought to clear this with the Minister of Defence.” 304 The proposal was
approved on October 4th, 1949.305
King Hussein, who came to power in 1953, also viewed the National Guard as an
important element of defense. He asserted that its purpose was to “defend the border in
order to allow the better trained and equipped army, in the event of [Israeli] aggression,
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to direct its strikes at specific targets.”306 Ultimately Glubb noted that there were
sufficient volunteers to avoid conscripting individuals into the National Guard.307
However, that this system was approved and implemented at all supports the hypothesis
that high threat environments encourage conscription. That it was strictly implemented in
a military force that was separate from the Arab Legion, however, indicates that British
military influence was important for keeping the latter a volunteer force.
V. Post-Glubb Developments in the Jordanian Army
Hussein dismissed Glubb on March 1, 1956. The circumstances that led to his
dismissal and the subsequent loss of British military control had developed relatively
recently. Part of the explanation has to do with the personality of the new king. Vatikiotis
argues that Glubb’s own beliefs about his dismissal—that the young Hussein resented
Glubb’s experience and influence over him—“May reflect accurately the feelings of a
young monarch struggling under immense and inimical pressure to establish his political
primacy.”308 Lawrence Tal agrees that much of the decision wrested with Hussein and his
personal ambitions.309 Kamal Salibi also emphasizes the identity and age of the new
monarch, referring to “the generation gap” between Glubb and Hussein that created
differences between them.310
All three of these sources agree that these differences were more than merely
personal, however, and rather reflected important political developments in the broader
Arab world. The rise of Arab nationalism made it increasingly untenable for the army to
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be dominated by the British, both at the level of officers and in terms of broader policy.
In the early 1950s—influenced by the nationalist coups in Syria and Egypt—a movement
formed in the Arab Legion called the Free Officers, which sought to “sack Glubb and
Arabise the Legion.”311 Riots in December 1955 and January 1956 centered on the
perception that the country was too much under the British thumb.312 In this political
environment, Glubb’s plan to Arabize by the Legion by 1965 was simply unacceptably
slow to many in the political opposition.313 Similarly, given this rising anti-British
sentiment and the overall decline in British imperial capabilities at this time, the benefits
to the British of retaining their influence or of preventing Glubb’s dismissal may have
been no longer perceived as worth the increasing cost.
British influence suffered a notable decline with the sacking of Glubb in 1956. By
1957, the United States had replaced the United Kingdom as Jordan’s principal source of
foreign support.314 However, the United States did not have the same interest in Jordanian
military design as did Glubb, as its leader. One of the key goals of Glubb’s firing was to
take back control of the Arab Legion. Hussein wanted to Arabize it, and in doing so
wanted to “demonstrate he was breaking the fetters of imperialism” and distance the Arab
Legion from its perception as “an alien force, run by British officers, taking orders not
from Jordan, but from their British commander.”315 Indeed, this was when the Arab
Legion was renamed the Jordan Arab Army, and British officers were quickly replaced
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with Jordanian ones.316 Thus, rather than simply replacing one patron with another, after
Glubb’s dismissal Jordan gained much more autonomy over its military than it previously
enjoyed.
In addition, the army leadership that replaced Glubb “had little use for the British
colonial notion of ‘tradition’” and “saw the army as an instrument of national
unification.”317 This is a goal that conscription is better suited to than volunteer
recruitment. Conscription is better able to force the integration of diverse populations
compared to volunteer recruitment, which must rely on the segments of the population
that are traditionally attracted to military service. Glubb, on the other hand, sought to
cultivate a high level of cohesion and corps d’esprit. He ensured separation between
recruits from tribes and the sedentary population, and recruited primarily from specific
tribes.318
The end of British influence created a permissive environment in which
Jordanians policymakers were able to make recruitment decisions based on their own
ideas about military design. Thus, while military recruitment stayed stably voluntary
throughout the period of British patronage, Jordan now began to change its recruitment
system more frequently. In 1966 it abolished the National Guard and instituted
compulsory military service for the first time. Two years later the service term was
expanded from ninety days to two years; two years after that they transitioned back to a
volunteer force, and in 1976 conscription was reinstated. These frequent recruitment
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changes suggest that Jordanian leaders were unconstrained by a patron to guide their
military design choices during this time.
This period was characterized by particularly high threat levels for Jordan.
Security threats emerged from an ever-shifting array of inter-Arab alliances and the rise
of Pan-Arabism.319 However, the government perceived the dominant threat as coming
from within the state. The Jordanian Prime Minister argued that, in addition to the threat
from Syria, it was internal security “which made it essential” to maintain high force
levels.320 In order to maintain these force levels he had even discussed the possibility of
implementing conscription with Hussein as early as October 1957, though they ultimately
decided against it.321 Notably, however, the tone of reports on debates about conscription
contrasts with the earlier report from Glubb. As will be discussed below, recruitment now
appeared to be under the control of the King and his Jordanian advisers, rather than
adopted according to British interests.
The internal threat became especially severe after the formation of the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964. The PLO constituted a potential alternative
source of authority for Arabs from the strategically important West Bank, who made up
most of the country’s population. One demand the PLO made was for stronger defense of
the frontier, including compulsory military service.322 The Jordanian government’s
implementation of conscription in the 1960s was designed not only to satisfy these
popular demands, but also to “prevent the likelihood of Jordan’s youth joining the
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[Palestinian] guerrillas.323 Again, the British now appear to have allowed recruitment
decisions to rest with the Jordanian government. While the British continued to offer
advice, reports from the Military and Air Attache’s officer show that the most important
policymakers were no longer British advisers but Jordanian advisers: In 1964, one report
describes how a chief adviser to Hussein “had no intention of allowing conscription to be
introduced,” and that “his plan was to expand the Army…without resort to
conscription.”324 This contrasts with King Abdullah’s earlier consideration of
conscription. Then, Glubb’s opposition resulted in an alternative reserve scheme that was
adopted by the Jordanian government. Post-Glubb reports on conscription reveal less
about British preferences, and instead report Jordanian debates and outcomes as matters
of policy.
Ultimately skepticism regarding the risks of arming the entire population
prevailed and Jordanians temporarily abandoned conscription in 1970. However, the
connection between the initial implementation of conscription in the 1960s and concerns
for internal stability show that conscription would not have been possible without the
earlier change in leadership. This permitted domestic policymakers with new ideas about
the role of the military in society to take power and implement their preferred recruitment
policies.
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VI. Conclusion
Jordanian military policy was for all intents and purposes the sole preserve of
British policymakers from the beginning of the Mandate system through the first ten
years after independence. The resulting recruitment policies followed a logic that was
consistent with how the British tended to think about the role of the military at the time.
Although the British themselves used conscription for their own armed forces in the
1940s, British thinking still favored volunteer recruitment. Domestically, conscription
was viewed as an unfortunate necessity and was never intended to provide a permanent
basis of recruitment.325 It was the government’s “constant aim to increase the proportion
of regulars and…our ultimate object [to achieve] smaller active forces based on voluntary
long-term engagements.”326 Moreover, the British citizens who led the Arab Legion
became officers in a period before National Service was ever implemented. It is
unsurprising that, as the evidence in this chapter shows, they preferred to recruit
volunteers to the foreign army they were designing, as well.
As British influence in Jordan declined, Jordanian policymakers became freer to
experiment with alternative forms of recruitment. Nationalists who viewed regime
stability as the primary goal and the military as an important resource for pursuing that
goal came to power. They eventually implemented conscription, though only for a few
years. Nonetheless, this shows that domestic leaders, when not constrained by high levels
of external threat and foreign patrons, are able to adopt recruitment policies based on
their own preferences. Moreover, these policies are more malleable, in part because they
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are subject to changes in domestic politics rather than to the relatively more stable
preferences of a foreign patron.
Therefore, this chapter supports my argument that foreign patrons influence
military recruitment in new states. It also supports the hypothesis that threat plays little
role in influencing foreign patron’s military recruitment preferences, as the British
maintained the Arab Legion as a volunteer force despite changes in threat perception.
Finally, I have demonstrated that colonial legacies were not enough to shape recruitment
practices in Jordan. Ottoman-era preference for conscription continued to influence
Jordanian thinking through much of the post-independence period. The principal factor
explaining Jordan’s volunteer recruitment system was the ongoing policy intervention of
the British.
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CHAPTER 5: IRAQ
I. Introduction
In 2003, the United States dismantled the Iraqi military and rebuilt it from the
ground up, electing to design it around a system of volunteer recruitment. This was a
stark change from the type of army Iraq had traditionally maintained. In fact, when it last
had an army recruited on a volunteer basis, Iraq was under a similar occupation by a
different foreign power. Then it was the United Kingdom, in its capacity as the colonial
power overseeing a League of Nations Mandate, that oversaw and shaped Iraq’s armed
forces.327 During the entire period of the Mandate, the United Kingdom exercised
enormous influence over the entire Iraqi government, including the defense
establishment, and sought to shape the army in its own image as a volunteer force.
Nonetheless, Iraq adopted conscription nearly immediately upon receiving independence
in 1932. Why?
In this chapter I argue that Iraq’s conscript army developed along the lines of my
second causal pathway: military recruitment free from external patronage and external
threat. Its recruitment policy was a result of Iraqi domestic policymaking, which was in
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turn influenced by policymakers’ familiarity with and preference for Ottoman military
practices. Furthermore, this relative freedom to adopt recruitment policies based on
historical experiences was made possible by the absence of two key constraints on the
Iraqi military. First, neither the United Kingdom nor any other country took on the role of
a military patron—while the United Kingdom provided some support to Iraq after
independence, as described below, it chose not to exert control over recruitment
decisions. Second, there was no major external threat to Iraq’s security.
Iraq’s decision to adopt conscription is even more puzzling given the apparent
continuity in Iraqi politics after independence. The United Kingdom remained the
paramount force in Iraqi politics well after the Mandate ended, and many scholars argue
that it continued to exercise considerable influence over the Iraqi military.328 However, I
argue that despite the United Kingdom’s continued influence, there was one key
difference that characterized the relationship between Iraq and the United Kingdom after
the former’s independence. While Iraq was dependent on military support from the
United Kingdom, after independence it was granted autonomy to adopt its own military
design decisions. The United Kingdom may still have had the capacity to intervene in
military design if it wanted to, but it sent clear signals that Iraq could adopt its own
preferences for recruitment policies. For the United Kingdom, the costs of continued
intervention in Iraqi military design were too high given the history of rebellion and the
availability of Jordan as a base of operations for the region.
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What, then, explains the Iraqi preference for conscription and its implementation
after independence? I argue that the British attitude of non-interference, coupled with an
environment of low external threats, created few constraints on Iraqi policymaking.
Instead, Iraqi leaders’ personal beliefs about the role of the military in society influenced
their decision-making. The recent experiences and education of Iraqi policy-makers
fostered beliefs that the military could be a tool for nationbuilding—the process of
creating a unified Iraqi national identity—and statebuilding—the strengthening of central
state institutions. More specifically, post-independence Iraqi leaders were more the
product of an Ottoman military education that stressed conscription’s nation- and
statebuilding aspects than of the British advisors that had most recently trained them. In
other words, in the absence of external influence after independence, one of Iraq’s
competing colonial legacies—that of the Ottoman Empire—played a major role in
determining recruitment decisions.
This explanation differs from the most common alternative theory presented in
the literature on military organization, that recruitment decisions represent deeply
ingrained culture or norms inherited from the colonial period. While both my theory and
a colonial legacy argument attribute Iraqi decision-making to domestic ideology, they
differ in terms of what constitutes the source of that ideology and how determinative it is.
For one, my theory only attributes importance to ideology because two other factors—an
interventionist foreign patron and a dangerous external environment—were not present to
otherwise constrain policymaking. Furthermore, I do not assume that ideology is
automatically passed down from colonizer to colonized. Rather, many states—Iraq
included—are characterized by competing colonial or pre-colonial legacies that could
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equally have become dominant after independence. In the case of Iraq, for example, it is
not clear—until one examines the nature of Iraqi military training and development—
why an Ottoman cultural legacy would supersede the more recent British one.
In addition, I recognize independence as an important critical juncture that, under
the right conditions, permits new policymakers to act on their own ideas. These ideas
may be influenced by cultural legacies, but are at least as likely to have more proximate
origins. The fact that in Iraq’s case policymakers were influenced by less proximate
historical ideas says more about how the circumstances in which Iraq achieved
independence fostered continuity than it does about the prima facie power of a specific
colonial legacy.
Moreover, these early decisions have important implications for the modern Iraqi
army. Iraq’s longtime reliance on conscription has left deep marks in its security culture.
Post-2003 governments have considered re-implementing conscription in Iraq.329
Consistent with my theory, the main obstacle to Iraq’s returning to its traditional form of
recruitment is the high level of international involvement in military design and training
since the 2003 invasion. The United States currently has hundreds of advisers in Iraq that
have trained tens of thousands of Iraqi troops.330 In addition, at least 5,000 American
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troops—likely more, given undisclosed deployments—have been participating in the war
against Islamic State, which has required extensive cooperation with the Iraqi military.331
If not for this overwhelming presence and advice, Iraq would likely return to conscript
recruitment.
However, this chapter focuses on the initial conditions in which Iraq built its
military after its 1932 independence. I first describe the genesis of the Iraqi army and its
organization during the Mandate era, highlighting the British role in these preindependence military design decisions. Second, I examine the extent to which British
preferences diffused to their Iraqi patrons, arguing that, as in Jordan, the pre-Mandate
Ottoman influence remained the dominant ideological force that affected Iraqi thought on
military organization. In the next section I address the claims of my theory. I argue first,
that the British did not play an active role in military design in Iraq after its
independence, and second, that Iraqi leaders who did make military design decisions did
not perceive their external threat environment to be particularly threatening. These two
conditions created a permissive environment in which Iraqi leaders could design the
military based on idiosyncratic factors relating to their prior beliefs about the relationship
between the military and society.
This chapter tests my theoretical claims in several ways. First, it highlights the
importance of independence as a critical juncture in the process of military design.
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Despite high levels of British influence before and after 1932, formal independence
increased the costs of direct British interference in the field of military design, especially
given divergent Iraqi preferences. Independence permitted Iraq greater control over its
military policies, allowing it to deviate from existing British practices.
Second, it emphasizes the freedom domestic political leaders have to design the
military based on idiosyncratic preferences when they have neither committed foreign
patrons nor major external threats to address. Thus the case of Iraq after independence is
illustrative of my second causal pathway for military recruitment decisions. One cannot
predict the recruitment practices the Iraqi military would adopt without a detailed
understanding of the country’s leaders’ particular preferences.
Finally, this chapter highlights the inability to understand military recruitment
based on theories that rely purely on colonial legacy. A more traditional colonial legacy
approach ignores two key facts about military recruitment in Iraq. First, it overlooks the
immense difference in preferences between Iraqi and British policy elites during the key
period of Iraqi military design. Colonial legacy arguments require believing that colonial
preferences are passed on to the policymakers in the newly independent state. This was
clearly not the case in Iraq. Thus, a colonial legacy argument cannot reconcile the
immense British role in all aspects of Iraqi foreign and defense policy—including
military design—during the Mandate era with the post-independence Iraqi leadership’s
explicit rejection of British colonial practices. Second, an alternative explanation based
on colonial legacy could highlight the continuity between the Ottoman period and postindependence Iraqi military practices. However, this argument requires ignoring the very
real influence of the British during the intervening Mandate era, as well as the possibility
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that the British could have continued to enforce their preferences after independence.
While ultimately Ottoman military preferences did influence independent Iraqi leaders’
decisions on military design, this was only possible because the British did not exercise
their influence on the Iraqi military after independence. To argue that an Ottoman
colonial legacy was the decisive factor leading to conscription in Iraq fails to
acknowledge the ability of the British to overpower these underlying preferences for
more than a decade during the Mandate era.

II. The History of the Iraqi Army
As with the Jordanian army, the development of the Iraqi army combined
powerful Ottoman-era influences with efforts to superimpose contemporary British
interests. World War I ended with the United Kingdom in control of much of the Middle
Eastern territory of the Ottoman Empire, including the territory that would become Iraq.
In 1920 the San Remo Conference formalized this control under the aegis of the League
of Nations Mandate system, which made the United Kingdom responsible for overseeing
the creation of effective governance and stability in Iraq until it met the criteria for
admission to the League of Nations as a sovereign state. Unsurprisingly, the British found
the creation of armed forces to be useful for the purposes of establishing stability.
The British created two separate armed forces. First, they recruited a force known
as the Iraq or Assyrian Levies. Initially formed during World War I, the Levies were
under direct British control and were ultimately manned mainly by ethnic Assyrians,
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except for the officers, who were British.332 The Levies numbered more than 5,000 at
their peak strength at the end of World War I, but had only light weaponry and were
tasked primarily with guarding British military installations—air bases that were
considered vital stop-overs on the way to India.333 They were also a major point of
contention between Iraq and the United Kingdom. The British viewed the Levies as an
important force loyal exclusively to them that could be counted upon absolutely to
protect their assets within the country.334 For precisely this reason, the Iraqi government
viewed the Levies as a major affront to their future sovereignty.335
The British were aware of this tension and had no intention of making the Levies
the national armed forces of Iraq. Well-trained locals were too scarce to dilute the ethnic
makeup of the Levies, and in any event the British had no desire to give up control of the
force that guarded their important military bases. Conversely, local opposition to British
rule was too pervasive and powerful to deny Iraqis the important symbol of sovereignty
that would come with control over their own military force. This became particularly
clear after the 1920 rebellion against British direct rule. Indeed, Abbas Kadhim argues
that this was the key memory for the British as they planned their administration of
Iraq.336 The 1920 insurrection was largely caused by the perception of Iraqis that the
British were reneging on their promises of home rule. While the cities remained largely
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loyal and under British control, it inflicted major losses on both sides, bringing “almost
total anarchy to the countryside.”337 Pacification required “some months of exhausting
British military efforts,” including several “misadventures,” “the summoning of
important reinforcements from India,” and expenditure of £40 million: much more than
had been spent during contemporaneous conflicts elsewhere in the region.338 The high
cost of the conflict also mobilized British domestic public opinion against intervention in
Iraq.339
One of the key consequences was the decision that continued intervention in
Iraq’s domestic policies would be too costly. The British decided to accelerate Iraq’s
transition to home rule, including the establishment of Feisal I as King of Iraq and the
reduction of Iraqi reliance on British troops. While the British had more than 60,000
troops in Iraq in 1920, only the Levies remained by 1930.340 Thus, it became clear that
Iraq would need an army not only as an important symbol of home rule, but also to
relieve the British of some of the responsibilities of enforcing stability.341 In addition, one
way in which a locally recruited national army would contribute to stability was by
providing employment for the “large and articulate group of unemployed and
discontented” officers from the recently defeated Turkish army.342
An Iraqi national army became an important part of the broader British strategy
for disengaging from Iraq. On January 6th, 1921, the seeds of the Iraqi military were
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planted when the Council of Ministers created the Iraqi General Staff.343 However, the
key decisions about the development of the army were made by the British two months
later when Winston Churchill, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, convened a
conference in Cairo in 1921 in which the future of British policy in Iraq, including its
defense, was decided. An important outcome of the conference was the determination
that Iraq would need an indigenous army: one “staffed, run and funded by Iraqis.”344
While the British continued to pay most of the cost for Iraqi defense forces, “the primary
and constant goal of those in London was to reduce the costs of the Mandate by forcing
the Iraqi government to take greater financial and strategic responsibility for its own
defense as soon as it could.”345 The goals of the army reflected British concerns about
maintaining influence at low cost to the British government. The army would be big
enough to suppress internal unrest but small enough to prevent the state from revolting
against the British.346 In 1922, 250 former Ottoman officers were inducted into the officer
corps, with the army reaching an initial strength of 2,000 volunteer recruits.347
The British sought to instill their military preferences in the Iraqi leadership in
several ways. First, there was a British military advisory mission, which included at least
46 military officers by 1930.348 In addition, the British helped set up an Iraqi Military
College. The Royal Iraqi Military College opened in 1921 before closing for financial
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reasons and reopening in 1924. The Director of the college and 15 out of 20 instructors
were British.349 Instruction relied on English textbooks, and even experienced officers
were required to redo their training along British lines.350 An additional Staff College for
senior officers opened in 1928.
Furthermore, the British retained ultimate authority for all Iraqi military matters.
According to Marc Heller, “From 1920–1932 the army of Iraq was virtually a British
appendage. During this period, it was directly financed by a British grant, and technical
decisions about size, training, equipment, and so on were a British Monopoly.”351 The
1922 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, ratified in 1924, secured the nature of this relationship,
establishing that the United Kingdom would continue to be responsible for the external
defense of Iraq. Moreover, a Military Agreement signed as subsidiary to the treaty
maintained that Iraq could lose its British military assistance if it failed to follow the
advice of the High Commissioner on military matters.352 This was no idle threat: The
Bonar Law government—formed in 1922—seriously considered a complete evacuation
of Iraq during its first few months, and a “fierce” campaign to “Quit Mesopotamia” filled
the British press at the time.353 While the British were anxious to have the treaty ratified,
doubts remained about the British role in Iraq should it not be ratified on favorable terms.
Despite high levels of British influence in Iraq, Ottoman practices continued to
dominate Iraqi military thinking. As al-Marashi and Salama write, citing recollections
from a graduate of the Military College, the British attempted “to create officers in the
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British mold, but Iraqis could not isolate themselves from the ideological currents in
society.”354 This was also true of Iraqi policymakers. Shortly after independence the new
government easily passed a bill calling for conscription.355 The next section details the
failure of the British to inculcate Iraqi leaders with a preference for a volunteer military.

III. Divergent Interests during the Mandate Era
Direct British influence in Iraqi military design ensured that the army would
develop along British lines. However, without this British intervention, it is unlikely that
the outcome for Iraqi military recruitment during the Mandatory period would have been
the same. There were major disagreements between British and Iraqi policymakers
throughout this period, explicitly over the form of military recruitment, that likely were
resolved in Britain’s favor only due to its direct control over the military.
Iraqi leaders sought to implement conscription throughout the Mandatory period.
In fact, conscription was one of the first proposals made by the government after Feisal
became king in 1921.356 Iraqi policymakers wanted conscription because they viewed a
strong army as increasing their chances for independence by demonstrating their ability
to provide for their own defense.357 Al-Marashi and Salama note that one of the reasons
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Feisal was so eager to expand the army after independence was that “his kingdom could
not ‘stand tall’ without a national army.”358 Feisal and his advisors viewed conscription
as important not merely because they wanted a large army for military purposes, but also
because they expected the military to serve as a unifying force for the nation. Toby
Dodge, relying on British archival documents that cite Iraqi leaders’ views on
conscription, describes how the “Hashemite vision of a mass conscripted army mirrored
their conception of the state and nation. Conscription of the urban population into the
army would forcibly create a homogenous and loyal nation through state action. The
army was to be the primary tool of education and statebuilding.”359 According to Reeva
Simon, who examines the background of Iraqi leaders, they “hoped to make the army a
school for the nation, an extension of the educational system.”360 She cites Phebe Marr’s
biography of Yasin al-Hashimi—a Prime Minister both before and after independence—
as evidence that it became “close to a dogma” that conscription could be used “to achieve
national cohesion.”361 Iraqi leaders again tried to implement conscription in 1926 by
presenting High Commissioner Henry Dobbs with a draft conscription law.362 In
parliamentary debates over the issue, Iraq’s first Minister of Defense, Jafar al-Askari
argued that conscription would not just aid defense but would “open the door of
participation” and “be more inclusive of the racial qualities and national virtuies with
which the Iraqi nation is graced than an army built on any other basis.”363
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This belief in the efficacy of conscription can be traced to the continued
dominance of Ottoman thinking in the Iraqi military, which Simon argues was the
intellectual foundation for much of the Iraqi army. For one, strong anti-British currents
continued to run through the military. The majority of army officers had served in the
Ottoman military, with dozens of Iraqi cadets having been accepted to the military
academy in Istanbul.364 Even in September 1936, four years after independence, 50 out of
84 officers had served in the Ottoman army.365 Exposure to Ottoman military education,
argues Simon, was in effect indoctrination with the principle of “unification of diverse
elements into a nation based on a common language and history.”366 Thus the Iraqi
military viewed conscription as the appropriate solution to a domestic statebuilding
problem: how to build support for a weak central government dominated by a minority
group elite. Even mandatory British military training was insufficient to overcome these
influences. Although most instructors were British, the ex-Ottoman instructors at the
Military College still “conveyed to their students Arabism and anti-imperialist ideas.”367
Second, this Ottoman influence in the military was replicated in the ruling class.
Indeed, the British choice for political leadership lay “among the city notables and the
former Ottoman officials and officer class.”368 This was not least because many of the
leaders of Iraq under the Mandate were former military officials, like Jafar al Askari and
Nuri Said, both of whom served as prime minister during the Mandate. Paul Hemphill
agrees that continued contact with Ottoman ideas via Ottoman-era military instructors
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influenced policies: “Officers who had served in the Ottoman and Arab armies continued
to mix with former comrades-in-arms….Cadets and junior officers, to whom teachers and
instructors had conveyed the ideas of their elders, remained in touch with school friends
and family acquaintances who had selected civilian careers.”369 Thus it is unsurprising
that Ottoman thinking about the military and the role of conscription was common among
Iraqi policymakers. A British report from the time also contends that “Iraqi politicians of
all shades of opinions have long wished to change the system of recruiting for the army.
They have inherited continental ideas on [conscription] through the Turks and believe
that conscripts are better fighters than professional soldiers,” as well as because “they
believe that it will strengthen national unity among the diverse peoples of Iraq and will
enable the Government to organize a much larger army without seriously increasing the
cost of maintenance.”370
It is important to recognize that the Ottoman influence on policymakers did not
extend to all sectors of society. Many groups were deeply opposed to conscription.
Indeed, one problem with cultural determinism explanations for military recruitment is
that the history of opposition to conscription runs just as deep as the history of state
enforcement of conscription. Under the Ottoman Empire, conscription disproportionately
affected the Shi’a tribes and was “the most resented” of Ottoman institutions.371
Similarly, the Iraqi leadership’s desire to implement conscription was a major point of
contention with the British in part because of opposition from the Shi’a tribes, whose
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support the British relied on to secure the countryside.372 These tribes continued to
oppose vigorously efforts to conscript their members to the Iraqi national army after
independence.373
Meanwhile, despite the preferences of Iraqi leaders, the British remained starkly
opposed to the idea of a conscript-based Iraqi army. There are both pragmatic and
cultural reasons for the United Kingdom’s interest in keeping the Iraqi army a volunteer
force. For one, as Peter Sluglett demonstrates using British archival documents, the
United Kingdom’s use of air power allowed them to justify keeping a small Iraqi army
that was reliant on them.374 Dobbs feared that rapidly expanding the army would lead to
major domestic unrest.375 Thus maintaining a small army perpetuated the United
Kingdom’s position of dominance in Iraq. Ultimately, as the Secretary of State for the
Colonies indicated in a letter to the High Commissioner in 1928, the United Kingdom
was not prepared to allow Iraq to adopt policies that would make it independent on
matters of defense.376 Preventing conscription, which the British perceived as enabling
Iraq to recruit a much larger army, would keep it dependent on the British. Less
cynically, the British were concerned that the adoption of conscription would alienate the
Shi’a tribes and lead to internal disorder.377 Of course, it is difficult to separate these
British attitudes toward conscription in Iraq from their own experience with military
recruitment. Dobbs was opposed to conscription on the grounds that it was “A policy
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which is against all our traditions.”378 It is telling that the British opposed conscription
despite their belief that “speedy progress with the creation of the army [was] the most
important and urgent problem” of the day.379 This reinforces the idea of a deep-seated
British opposition to conscription, which led the British to oppose it despite having some
advantages in achieving British goals.
Regardless of the reasons, it is clear that the United Kingdom actively opposed
Iraqi leaders’ preference for conscription. Furthermore, it is this opposition that kept Iraq
from adopting conscription before independence. As one British report notes, “Until 1932
the Iraqi Government reluctantly gave way to British views.”380 There were some
minority views among British advisors that conscription could be useful, and the issue
was actively debated. A key example illustrating the importance of Iraqi military
recruitment to the United Kingdom can be found in the debates that followed Iraqi
attempts to introduce a conscription law in 1926. British advisors debated the merits of
conscription and how it should be implemented. Kinahan Cornwallis, advisor to the Iraqi
Minister of the Interior, for example, wrote to the High Commissioner suggesting
conscription because there was “no virtue in the maintenance of a large voluntary army
without a reserve.”381 Moreover, he noted the importance of determining whether “the
forces of His Majesty’s Government will be available” to enforce conscription.382 This
indicates that military recruitment was important not just to local officials but to the
government of the United Kingdom as well.
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However, this also underscores the fact that British support for conscription was
contingent on British willingness to enforce a policy that they deemed would be
unpopular in Iraq. Ultimately, the British determined that conscription was not a viable
option and that they could not support it. Their concerns principally stemmed from the
unpopularity of conscription across much of Iraq. Official correspondence shows that
High Commissioner Dobbs feared that “conscription would arouse the intense hostility of
the rural population across Iraq.”383 The result, he predicted, would be that conscription
could not be applied to the tribal sections of the population, leading to “urban and
suburban sections of society as the only source of possible recruits” and resulting in
severe consequences for the available workforce.384 Worse still, efforts to enforce
conscription “would be followed by a widespread tribal combination and rising which
might easily bring about a return of the conditions of 1920”—precisely the conditions
that the United Kingdom sought to avoid by permitting home rule.385

IV. Iraqi Military Freedom after Independence
The British interest in Iraqi military design was strong while the United Kingdom
remained formally responsible for Iraq’s stability. This situation changed after Iraq
achieved independence. The United Kingdom was no longer willing to exert direct
control over the Iraqi military. Moreover, it made this abundantly clear to Iraqis in the
years leading up to independence. This, combined with a low perception of external
threats that permitted Iraq to focus on internal security, allowed leaders to adopt a
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military recruitment policy based on domestic preferences informed by their idiosyncratic
socialization with Ottoman ideas about the role of the military in society.
A. British Involvement After Independence
Many scholars have argued that Iraq continued to be dependent on the United
Kingdom well after independence.386 The 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was signed after the
British announced their intention to recommend the League of Nations recognize Iraq,
ending the mandate establishing the post-independence relationship between Iraq and the
United Kingdom. The treaty required Iraq to consult with the United Kingdom in all
foreign policy matters. The British also maintained military instructors in Iraq until the
1950s.387
While this may have been the case, the British chose not to exercise their
influence in the sphere of military design. As Toby Dodge argues, the “power and role of
British advisers changed dramatically” during the middle years of the Mandate,
decreasing in influence from “exercising executive control to assisting Iraqi office
holders.”388 He cites one British civil servant as describing the role of advisor as,
“whether you call him an Under-Secretary or Inspector-General or a Director, is an
Englishman.”389 Indeed, British policymakers did not perceive Iraq to constitute any vital
interests. Mark Heller argues that, with no oil production until 1927, “at the end of World
War I, British cultural and commercial interests in Iraq were of minor importance,” and
that “Iraq was never deemed to be as vital to the imperial system as were, for example,
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Egypt or Aden.”390 Although he maintains that British influence was preserved even after
independence, he explains that this influence was insufficiently applied compared to
Jordan, and he acknowledges that the British “relinquished direct control” in 1932.391
Principal British interests were in the maintenance of their several air bases throughout
the country. However, they were able to provide security for these using the Levies after
independence, and so did not need to rely on Iraqi national forces.
The absence of major strategic interests in Iraq suggests little need for the United
Kingdom to have extended the resources necessary to ensure that the Iraqi army
continued to implement British-preferred policies after Iraq was granted independence.
Dodge argues that from the very beginning, the British “were very aware of the
temporary nature of their tutelage” and that “Britain’s primary policy goal from 1927
onward was to unburden itself of its international responsibilities towards Iraq as quickly
as possible.”392 Others have also argued that the Mandate was clearly not intended to be a
long-term arrangement. Ernest Main, writing in 1935, describes how in the subsidiary
Military Agreement, both parties agreed that “the Government of Iraq should at the
earliest possible date accept full responsibility for the maintenance of internal order and
the defence of the country from foreign aggression: British military assistance was to be
progressively reduced ‘with all possible expedition’ [emphasis added].”393 Similarly, the
1924 Military Agreement provided that “Iraq should within four years become entirely
self-defending, from both internal disorder and external assault.”394 This policy was
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emphasized yet again during the renegotiations of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in 1930, with
the High Commissioner declaring that a principle goal was the “acceleration of the
assumption of the administrative responsibilities by the Iraq Government so far as
consistent with treaty obligations.”395
Given the contradiction between the British desire to exert influence and their
preference for doing so with minimal commitment, it should come as no surprise that the
efforts to instill British military education during the Mandate era were insufficient to
change Iraqi beliefs about the utility of conscription. With no diffusion of British beliefs
about military effectiveness, only a willingness to exert continued control over military
affairs could have led Iraq to continue to use volunteer recruitment after independence.
The discussion in this section shows that the British sought to minimize their
involvement in Iraq after independence. However, they also made clear statements about
their unwillingness to get involved in debates over conscription. As early as 1927, the
Overseas Defence Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence determined that the
United Kingdom “must leave the Iraq Government, if it thinks it wise to do so, to attempt
to enforce [conscription] in sole reliance on its own military forces or police.”396 This
became British policy and was communicated to the Iraqi government by mid-1927.397 In
the context of the Mandate at a time when Britain had yet to formally propose Iraq’s
independence, this could be perceived as an effort to coerce Iraq into maintaining
Britain’s preferred policies—Iraqi leaders knew that they lacked the capacity to
implement conscription effectively, and feared the consequences of attempting to govern

395

As quoted in Main, Iraq: From Mandate to Independence, 95, 97.
TNA: CO 730/114, “Reorganisation of Defence Forces.”
397
Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 97.
396

189

without British security assistance.398 After independence, though, when the United
Kingdom had even less capacity to control Iraqi decision-making, this should be taken as
evidence of the United Kingdom’s unwillingness to act as a military patron. This enabled
Iraq to pursue its own policies after independence.
B. Low Threat Environment After Independence
Given the control of local Iraqi policymakers over military design, it is next
important to determine whether the external threat environment constrained their
recruitment decisions. While there were several potential external threats to Iraq, none
was particularly acute, especially when compared to the threat of internal unrest. For
example, the border disputes with Turkey and Saudi Arabia had been settled in 1927 and
1930, respectively. According to Sluglett, after these issues were settled, “there were few
instances, or threats, of invasion from outside, and in any case the deterrent effect of the
British connection was the main bulwark against such possibilities.”399 The League of
Nations, for its part, determined that Iraq did not have sufficient military forces to protect
its borders but that its League membership and alliance with Britain would suffice to
provide external defense.400 With the 1930 Treaty of Alliance securing British
responsibility for external defense, domestic security remained as the sole responsibility
of the Iraqi army.
There is strong evidence that external threats were sufficiently low that the Iraqi
military could focus on internal threats rather than external ones. The orientation of the
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Iraqi army towards internal threats indicates that external threats were not a priority.
Scholars are in agreement that the army was primarily designed with internal threats in
mind. Eliezer Be’eri writes that that “Since the inception of the state, the main occupation
of the Iraqi army has been internal policing and repression,” while Nadav Safran goes
even further, arguing that “From the time of the creation of the modern Iraqi state after
World War I, the Iraqi armed forces were designed exclusively to uphold the authority of
the government internally and to keep the country together in the face of strong
centrifugal tendencies.”401 Ernest Main assessed that interior threats were more likely to
be severe enough to require British assistance than external ones—in particular, “the
northern and eastern mountains and the middle Euphrates” where “there live tribes—
Kurds and Assyrians in the one case, in the other Arabs—impatient of all political
control, raiders and looters by inclination and by tradition, and determined opponents of
any regime of law and order. If they feel strong enough to resist it.”402
Iraqi leaders were primarily concerned with internal threats, and in particular
sought to use the army as a tool for statebuilding. They viewed conscription as an
effective way of increasing the strength of the state vis-à-vis the tribes and of
strengthening an Iraqi national identity over minority identities. It has already been
shown that Iraqi leaders were influenced by Ottoman principles that emphasized the
army’s ability to create a cohesive national identity. This remained the principal goal of
the military after independence. In a 1932 paper, al-Askari emphasized that the priority
for the military was addressing internal threats by arguing for the need for the state to
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have a strong military “to protect its institutions.”403 This paper “stressed that the Iraqi
Army’s priority should be devoted to dealing with internal security, enforcing the rule of
law, and collecting weapons owned by civilians.”404
Similarly, King Feisal was primarily concerned with the army’s weaknesses in
relationship to the countryside, where 100,000 rifles were dispersed among the
population in comparison to the army’s 15,000.405 He assessed that the first and second
priorities in strengthening the country should be “to increase the numerical force of the
army, so that it could suppress at least two simultaneous uprisings,” and to implement
conscription.406 Thus the goals of the army according to two key Iraqi policymakers
address internal rather than external threats. This emphasis on internal threats created
more flexibility for Iraqi leaders to rely on their personal beliefs about military design.
Notably, in this case, Iraqi leaders’ perceptions about military design were based on
Ottoman beliefs about the necessity of using conscription to build a strong state and
national identity—beliefs which resulted in the same outcome that likely would have
occurred if Iraqi policymakers had focused on external threats, since Iraqi policymakers
also emphasized conscription’s ability to rapidly expand the army.

V. Conclusion
The story of the Iraqi army’s genesis resembles that of Jordan in many ways. Both
countries had weak central administrations with limited public legitimacy. The
individuals who constituted the military in both countries also had strong roots in and
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familiarity with Ottoman era military policies. Finally, the United Kingdom played a
major role in the redesign of each country’s military institutions in the pre-independence
era, and maintained substantial influence in defense policies after independence.
However, whereas the Jordanian military continued to develop along British lines,
maintaining volunteer recruitment after independence, the Iraqi army quickly deviated
from its colonial patron’s plans and instituted conscription once it was independent.
This chapter has argued that the principal difference between the two cases lies in
the degree of the United Kingdom’s influence over each state’s military policies.
Whereas in Jordan the United Kingdom continued to exert direct control over the military
via the presence of British officers and in particular the command of former British
officer John Bagot Glubb, there was no analog in Iraq. The British maintained advisors in
Iraq, but not in positions in which they had command over troops. Instead, advisors’ roles
were “surprisingly limited,” merely requiring Iraqi ministers to consider the advice of
their advisors and to consult with them.407 In contrast, in Jordan British officers continued
to lead troops, including during the Arab-Israeli war. The use of native officers with prior
experience in a conscript army limited British ability to influence the shape of Iraq’s
army. Moreover, the British adopted an explicit policy that distanced them from
extensive intervention in Iraqi military and defense policy. Thus, whereas in Jordan the
British continued to dominate military organizational decisions, Iraqi leaders were left
with a relatively free hand to pursue their personal preferences.
Available resources do not establish explicitly why the British were more willing
to engage in extensive military design efforts in Jordan than in Iraq. However, it can be
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surmised that several factors were at play. One reason may simply be that the territories
were considered redundant; if all that was necessary was a regional foothold with which
to secure communications to India and establish stability in Palestine, the British may
have decided that high levels of influence in both Iraq and Jordan were unnecessary.
The decision to invest in control in Jordan but not Iraq was likely also influenced
by the relative cost of intervention in each territory. Recall from Chapter 2 that the
decision to establish or maintain patronage is essentially a cost-benefit analysis. If
patronage is perceived as offering little benefit and requiring high costs, powerful states
are likely to try to avoid become a patron. High costs can reduce the likelihood that
patronage will develop even if there are substantial benefits to be gained. As discussed
above, the 1920 rebellion in Iraq played a major role in convincing the British to
minimize their interference in Iraq by revealing the degree of opposition to British rule
and the costs associated with maintaining it. While there was some tribal opposition to
British rule in Jordan, rebellion there never reached the level it did in Iraq in 1920.408
Thus, the British may have evaluated that patronage in Jordan could be achieved at a
lower cost.
Iraq’s path toward a conscript army also differed from that in Bosnia, which is
discussed in the next chapter. Local policymakers in Bosnia were also able to set military
policy for a similar reason—the abdication of control by a potential patron. However,
whereas a high threat environment led Bosnian policymakers to rely on conscription for
defensive reasons, there were no such constraints in Iraq. On the contrary, Iraqi leaders
perceived a permissive external environment. As a result, they designed the military to
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maximize their domestic, statebuilding goals. This meant that their ideas about military
design were not constrained by external forces but rather were influenced by their prior
understandings about the role of the military in society.
The development of the Iraqi military since independence is a paradigmatic
example of the path dependency of military recruitment. The Iraqi decision to adopt
conscription after independence can be traced to their leadership’s greater familiarity
with conscription from their experience in the Ottoman military education system. As a
result, they came to view conscription as the best way to achieve their military goals: the
creation of a strong nationally unified state. These preferences held strong despite a
period of British political domination, during which they could not be achieved.
However, once military recruitment was autonomously decided, the same system was
maintained for decades, through multiple political changes. Only when Iraq was once
again dominated by a foreign power, seventy years after its initial military design, did its
military recruitment system change.
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CHAPTER 6: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
I. Introduction
The Bosnian armed forces used conscription throughout the Bosnian war for
independence, which began almost immediately upon international recognition of the
new state in 1992 and lasted until the signing of the General Framework Agreement for
Peace—more commonly referred to as the Dayton Agreement—in 1995. Far from merely
being a peace treaty, the Dayton Agreement included a constitution for the new state and
detailed descriptions of its new political institutions, drafted with extensive oversight
from members of the international community—most notably, the United States.
Conspicuously absent from this otherwise comprehensive blueprint for statebuilding,
however, was any substantial effort to create a centralized military. Instead, each of the
three formerly warring ethnic parties—Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Bosnian Serbs—
maintained de facto control over their own armies. The result was a classic ethnic
security dilemma.409 Amidst an atmosphere of extreme mutual distrust, each ethnic army
continued to use conscription—despite continually downsizing the number of their
enlisted personnel—for a decade after the Dayton Agreement had established the first
permanent instruments of government for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and made three
ethnic communities partners in a single state.
This institutional inertia, influenced by high levels of external threat, governed
military design for all three communities in BiH until 2002, when the new High
Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina initiated a process of defense reform. A first
defense reform commission permitted conscription to continue when it issued its
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recommendations in September 2003. However, the second Defense Reform Commission
report required a full transition to an all-volunteer force on January 1, 2006, only a few
months after issuing its recommendations. Bosnia remained a virtual international
protectorate, which raised the question: what changed? What was different about the
initial period of military design that led BiH to build a conscript army?
This chapter compares the conditions in which military design choices were made
to explain why policymakers considered a volunteer army both feasible and desirable in
2005, but not in 1995. I also engage in a process-trace of the 2005 Defence Reform
Commission’s decision to end conscription. This allows me to determine what actors
were responsible for military recruitment decisions and what motivated their preferences
at each point in time. By looking forward in time from the initial point of military design
to examine a policy change, I can make inferences about the counterfactual: under what
circumstances would actors have elected for volunteer forces after the Dayton Accords?
In doing so, I am able to gain additional traction in identifying the actors and conditions
that influenced the decision to use conscription in 1995.
I find that the actors responsible for military design changed throughout this
period. I argue that despite the international involvement in Bosnian independence and
political development, external actors intentionally avoided influence over organizational
aspects of the new state’s military design. In the absence of a strong, external patron
willing to lead the way on these military matters, local preferences determined military
design. Furthermore, these local preferences were defined by what the leaders of each
ethnic community perceived as a highly threatening environment. A weak central
government and continued ethnic mobilization meant conflict and ethnic cleansing could
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easily re-erupt on short notice, making it too risky a proposition for any one party to
unilaterally reduce its available manpower. Thus, this case of military design is
representative of my third causal pathway: Domestic threat perceptions determined the
initial recruitment practices in BiH in the context of major external security concerns.
This chapter similarly provides evidence against several alternative explanations
about the use of conscription. It suggests, contrary to many realist expectations, that
many actors continue today to view conscription as the preferable form of military
recruitment, despite advances in technology that have made volunteer militaries more
accessible. Furthermore, while historical experiences, including colonial practices, may
affect policymakers’ preferences for conscription, they are not determinative.
Intervention by foreign actors can overpower these preferences, or even change them.
To support my argument, I rely primarily on memoirs and original interviews
with policymakers who were involved with defense reform in Bosnia throughout this
period. Interviews, in particular, were important to capture the micro-level causal
processes that my theory predicts.410 While much has been written on defense reform in
Bosnia, the role of conscription takes a back seat in these studies to the more contentious
issues of military and defense integration of former enemy forces. This makes it difficult
to discern precisely how recruitment fit into broader debates over military organization
and what factors weighed most heavily on the outcome. Indeed, a key goal in using
interviews is to determine who made the key decisions about recruitment and why.
Therefore, my interviews provided important information about the decision-makers and
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their goals that is typical of studies engaging in process tracing.411 They provided causal
process observations that were useful both for determining the values of my independent
variables and to challenge arguments emphasizing a culturally deterministic mechanism
of military diffusion.412

II. Interview Methodology
I began by contacting individuals who were directly involved in Bosnian defense
reform processes, and used a snowball technique to identify additional interviewees.
While snowball sampling risks biasing data by decreasing the representativeness of the
sample, this is not a major concern in my study. My goal is to process-trace the creation
of the BiH military. When process-tracing, “one cares less about getting a representative
sample” than about learning “who is responsible for causing the particular action” or
“how events unfold.”413 I am not studying responses themselves so much as I am using
the interviewees as “expert sources of information.”414 Moreover, a snowball technique
increased my ability to access important respondents.
I spoke with 18 people who were intimately familiar with different aspects of the
creation and development of the Bosnian army. This is a substantial portion of those who
were influential on issues relating to conscription in Bosnia, and included all those who
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were identified in existing literature and through my interviews as the most important. It
quickly became clear that the community of defense policymakers for BiH is fairly small,
and that those focusing on conscription constitute an even more specialized group. By
around the fourteenth interview, interviewees were identifying the same set of people as
influential or knowledgeable about recruitment decisions—many of whom were people to
whom I had already spoken.
Respondents included people working at all levels of policy formulation, from
military officials and technical advisors, to ambassadors, civil servants, and Bosnian
cabinet ministers. Most were associated with the international community in some form,
most often as representatives or employees of NATO or the OSCE, rather than parties
representing policymakers for BiH. Twelve interviewees were or are now American
nationals, though only five of these represented American interests at the commissions.
Indeed, most interviewees stressed their role as members of an organization or institution.
They explicitly and preemptively distanced themselves from the preferences or actions of
a government they did not represent. Furthermore, two of three Bosnians I interviewed
were Defense Ministers, one of whom attained this position as a direct result of the
Defense Reform Commissions. Twelve interviewees were directly involved in the
Defense Reform commissions as full members of the secretariat or as part of working
groups. Information about what periods of defense reform the respondents participated in
is available in table 5.1.415

415

Appendix B has more information on my interview methodology. Most interviewees agreed to
be identified. Some, however, requested anonymity because they were unsure about the continued
confidentiality of some information. I have only used names or other identifying information
when I was granted explicit permission to do so.

200

Erich Bleich and Robert Pekkanen distill the array of critiques often levied at
interview methods into three categories of potential concern: how representative are the
interviewees of the broader sample population, was the interview of sufficient quality to
reveal the right information, and how accurate is the researcher’s report of the interview
content?416 I hope to have alleviated concerns about the representativeness and quality of
my interviews by having described my methods in this section. However, it is important
that I demonstrate that I am not cherry-picking quotes or hearing what I want to hear. To
that end, I attempt to be clear about the extent to which the sentiments and facts reported
by interviewees reflect responses from others who had similar knowledge.417 I also report
responses suggestive of mechanisms other than those that I hypothesize. While some
respondents attributed the choice of recruitment system to multiple factors, the weight of
evidence from interviews, memoirs, and secondary literature suggests that military threats
and international pressure were the most important factors.

III. Military Design and the Dayton Agreement
The military design agreed to during the Dayton Agreement reinforced the wartime status quo. Bosnia’s constitution created a weak central state, with most powers
belonging the two Entities—the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Federation) and
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Republika Srpska (RS)—which represented the country’s Muslim and Croat population,
and Bosnian Serbs, respectively. This allowed the Entities to assume control over military
and defense decisions. While the constitution gave the central government control over
foreign policy, its responsibility for preserving the country’s “sovereignty, territorial
integrity, political independence, and international personality” was contingent on the
“division of responsibilities between the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”418 The
Entities also had explicit authority to take appropriate measures to “provide a safe and
secure environment for all persons” in their territories, as well as residual powers not
explicitly assigned to the institutions of the central government.419
Most tellingly, the constitution makes several references to Bosnia and
Herzegovina’s multiple armed forces, even establishing a Standing Committee on
Military Matters (SCMM) to coordinate their activities. The SCMM was Bosnia and
Herzegovina’s sole defense institution in the years after Dayton. The Entities maintained
complete autonomy to continue to administer their own armed forces. In fact, the
Federation itself was so weak that even the Bosnian Muslim and Croat forces remained
separate, meaning there were essentially three armies instead of two. All three continued
their wartime practice of conscription.
The international community invested little time and energy in redesigning the
military institutions of the newly independent central state it helped to create. However,
the United States and its allies devoted substantial efforts to downsizing and demobilizing
wartime forces, which they perceived as necessary to reduce overall tension levels and
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the likelihood of renewed conflict. Annex 1-B of the Dayton accords established strict
limits on arms importations, as well as a clear force ratio that would define final military
sizes of each of the armies.420 However, the principal vehicle for achieving
demobilization and downsizing was the “Train and Equip” program for the Federation
army. This program was intended to recreate a balance of power between the Bosniaks
and Bosnian Serbs by improving the capabilities of the Federation forces. By canceling
out the RS advantage in equipment, Train and Equip was a major incentive convincing
Bosniaks to sign the peace deal.421
Unlike constitutional provisions such as the SCMM that established new chains of
command and organizational procedures, Train and Equip could work within the existing
institutional framework of the Federation army. It worked by helping Federation troops to
learn new skills, not by redesigning the military and its relationship to society.
Nonetheless, the existence of Train and Equip raises the question of why the United
States was willing to exert influence in one realm of military policy—capabilities—but
not in other realms that could arguably have a larger and longer lasting effect. Changes to
organizational policies that would reinforce military power-sharing through unified
recruitment mechanisms could potentially reduce the security dilemma, while eliminating
conscription altogether would reduce each side’s ability to quickly mobilize large
segments of the population.
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There are several reasons why this may have been the case. I argue in the next
section that the international community viewed changes to military organization—which
disrupt both existing domestic power structures and the external balance of power—as
too threatening to the fragile peace. Train and Equip, on the other hand, contributed to
peace by reinforcing a balance of power. The United States did not believe that a major
change such as a transition to an all-volunteer force would reinforce peace, given the
volatile security environment. Any effort to make such a drastic change carried too great
a risk of backfiring. As a result, international policymakers spent little time thinking
about how such organizational changes could even be implemented. While Bosnian
leaders clearly also preferred to retain conscription, it was the fact that the international
community had other priorities and so approached military change cautiously that led to
recruitment continuity, not Bosnian intransigence.

IV. International Interests and Domestic Military Design
Upon first inspection, BiH appears to be a deviant case: its continued reliance on
conscription would run in contrast to the expectations of all existing theories about when
states should use compulsory recruitment policies.422 Bosnia gained independence at a
time when military effectiveness-based arguments would expect the need for conscription
to be at an all-time low. The end of the Cold War, coupled with advances in capitalintensive technologies, was reducing the need for states to rely on costly, manpowerintensive armies for defense. At the same time and for the same reasons, the international
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environment itself was less threatening, and therefore allowed states to be less concerned
with traditional security and territorial defense. The presence of 60,000 NATO-led peace
enforcement troops on the ground in BiH should also have eliminated the need for local
forces to provide security.
The United States, in particular, devoted time, money, reputation, and
personnel—including 20,000 troops—to negotiating and enforcing the Dayton
Agreement. One might expect, then, that the international community’s considerable
effort to design political institutions in Bosnia would have also carried over to military
reform. Cultural or organizational arguments would suggest that the extensive role of the
United States in creating and enforcing the Dayton Agreement and training and equipping
the new Bosnian army should produce emulation, resulting in the establishment of an
American-style volunteer military. Similarly, the heavy-handed influence of foreign
actors in completely rewriting the Bosnian constitution and administering political
institutions reduces the likelihood that pre-independence practices would automatically
be replicated in the new state.
As this chapter will show, local threat perceptions determined military policies in
the period of statebuilding that followed the Dayton Agreement. International actors were
deeply invested in securing peace in Bosnia. Importantly, however, foreign intervention
in the new state’s military design was actually intentionally minimized during the Dayton
negotiations, and was essentially absent for years afterwards. The only state with the
resources and interests to act as a military patron, the United States, viewed more overt
intervention into military policies as too destabilizing to the fragile peace that had been
achieved. As a result, it was domestic politicians’ preferences and beliefs about local
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security that were most relevant to the continued use of conscription in Bosnia and
Herzegovina after the war.
Evidence that Bosnia’s foreign benefactors wanted to distance themselves from
military design emerged early in the negotiation process. While the European Union and
the United States played active roles in negotiating and implementing the peace
settlement, both actors viewed interference in the organization of the post-conflict
militaries as a bridge too far. This is somewhat surprising given the extent of foreign
military activities in Bosnia both before and after Dayton. This is particularly true for the
United States. Ultimately, while Europeans contributed to the peacebuilding effort, it was
the Americans who called the shots. As the first High Representative of BiH wrote, it is a
“simple and fundamental fact that on key occasions the United States was the only player
who possessed the ability to employ power as a political instrument and when forced into
action was also willing to do so.”423 If any foreign power was able to expend further
resources to reshape the Bosnian army, it was the United States.
This was not something that interested the United States during the mid-1990s.
Instead, elites driving Bosnia policy in the U.S. viewed Bosnia as a quagmire that had
unfortunately engaged American reputation and its commitment to NATO.424 The best
solution was to stabilize the region and get out, with as little commitment as that goal
would allow. As one high ranking member of NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) said,
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“"Did we want to have 22,000 troops committed to the Balkans in Europe? No! We
thought it was a European problem, but to make this work the US had to step up.”425
This can be seen in part through the limited American efforts to influence military
design during the war. The Americans indicated an initial willingness to engage in
military design when it mediated a cease-fire and federation agreement between Bosnian
Muslims and Croat forces in February 1994.426 U.S. policy intended to decrease Bosnian
Serb bargaining leverage by ending the conflict between Muslims and Croats and
strengthening their military forces. The Federation Agreement signed in Washington on
March 1, 1994 called for the unification of their two armies, including the establishment
of a joint command.427 Subsequently, a small advisory mission of 15 American officers,
led by a retired U.S. major general, was dispatched at the end of 1994 to integrate the
Muslim and Croat forces into a single federal army.428 However, divisions between the
two sides proved insurmountable. As long as they continued to compete for territory
against the Bosnian Serbs, there was no shared Federation military for Americans to help
develop. Fighting continued to erupt between Bosnian Muslims and Croats, and military
cooperation between them was virtually non-existent by the time planning for
comprehensive peace negotiations at Dayton began in October 1995.429 This failure of
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externally-driven military design may have been due to the absence of a strong American
belief in its necessity or the existence of extremely high barriers—including animosity
between combatants—to successful intervention. In either case, recruitment decisions
remained in the hands of local actors throughout the war.
American goals for Bosnian military development at Dayton were even less
ambitious. The primary goal of the United States was to end the conflict quickly with the
minimal necessary long-term investment. It is easy to lose sight of this due to the broad
scope of the Dayton Accords, of which large portions are dedicated to establishing
civilian governmental institutions. Some participants, including the United States’ chief
negotiator, Richard Holbrooke, preferred a more comprehensive, maximalist approach to
the peace agreement.430 Negotiations at Dayton not only focused on military-security
issues relating to the separation of forces and control of territory, but also on establishing
and overseeing civilian institutions—including elections and ethnic representation in
government—designed to create a lasting settlement in a stable state. As Derek Chollet
wrote, “If Dayton’s first goal was to end the war, its second goal was to maintain Bosnia
as a single state.”431 However, this very much remained a secondary goal—one that was a
means to the end that was lasting peace.
Wherever statebuilding threatened peace, Americans resolved this conflict of
interest in favor of the latter. Although the Dayton Agreement included extensive
provisions on new civilian institutions, efforts to enforce major changes to military
design were viewed as potentially too destabilizing. The United States viewed the
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military situation as the key to securing peace—and consequently this absorbed most of
its attention.432 According to this logic, international efforts would be devoted to ending
the war and preventing the resumption of hostilities. Furthermore, this could best be
achieved not by forcibly integrating hostile forces into a new military, but by establishing
an internal balance of power among the existing armed forces.433 This led to a hands-off
approach to military design that left Bosnians in control of recruitment and other
organizational decisions. The active American role in statebuilding did not extend to the
realm of military design.
A chief advantage of this minimalist approach was that it limited the American
commitment to a process the Clinton administration had little desire to be a part of. The
United States had few if any tangible security interests to protect in Bosnia. Its decision
to intervene in 1995 was ultimately motivated by concerns over the credibility of
American leadership and the future of the NATO alliance, both of which had been
challenged by the intractability of the Bosnian conflict.434 As a result, American policy
was very much constrained by domestic support and interest. Having already felt
compelled to engage in Bosnia, “policy was driven by the need to get out” and avoid a
long-term military presence.435 The administration thus had little interest in devoting the
resources necessary for sweeping military change. American policymakers were unhappy
with the need to deploy 20,000 troops to Bosnia and would have preferred to rely on a
unified and effective Bosnian military for local security.436 However, that would have
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required a longer period in which more American peacekeepers and military trainers
would have needed to be present in Bosnia. The Clinton administration had even less of a
desire to provide the more substantial commitment of military resources that would be
necessary to reform the Bosnian military.437 It wanted solutions that would allow it to
disengage as quickly as possible, with low costs and limited public attention.
One of the most difficult and controversial examples of this is the debate over the
length of the American-led peace enforcement force’s (IFOR) mission. Before
participants even arrived at Dayton, the White House had decided and publicly
announced that IFOR would complete its mission and withdraw within twelve months.
The NSC Principals Committee made this decision after little debate, and with the goal of
preventing “mission creep” and repeats of the disastrous 1993 intervention in Somalia.438
According to Ivo Daalder, the NSC staffer responsible for formulating U.S. policy on
Bosnia at the time, “just as IFOR’s narrow mission was framed around more limited
objectives, so the one-year deadline was constructed on the basis of an exit strategy that
had a more limited purpose than advocates of a durable peace in Bosnia had in mind.”439
While the administration ultimately extended the deadline for withdrawal and
transitioned IFOR into a “Stabilization Force” (SFOR), its initial deployment was only
possible on the understanding that its authority was driven by a short-term mission
designed to ensure a military balance, not nation-building.440
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Another advantage to avoiding questions of military design at Dayton was that it
set goals that seemed more feasible. Holbrooke would later lament not devoting more
effort to insisting on greater military reform.441 However, my interviewees suggested that,
with or without greater foreign assistance, not much more could have been accomplished
in terms of post-war defense reform. Clifford Bond, the American ambassador to Bosnia
during the first Defense Reform Commission, summarized this common sentiment: “It
was a peace agreement. They did what could be done. The sides weren’t about to
disarm.”442 The relationships between the three ethnic groups were not conducive to the
level of cooperation needed in an integrated military. They were too fraught with hostility
and distrust—“just what you would assess at the end of a war, with all of the emotions
that were attached to that.”443 The perception was that this made compromise on military
reform more difficult than compromise on other areas. The United States insisted that
when it came to military reform, any more room for disagreements could potentially
derail the entire peace process. American policymakers rejected military reform as too
dangerous.444 Consequently, issues like military design were a lower priority than
political compromises. As one interviewee who participated in the Dayton negotiations
described the atmosphere there, “For most of the things at Dayton, we were like, ‘can we
get this done now?’”445 For the United States, the answer to this question when it came to
military reform was “no,” allowing for greater domestic control over recruitment issues.
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These debates are important evidence in favor of the argument that Bosnian
preferences were decisive. Military design was not at the top of the agenda for American
policymakers during the Dayton Agreement negotiations. Given existing Bosnian
military practices and the likelihood of renewed conflict, reforming the military in any
way was considered a costly endeavor that few members of the international community
desired to undertake. The threat environment made major military reform particularly
risky. Thus, the main reason there was no push from the international community toward
a volunteer army in 1995 was that such an effort had too high a probability of
undermining peace.
Conversely, it is less likely that Americans simply encountered too much
resistance from Bosnians to enforce their agenda. For one, local actors were not
inherently opposed to volunteer forces, but rather wanted to maintain a balance of
capabilities. The main Bosniak goal was to maintain high levels of readiness with large
reserve forces to prepare for potential conflict with an RS force that, with reinforcements
from Serbia, would outnumber them. Bosniak leaders ideally preferred a single army for
both Entities, which by virtue of their larger numbers within the country, they believed
they could control.446 Conscription, then, was only viewed as necessary so long as an
independent Serbian force continued to be a threat. Indeed, this was ultimately the
compromise that was struck at the 2005 Defence Reform Commission. However, as the
discussion earlier in this chapter shows, the United States clearly preferred to stay out of
military design altogether, and was not interested in potentially disrupting the peace by
forcing the dismantlement of the Entity armies.
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Not only did the United States want to avoid excessive interference in Bosnian
military affairs, but it is likely that the Bosnian army would have looked very different if
the United States had viewed military reform there as a worthwhile investment. Many
interviews noted that American preferences were to have a single, professional military in
BiH. One high-ranking American military commander said, “The long term intent was to
have a single entity that was capable of providing defense inside of Bosnia and that three
warring factions were disarmed and contributing to a peaceful political unit.”447 Other
interviewees stressed that Americans were uncomfortable with the idea of three armies in
one state, but that more time would be needed to build support for such drastic change.448
While negotiators do not appear to have debated the merits of interfering in Bosnian
recruitment practices, there is little reason to expect that they would have, given their
attitude toward making changes in other aspects of military design. Thus, it is difficult to
speculate how American perceptions might have differently evaluated the role and
purpose of conscription in an environment more conducive to reform. However,
ultimately it is clear that a lack of willpower or resources led the United States to
subordinate its preferences about military design to the more urgent goal of peace.
Even though some members of the international community realized that the
long-term stability of Bosnia depended on creating a unified and professional military,
key international actors viewed such reform as too demanding and risky in the short-term.
Instead, “ending the war, separating the armies, and preserving Bosnia and Herzegovina
were the driving motives of the negotiators, not necessarily building a sustainable
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peace.”449 For now, international actors cared most about establishing peace; ensuring it
could be sustainable would only complicate matters. Military reform would have to be a
problem for a later date.

V. Local Threat Perceptions after Dayton
The failure to integrate the wartime armed forces of the three ethnic groups had
important consequences for their recruitment practices. It meant each group maintained
the capacity to restart the war. This in turn incentivized both sides to stay armed and able
to fend off renewed invasion on short notice, exacerbating an already unstable and
tenuous peace. Thus, the most formative years for military design took place in a
dangerous environment, in which both the Federation and the RS perceived that major
territorial conflict still threatened their independent existence. Bosniaks continued to
view conscription as vital for its role in creating a large reserve force that could be called
upon for defense on short notice.
The widespread perception that war could easily erupt again was reinforced by
indicators of the international community’s shaky commitment, represented most clearly
by the efforts to limit IFOR’s authority and deployment. As Roberto Belloni writes,
“third parties’ passive, short-term and less than daring approach did little to help a
population traumatized by years of war,” allowing nationalists to continue to engage in
ethnic cleansing.450 Indeed, “no one had much confidence that peacekeeping forces
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would easily deter another round of fighting.”451 Instead, the American approach to
peacebuilding immediately after Dayton single-mindedly focused on creating a balance
of military capabilities between the Bosniak and Bosnian Serb communities. The
Americans’ preferred program for achieving this goal was the Train and Equip program.
However, it was not intended to make structural changes to the army or its relationship to
society. According to Jim Pardew, who led the Train and Equip program, recruitment
“was their job, not mine. The military had to raise their army. They were in the position
of needing to figure out how to raise their army and what kind of army they could
afford.”452
These decisions from the international community both reflected and reinforced a
mutually threatening atmosphere within BiH and the expectation that peace would be
temporary. Rohan Maxwell and John Andreas Olsen, both of whom served in advisory
roles during various stages of post-Dayton Bosnian defense reform, argue that “high
levels of mistrust…shaped the military structure of BiH,” causing both entities to
maintain “relatively large, conscript-based forces that regarded each other as potential
enemies.”453 The Train and Equip program was intended to create a military situation in
which both sides could feel comfortable demobilizing troops, but was viewed as
necessary precisely because the security environment was so precarious.454 While it
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ultimately achieved its goal of permitting downsizing, tensions remained high. By
February 1998 the Federation army included only 45,000 active duty troops, whereas this
number was 100,000–200,000 higher less than a year earlier. However, conscription
permitted all sides large numbers of reserves to be called up on short notice. If
downsizing was to take place, Bosniaks would only allow this in a manner that would
permit fast remobilization and immediate territorial defense. Although Pardew reported
Bosnian politicians like Izetbegovic (the first president of BiH) preferred a smaller, better
trained force, they felt constrained by popular demand to maintain a larger, war-ready
force even in peacetime.455
Even while the armies were demobilizing and the balance of power was shifting,
wartime threat perceptions persisted.456 Responses during my interviews support
Maxwell and Olsen’s view that local policymakers built the military with fears of
renewed conflict in mind. Interviewees repeatedly emphasized the high level of tensions
and mistrust immediately after the Dayton Agreement. They made statements like “The
sides weren’t about to disarm,” and “they wanted to mobilize, not demobilize!” to explain
why the Entities did not engage in more aggressive military reform in the mid-to-late
1990s.457 One respondent who worked closely with entity army commanders for SFOR in
the late 1990s as the Chief Inspector General for the entity armed forces said that
Bosniaks resisted reform “because they always thought in the back of their mind that they
would have to go back to war, so they wanted to sustain numerical and weapons and
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equipment superiority.”458 The first BiH Defense Minister, Nikola Radovanovic, also
argued that the precarious situation between the neighbors continued to dominate how the
entities thought about the defense through the early 2000s, during the first Defense
Reform Commission: “the argument was that following the experience in the ‘90s it was
important to be able to defend.”459 He also suggested that major reforms that would
reduce readiness were unlikely in this environment: “In 1995 there was civil war. Ten
years after that we were talking about a single military. It was a surprise.”460

VI. The Transition to an All-Volunteer Force
In the immediate aftermath of the war, the threat of invasion continued to loom,
causing Bosnian politicians to want to maintain an army that had the capability to
mobilize quickly. However, there was almost no overt discussion among policymakers
about the use of conscription in these early years after independence. I argue that this is
consistent with the advantages of maintaining conscription in such highly charged and
uncertain security environments. If policymakers were preoccupied with security, one
reason for an absence of debates about recruitment policies is that there was nearly
universal agreement that it would be necessary for preparing an adequate defense against
renewed Serbian aggression.
It is particularly clear that this was the case once the international community
began to urge greater defense reform. The process leading to Bosnia’s abolition of
conscription on January 1, 2006 offers a useful point of comparison for evaluating my
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arguments. The same variables—international intervention and threat perception—can
explain this change in recruitment practices. But, precisely because international actors
began to pressure explicitly for the reduction and elimination of conscription, recruitment
practices featured more prominently in debates among Bosnian policymakers. The
explicit role of conscription during the process of defense reform that began in 2003 also
demonstrates weaknesses in alternative explanations of conscription based on culture.
Between the Dayton Agreement in 1995 and the first Defense Reform
Commission in 2003, the international community ramped up not only its interest in
affecting military practices in Bosnia, but also its institutional ability to enforce military
reform. At a December 1997 meeting in Bonn, the Peace Implementation Council
(PIC)—the group of fifty-five countries and agencies that underwrite the peace process in
Bosnia—enhanced the powers of the High Representative in BiH, the office established
by the Dayton Agreement and appointed by the PIC to oversee civilian implementation of
the peace treaty.461 These new “Bonn Powers,” as they became known, gave the High
Representative broad powers to enact binding decisions in BiH and to remove public
officials who violated the Dayton Agreement.
As other scholars have noted, international influence was responsible for nearly
all the outcomes of the defense reform process.462 This was also the case for the abolition
of conscription. A public scandal in which it was discovered that an RS-owned firm had
been selling weapons to Iraq—known as the Orao Affair—coupled with the investiture in
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2002 of a new and activist High Representative—Lord Paddy Ashdown—led to renewed
interest from the international community in using its influence to enact change in BiH
military structures. This shifted control over BiH military structure back to the foreign
powers, and in particular, to the United States. Europeans staffed many of the bodies that
were influential in defense reform, including the Office of the High Representative, from
which the impetus for reform initiated, and the OSCE, which had chief responsibility for
assisting with military downsizing and parliamentary oversight.463 However, American
influence in NATO, control of SFOR, and institutionalized responsibility for military
aspects of the Dayton Agreements again gave the United States an outsized role. The
OSCE representative at the first Defense Reform Commission was an American,
Ambassador Richard Beecroft. Similarly, the United States insisted that an American
lead the first Defense Reform Commission.464 As a result, while the broad goals of
defense reform were set by Ashdown, many of the specific policy changes implemented
by the commissions reflected American strategic thinking.
Defense reform occurred in two main phases, arising out of two internationallyinitiated and -led Defense Reform Commissions that issued their reports in 2003 and
2005.465 While these commissions ostensibly only made recommendations that then had
to be enacted by the BiH Parliament, they were de facto binding. The American chairmen
of each commission were careful to craft recommendations and agreements that they
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knew would make it through Parliament. One said, “I made sure that members of the
commission had political authority to make commitments on behalf of their parties or
governments, so it was politically binding.”466 Furthermore, international actors were
unified in their insistence on reform, and although Ashdown had publicly declared he
would not use his Bonn powers, it was widely recognized that he was prepared to impose
change if it was not forthcoming.467
The international community was active at all levels of the Defense Reform
Commissions. General policy level discussions and formal decisions were made by the
full membership body, which included high-ranking representatives from the United
States, each of the Entities, the SCMM, the OSCE, SFOR, and the EU, or else in informal
meetings outside the commission. Much of the work to generate specific policy
prescriptions and technical language was done by the Secretariat and various working
groups, which were similarly made up of national representatives and technical advisors.
The core team of the Defense Reform Secretariat was primarily made up of international
actors.
Working groups included representatives from each entity—as well as the
Ministry of Defense once it was established—their lawyers and legal advisors,
interpreters, and technical or military experts, often from the OSCE, depending on the
group or issue being discussed. They met off-site every few weeks. Politically difficult
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issues tended to be hashed out in a top-down fashion before the working groups presented
possible models to the commission. Members of each working group were present at all
commission meetings, and some members of the working groups participated in both
commissions. Details of legislation were often decided in working groups that adopted a
technical and non-partisan approach to the issue.468
The first Defense Reform Commission left conscription in place, though it cut the
number of conscripts in half and reduced the service term for conscripts from six to four
months.469 The second Defense Reform Commission, whose recommendations were
issued only two years later, eliminated conscription altogether. At each commission,
military recruitment was a contentious issue for representatives of the Federation and RS.
Federation representatives continued to prefer conscription, which they viewed as vital to
their security. The RS, meanwhile, was less prima facie opposed to a volunteer force, but
was nonetheless wary of any measures that would further decrease its power and
autonomy relative to the Federation.470 However, for the members of the international
community who guided the defense reform process, it was only one among many aspects
of the defense infrastructure that needed to be reformed. Only once the first Defense
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Reform Commission made headway into unifying the Entity armies and reducing
tensions between them did international actors demand a complete end to conscription.
A. Foreign Actors’ Goals for Defense Reform.
With foreign powers now choosing to intervene in Bosnian military design, it was
their threat perceptions that would shape military recruitment practices. While members
of the PIC did not necessarily concern themselves with whether BiH would use
conscription, this did become an important issue for the bureaucrats and diplomats who
implemented defense reform. These foreign actors were tasked with creating a unified
and affordable peacetime BiH army that could participate in NATO’s Partnership for
Peace (PfP) program. They knew that PfP was a particularly attractive goal for the
Bosniaks, as full NATO membership would provide a firm security guarantee.
Consequently, the international community focused heavily on this goal.471 The
international actors designed the BiH defense reforms based on their own understandings
of what an army with these goals should look like.
Defense reform efforts began in late 2002, when then High Representative Paddy
Ashdown seized upon the Orao scandal in RS to demand greater strides towards military
professionalization and the strengthening of the civilian chain of command. The
possibility of NATO membership was the principal carrot offered by the international
community that motivated the reform process. During the 2003 Defence Reform
Commission, the international committee focused on enhancing state-level controls and
the affordability of the BiH armed forces as the main requirements for PfP membership.
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While the international actors driving defense reform believed conscription was
inefficient, they adopted a similar attitude as during and immediately after the Dayton
Agreement: conscription took a back seat to operational reforms that were viewed as
higher priority.472 According to Jim Locher, the Chairman of the first Defence Reform
Commission,
We thought that eliminating might be an outcome but we were pleased to
secure a 50 percent reduction. There was only so much you could do in the
first commission. Again, when the first Defence Reform Commission
started, no one thought there was any possibility of defense reform. I
remember a meeting with all of the ambassadors from European Union
countries on my second day in Sarajevo, and each one of them told me
defense reform would not happen.473
Another interviewee intimately familiar with Bosnian defense reform during the entire
period under examination expressed similar sentiments, noting that administrative
unification was not achievable in 2003 and it was not clear whether this would change in
the future.474 The reductions in conscription at the first Defence Reform Commission
were not necessarily viewed as an intermediate step on the way to all-volunteer force.
NATO would not concern itself with the state’s domestic recruitment policies as long as
there was force reduction.475
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This suggests that in 2003 the international community appears not to have been
fully prepared to impose change for which Bosnians were not yet ready. While PfP
membership was an established goal, the attitude to change remained cautious. These
external reformers agreed conscription was bad for Bosnia, but still allowed local
preferences to dominate military design. James Locher described conscription as “just not
that important to me at the time.”476 The Bosniak fear of Serbian aggression remained
high; this deterred members of the Defence Reform Commission from insisting on the
elimination of conscription.477 Locher said that this was “not a case of the international
community forcing its vision on everyone. For defence reform to be effectively
implemented, the ideas needed to be owned and advanced by the Bosnians. This was their
commission, and it had to be and be seen as their commission.”478 Rohan Maxwell
similarly described the 2003 Defence Reform Commission as the best outcome
achievable given Bosnian political opposition at the time: it was “a lowest common
denominator thing” and “there was no appetite” for eliminating conscription.479 Another
interviewee argued that conscription was left in place because “we wanted them to make
their own decision based on financial logic.”480 While one interviewee who worked on
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both Defence Reform Commissions characterized the changes to BiH military design as
subject to enormous external pressure—to the extent that the parties “felt they had to
come to those compromises,”—he concurred with others’ conclusions that agreements
about conscription were limited by locals’ threat perceptions in 2003.481 This sufficiently
raised the cost of enforcing a volunteer army on the unwilling Bosnians to lead an already
skeptical international community to temper its goals.
B. The Tipping Point
This international attitude changed at the beginning of the 2005 Defence Reform
Commission. The initial mandate of this second commission was to enforce the decisions
made in 2003. It was not a given, after that commission, that a second round of reforms
would be necessary. Rather, Ashdown called for a new Defence Reform Commission
after another scandal highlighted the shortcomings of existing implementation efforts:
evidence emerged that Bosnian Serb forces had been assisting in the protection of war
criminal Ratko Mladic.482 As a result, there was no initial focus on transitioning to an allvolunteer force.483 However, the international community was even more determined to
enforce its desired reforms at this point in time: “The entire frame of reference had
shifted….It was no longer a question of whether the state could assume complete control
of all armed forces, but rather a question of how and when it would happen.”484
Raffi Gregorian, the American choice to co-chair the second Defense Reform
Commission, was a particularly powerful force behind the change in the international
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community’s attitude toward conscription.485 While the international community’s
perception by the First Defense Reform Commission was that conscription provided no
benefit to BiH, its members were not prepared to eliminate it. According to Rohan
Maxwell, “2005 was the year we started thinking about it [conscription],” though there
was “no mandate to do anything.”486 He added that one of the first things Gregorian did,
before the commission even started its work, was to present a document to him that
included ending conscription as a big picture goal.487 Gregorian himself acknowledged
that ending conscription and reinforcing the professionalization of the armed forces was
“not a requirement but we [members of the reform commission and Bosnian political
leaders who signed it] went above and beyond,” to make the Armed Forces of Bosnia and
Herzegovina more efficient.488 The motivation was designing a military that was cost
efficient and effective at its likely missions with NATO. Gregorian said the international
community “did not see a continuing need for conscription because it doesn’t actually
help [Bosnia]. You’re not actually facing invasion.”489 It was the greater power of the
international community in 2005, and particularly how those goals were implemented by
American policymakers, that allowed for the transition to an all-volunteer force at that
time.
Therefore the reforms of the second Defence Reform Commission reflected the
international community’s—especially the United States’s—perceptions of how the BiH
armed forces should address the country’s most pressing threats. The international

485

Amb. Clifford Bond, May 9, 2016, Interview #1.
Rohan Maxwell, July 21, 2016, Interview #11.
487
Rohan Maxwell, July 21, 2016, Interview #11.
488
Raffi Gregorian, June 16, 2016, Interview #6.
489
Raffi Gregorian, June 16, 2016, Interview #6.
486

226

architects of the new and unified Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegvoina (AFBiH) did
not perceive renewed ethnic conflict to be particularly likely, and saw BiH as facing a
low threat of major land conflict. In sum, “The AFBiH [was] not designed to provide
stand-alone territorial defense against regional neighbors.”490 As early as the 2003
Defence Reform Commission, international actors had recognized that the Bosnian
military’s force size and structure was inappropriate to the types of missions it would
likely have to participate in: peacekeeping and support operations, not major land
warfare.491 Even in the 1990s, according to the international community, “there was not a
lot of military purpose” for the entity armies.492 SFOR was meeting all the country’s
security requirements. Bosnian policymakers had little ability to withstand the redoubled
efforts of the international community, which was now committed to military reform.
Moreover, it is worth noting that there was substantial opposition within Bosnia,
especially among Federation officials, to ending conscription. Gregorian argued that “the
issue of conscription was a big deal. Right up to the last minute there were retired
generals who were trying to push civil defense training in high schools, et cetera…”493
Gregorian also cited the importance of providing for a reserve force of exactly half the
strength of the active forces as part of the final deal that ended conscription, as this may
have at least symbolically compensated for the loss of compulsory military training.
Maxwell’s perception was that there were fewer obstacles to this reform. However, his
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account of events also emphasized the importance of first convincing Bosniaks that they
were not getting tangible benefits from conscription and that it was unaffordable in the
long run.494 Similarly, some of the actors who were opposed by the time the commission
issued its recommendation may have had less influence on policy outcomes by this time.
The BiH Presidency—under possible international pressure—“had decided that all
general officers would be retired” before the new commission.495 This indicates that
Bosnia would not have eliminated conscription if not for the work and preferences of the
international community.
As a result, there was a permissive environment in which the policymakers at the
second Defence Reform Commission could recommend, and in fact enforce, the abolition
of conscription—once they had decided this was an important goal. With no security
logic underpinning support for conscription to prepare for extended land warfare, the
particular preferences of the international reformers determined BiH recruit practices
after 2005. The international actors who dominated Bosnia’s defense reform process
came from countries where conscription was seen as a policy only necessary for high
threat environments. Their preference for volunteer forces in low threat environments is
evident in the arguments they emphasized during the Defence Reform Commission
negotiations. Volunteer recruitment was widely touted by the international community as
more economically efficient and appropriate for other military missions. Defense
reformers emphasized in their conversations with Bosnians that conscription was not
giving them the security value that they thought it did.496 They focused particularly on its
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high cost but low yield, especially given limited training requirements.497 The high costs
of conscription also failed to provide even basic amenities for recruits, who were often
sent home on the weekend because the entity armies could not afford heating.
Additionally, a member of the conscription working group of the first Defense Reform
Commission noted that the advisors limited their analysis of potential recruitment
policies to their implications for defense; they did not consider whether conscription
would affect opportunities for nation-building or other consequences for society.498
These arguments are consistent with a process of military design that is heavily
reliant on the professional experience and prior beliefs of those leading the reforms, who
were from countries that favored volunteer systems and did not view military recruitment
as a tool for reshaping society. Maxwell argued that the multilateral nature of the Defence
Reform Commissions limited the “tendency on the part of some international actors to
offer solutions that replicate those of their home countries.”499 Nonetheless, the beliefs of
the reformers about the proper uses of conscription seem to have had an important effect
on how they molded the Bosnian military. This is evident in the Conscription and
Reserves Information Paper that prefaced the 2005 Defence Reform Commission’s
report. It concluded, “Forces based on compulsory military service are mainly suited for
territorial defence purposes, as a generally acknowledged internationally principle. No
NATO country deploys conscripts abroad unless they have specifically volunteered for
such service. Conscript forces would be almost useless for the most likely future missions
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of the AFBiH….”500 This document reflected the beliefs of the American co-chairman of
the second Defence Reform Commission, Raffi Gregorian, and guided his efforts when it
began.501 Rather than a large, readily expandable military, Bosnian forces would need to
be highly professional to prepare for peacekeeping missions and interoperability with
NATO. This was the point of helping Bosnia join PfP.
The international community clearly entered the second Defence Reform
Commission with the perception that BiH would not need a military capable of meeting
major land warfare and renewed ethnic conflict. However, there is reason to believe that
had the threat environment been different, the international community would not have
been as concerned with transitioning BiH to a volunteer force. Ashdown, the principal
driver and final arbiter of Bosnia’s defense reform, explicitly highlighted the
pointlessness of conscription for BiH’s anticipated peacekeeping missions, and
countered, “If the state was threatened like any other state then it [conscription] would
have been reasonable.”502 Another interviewee who was influential throughout the
defense reform process raised the similar points, referencing in particular his experience
advising defense reform in other countries that did face such threats and maintained
conscription.503 It was the international community’s emphasis on force reduction and
affordability in light of a low threat environment that led to Bosnia’s transition to an allvolunteer force.
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C. Implications of Bosnian Resistance to Reform for Initial Recruitment Decisions
Importantly for the theory, these reforms were implemented despite continued
Bosnian perception of high threats that they believed would necessitate conscription.
Americans had to work hard to enforce their version of a peacetime army over Bosnians’
“inherited wartime mentality.”504 The reasons interviewees gave for Bosnian resistance to
these efforts reinforces the argument that local preferences for conscription were for
military and security, rather than cultural, purposes. In the words of one interviewee,
“Bosniaks wanted a large force and large reserve force because that’s the only army they
had to defend themselves. Getting [them] to agree to dramatic reductions in reserve or
overall force or reduce conscription was a tough sell.”505 As noted above, senior BiH
official emphasized “the experience in the ‘90s” as placing a premium on the entities’
belief in defense, especially given the continued existence of war time units.506 Bosniak
officials adamantly sought assurances at the first Defence Reform Commission that they
would not be required to give up conscription until there was state-level control over all
armed forces—in other words, until there was no longer a separate RS army that could
threaten them.507
Some people have argued that local elites recognized that the NATO presence
eliminated threats to their security by the time defense reform began.508 However, the
reluctance of entity actors, especially Bosniaks, to end conscription before the state
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established a monopoly on force suggests that the local threat perceptions still saw war as
likely. In addition, Bosniak acquiescence to ending conscription did not indicate a
fundamental shift in their threat perceptions. As described above, “the enormous amount
of external pressure” meant that “there’s no real buy-in from anyone.”509 This risk of
backsliding has led to efforts to limit the size of the army altogether, as the only option
for reducing the likelihood that the ethnic communities will once again view reignited
conflict as a serious possibility. This offers further evidence that the international
community’s willingness to enforce its preference for a volunteer military fit for a low
threat environment has played a major role in BiH military design.

VII. Alternative Hypotheses
Bosnian policymakers’ fear of renewed existential conflict is not the only factor
that could have led them to adopt strong preferences for conscription after Dayton. There
are two other ways they could have settled on a policy of conscription. First, pre-existing
cultural norms or organizational practices could have led them to view conscription as the
most effective military practice for establishing security given the severe threat
environment. In other words, would other actors in the same position have also used
conscription to defend against a potential Bosnian Serb threat, or might a volunteer force
have served just as well? Such an explanation would stress the particular military heritage
of policymakers within Bosnia. This account parallels the common argument that former
British colonies use volunteers because of an internalized distaste for citizen armies or a
respect for individual rights: did Bosnians prefer conscription not because it was the best
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solution to a highly threatening environment, but because of a Yugoslav culture that
perceived conscription as appropriate or effective?
This counterfactual is impossible to test with certainty, but there are some
indicators that Bosnians were constrained by the existing threat environment, not by
historical experiences, when designing their army. On the one hand, many people have
suggested that Bosnian defense planners were strongly influenced by their experience in
the Yugoslav army, which in turn had adopted many Soviet-style traits. According to this
view, Bosnian policymakers may have just wanted to continue using the recruitment
practices with which they were most familiar. Indeed, “it was clear that conscription was
something they were accustomed to,” and financial constraints on the Bosnian army
meant that there was “no plan for the future of the Federation after the war.”510 Falling
back on historical experience or perceived cultural tropes could be particularly tempting
during periods of uncertainty and speedy potential mobilization, since adopting new
recruitment practices would require many other changes to the way the military trains and
functions.
The Bosnian experience with conscription ran deep. Both the Bosniak and
Bosnian Serb armies were offshoots of the Yugoslav People’s Army, “which was
deliberately used as an integrative tool,” reinforced by conscript service—outside the
recruit’s home region—that ensured “most males experienced a common rite of
passage.”511 As one senior American participant in the second Defense Reform
Commission said, “All of the Entity army people on both sides had ‘grown up’ in
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Yugoslavia, where you had a core army but the entire population was armed and trained
and after your service you joined the reserves and had huge stockpiles in anticipation of
partisan warfare and invasion. And that’s the framework in which they all thought about
this stuff.”512 A senior OSCE representative pointed to an even deeper historical basis for
conscription: He recalled that the reason military recruitment policies weren’t addressed
earlier was that “it was just assumed due to the cultural history of Yugoslavia, AustriaHungary, that we thought conscripts would have to be retained.”513 Radovanovic
supported this view, arguing that “what is mentioned quite often here is not necessarily
about culture and socialization, but is more to prepare young boys and maturation.”514
However, Bosnians were also exposed to American military practices both during
the war and after Dayton. Familiarity with certain military practices did not stop them
from adopting reforms in other areas, or from wanting to adopt more NATO-esque
policies. The Train and Equip program made particular strides toward changing Bosnian
perceptions about what military practices to emulate. The program was administered
primarily by the private military contractor MPRI, which was comprised of former U.S.
military personnel and “took pride in the facilitating the execution of U.S. foreign
policy.”515 The aim of this policy was “to build a NATO-type military,” and was a rare
point on which Bosniaks, Croats, and Americans agreed.516 Through the Train and Equip
Program, according to Rohan Maxwell, the Federation “had largely bought into the
notion that, ‘this is the US system, this is a better system.”517 According to Locher,
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Bosnians were eager to adopt new military practices and it came down to the OSCE to
adjust their advice given Bosnian history to facilitate this process: “You can’t just take
US or German practices and apply them. What would work in a Bosnian context? But
they said they want to look like a NATO military, so ‘what do we need to do to move in
that direction?’ But we needed to modify it.”518 Thus, the post-Dayton period created an
opportunity for Bosnia to deviate from historical military practices. Bosnian officials
were clearly not constrained by or wedded to these past practices, and actively sought to
emulate new models in many other, non-recruitment, areas. This is evident in their
acceptance of the Train and Equip program, as well as in the fact that they wanted greater
integration early in the reform process. As Clifford Bond said, “Bosniaks did not believe
reforms went far enough....[Bosniaks] thought that ‘Everyone else is moving in the
direction of Europe and do we want to be left out?’”519
The fact that Bosnians prioritized effective defensive capabilities and still sought
to retain conscription, despite efforts to emulate the United States in other ways, suggests
that military circumstances created incentives for conscription. Interviewees repeatedly
emphasized the threat environment as the major determinant of Bosnian preferences. One
Defense Reform Commission working group member said “Bosniaks believed that
Croats and Serbs could rely on Croatia and Serbia for protection, while they did not have
a protector. They felt that if they got rid of conscription they wouldn’t be able to defend
themselves.”520 Without these threat perceptions, there would have been less commitment
to maintaining conscription.
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Second, might conscription have served some purpose other than territorial
defense that was more important to those responsible for Bosnia’s military design? If this
was the case, the threat of renewed conflict merely may have been useful rhetoric
designed to justify a potentially unpopular policy that would serve other interests of the
political elite. This is a particularly important possibility to evaluate because NATO’s
security guarantee could have reduced the need for the Entities to optimize their
militaries for conflict. One recurring concern in security sector reform and disarmament
programs is unemployment: if there are not enough economic opportunities in postconflict situations, a surplus of ex-soldiers can be destabilizing.521 Thus, it may be the
case that states that are already in the process of demobilizing and weakening the military
may nonetheless choose to conscript to reduce unemployment and maintain control of
armed individuals. A participant at the Dayton Agreement negotiations said that
participants wanted to make sure that enough former combatants had career paths into the
army or police, while an observer at the first Defense Reform Commission noted that a
fear of what newly unemployed soldiers would do in civilian society characterized many
of the debates at that time.522 However, these concerns ran up against the broader
emphasis on demobilization and cost-saving.
The more common non-military argument in favor of conscription was that it had
cultural value as a vehicle for socializing youth, especially young men. All entity actors
viewed mandatory military service as an important mechanism, if not for active political
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indoctrination, at least for turning boys into men: “There was this perception in Bosnia
that it was part of becoming a man.”523 While this likely meant Bosnian politicians had an
emotional or cultural attachment to conscription that made them more reluctant to
abandon it, ultimately these arguments served a more fundamental military logic, and
were not intended to support state-level integration. As one interviewee involved in
defense reform in Bosnia for more than a decade noted, “all the reasons for conscription
were to keep the communities divided.”524 This meant that conscription took on added
significance for Bosniaks, who viewed conscription’s “stamp on young men” as
providing additional cohesion and reserves that were necessary given the fact that they
were the only ethnic community with “no big brother to come to their aid.”525 Thus,
conscript socialization focused on the ethnic communities, and no one ever suggested
expanding this logic in service of integration or unification across the communities.

VIII. Conclusion
Conventional wisdom would attribute the Bosnian preference for conscription to
the institutional legacy of the country’s Yugoslav heritage or other aspects of its domestic
culture. Such arguments, while consistent with some actors’ preferences, obscures the
real preferences that motivated conscription, and the possibilities for broader reform,
within Bosnia. Local security concerns and territorial defense, not domestic statebuilding,
dominated debates over military design in the years following the Dayton Agreement.
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The threat of major, renewed land warfare was so high that the peace treaty’s
international guarantors largely intentionally avoided the issue of military design, leaving
multiple armed forces in place that continued to view each other as enemies. While the
resolve and interest of the international community—in this case, essentially the High
Representative and the United States—in creating a more effective and efficient BiH
military increased with time, it was not until 2005 that it enforced its recruitment
preferences. This was particularly challenging because Bosnian and American
perceptions of the threats facing BiH and the purpose its army should serve differed so
dramatically. International policymakers did not see a need for a Bosnian military
capable of fighting a major war, and worked hard to extract concessions that would
support their preferred deference reform policies. Without this external pressure, which
overcame the institutional inertia of entrenched defense attitudes within the country, there
is no indication that Bosnia would have adopted an all-volunteer force.

238

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
Reestablishing effective national security forces was among the most important
priorities after the American-led invasion of Iraq and ousting of Saddam Hussein in 2003.
American military commanders and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) began
planning what the new Iraq armed forces would look like even before President Bush’s
famed “Mission Accomplished” speech.526 The army that they decided to build was
remarkably different from that of the pre-Occupation era. Hussein’s army—like every
previous Iraqi army since its independence from the United Kingdom in 1932—was a
large, conscript-based force, characterized by heavy rank inflation and ethno-religious
divisions. The new force was configured to focus primarily on border defense.527 It was
reduced from 350,000 to 40,000 personnel, organized in three divisions equipped with
limited heavy weapons, and lacked the capacity to function effectively away from
bases. 528 The CPA was particularly concerned that the new army would reflect the ethnic
and religious makeup of society.529
These decisions were based on American understandings of the post-war regional
security environment and how to dampen sectarian grievances. However, these were not
the only ways to design the new military in Iraq. While the decision to disband all Iraqi
security forces, including the Ministry of Defense, forced the CPA to build the armed
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forces from the ground up, the pre-war plan had been to recall and retrain demobilized
and surrendered soldiers.530 Iraqi nationalists, too, viewed the large existing army as an
important symbol of sovereignty and national identity.531 Despite continued debates
about recruitment and organization in the new Iraqi army, the CPA held fast to ideal of a
small, heavily-vetted, and Ba’athist-free volunteer force.
The story of Iraq’s recent experiences with military recruitment is a familiar one.
As this dissertation shows, similar dynamics occurred in Iraq during the Mandate era, in
Bosnia in the mid-2000s, and in Jordan in the years surrounding its independence. This
dissertation demonstrates that this kind of foreign influence on military recruitment is
surprisingly common. There are countless examples of powerful states frequently using
military advisors, troops deployments, and even direct control to ensure new states adopt
their preferred military policies. Pakistan and India were both led by British generals in
the years after independence, and British officers remained in both places to assist with
training.532 Many post-Soviet states continued to be dependent on Russian assistance after
their independence, including a large Russian military presence or Russian command
over troops.533 France played a similar role in many of its former African colonies.534
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I examine these patron-client relationships and describe their effect on important
military policies, focusing particularly on the use of conscription. The military is an
important actor in international relations. However, it is undertheorized in political
science literature, often treated as invariant across states. Similarly, political science has
traditionally emphasized the way militaries are similar, without in-depth analysis of the
many ways in which they differ. The challenges associated with collecting data on
militaries around the world has further inhibited large-n studies of the military. This has
limited analysis to comparative case studies that often make no effort to provide a
generalizable account of military organization beyond the cases at hand. Therefore, my
dissertation provides a notable foray into large-n statistical comparisons of different types
of militaries.
I chose to focus on an understudied but particularly important military policy, the
method of recruitment. There has been little research into why some states use
conscription while others use volunteers, especially compared to the volume of work on
other aspects of military organization, such as the development of specific doctrine or the
advent of the standing army. This dissertation is situated in a similar vein to both this
literature and more recent work on variation in military policies, for example, the
adoption of female integration into armed forces.535 Like this other work, this dissertation
explains why not all militaries adopt the same policies.
My approach to this puzzle differs substantially from traditional political science
explanations for variation in military policies. Existing research explains military design

Political Change, edited by Claude E. Welch, Jr., 1–61 (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1970): 11.
535
Laura Huber and Sabrina Karim, “The Internationalization of Security Sector Gender Reforms
in Post-Conflict Countries,” Conflict Management and Peace Science (forthcoming).

241

as either a product of threat environments or domestic politics. However, I emphasize the
need to look to beyond these factors. I demonstrate the important role of outside actors in
influencing how states design their militaries. Military design is an important realm in
which international hierarchy—or shared sovereignty—plays out. As a result, we should
understand militaries not simply as the product of the environments in which they
develop, but as affected by powerful forces often outside their control. Other studies of
different military policies would also benefit from consideration of the powerful states
that influence how states and their militaries develop.

I. Summary of Arguments
In chapter 1, I introduced my goal of developing a theory of military design. I
established the importance of conscription as a military policy and justified my focus on
conscription over other possible policies. The method by which a state will recruit its
military personnel is one of the first decisions it must make when designing its military,
as it has important implications for training, length of service, and military
administration. Existing research also shows that the decision to use conscription has
implications for an array of social and political outcomes. At the interstate level,
conscription can affect military effectiveness and the frequency of conflict initiation,
while domestically it has been linked to national identity, state formation, and political
participation.536 Lastly, conscription has important social consequences given the
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different quantity and portion of the population that it exposes to military service, even
when it is not universal.537 Even ignoring the consequences for states and militaries,
conscription certainly has drastic implications for the young men—and occasionally,
women—who are called upon for military service.
While the decision to use conscription is a particularly notable component of
military design, it is also a useful focus from the perspective of testing the theory of
military design I developed in chapter 2. My theory explains why militaries are designed
in different ways and predicts differences in their military recruitment policies. The
argument I developed in chapter 2 describes military design as a product of patron-client
relationships. Strong states with security interests in weaker states use their military
influence to ensure that the weaker state adopts their preferred policies. This results in the
emulation of patron state practices by their clients, either through direct control by the
patron or the diffusion of patron-held values in training. Patron states are particularly able
to affect recruitment policies during periods in which their clients’ military institutions
are in flux—what I call “new states”—for example, after independence, after social
revolutions, or during period of post-conflict reconstruction.
For example, negotiations with West Germany to end its post-World War II
occupation provided an opportunity for NATO, led by the United States, to influence its
recruitment policies. As the return to full West German sovereignty neared, it became
increasingly urgent to settle on a process of German rearmament that was deemed
necessary for Western Europe’s security vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. While the United
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States had ultimately decided that the question of conscription or voluntary enlistment
was one for German authorities, NATO security requirements left Germany with little
option.538 More specifically, the United States “demanded West German rearmament as a
price for American reinforcements to Europe.”539 At the London and Paris Conferences
on West German sovereignty and rearmament, West Germany had agreed to contribute
five hundred thousand men to NATO and the European defense.540 However, with few
volunteers forthcoming, the “quantitative logic” was paramount in the West German
decision to introduce conscription.541 Similar dynamics were at play in Jordan at the
moment that it gained independence, when the British used direct control over military
decision-making as well as command over the military’s budget to ensure that it adopted
particular recruitment practices.
The adoption of conscription is a particularly useful test of this theory because
conscription’s implementation is so often attributed in the literature to domestic culture or
ideology. Thus, conscription constitutes a hard test of the theory: if conscription is
actually determined by foreign actors, then my theory should be at least as likely to apply
to other types of military policies, less associated with a state’s domestic attributes, as
well. Thus, as described above, the United States did not only determine the post-2003
Iraqi army’s recruitment practices, but also how big it would be, how mechanized it
would be, and what units it would be organized around. Similarly, the Defense Reform

538

United States Dept. of State, Office of the Historian, “The United States Deputy
Representative to the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State,” Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III. Available at
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v03/d286.
539
Large, Germans to the Front, 82.
540
Large, Germans to the Front, 220.
541
Ute Frevert, A Nation in Barracks: Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society
(Oxford: Berg, 2004).

244

Commissions in Bosnia addressed additional issues, including changes to command and
control, size of active and reserve forces, ethnic balance, and the number and type of
brigades that constituted the army.
I theorize several mechanisms that lead client states to adopt the patron’s military
recruitment practices. These include direct control by the patron as well as normative
emulation and learning by the client. Sometimes patrons actively intervene in the
recruitment policy of their clients, as in the case of Jordan; other times, clients elect to
adopt the patron’s policies on their own or with less overt interference, as in the case of
West Germany.
In addition, my theory makes predictions about recruitment in the absence of a
foreign patron. When there is no foreign patron, I argue that threat perceptions determine
military recruitment. States that fear major territorial invasions from other states are more
likely to use conscription to safeguard their security. States that perceive that they face
low threat environments, on the other hand, are unconstrained in the choices they make
about military recruitment. Under these conditions—no foreign patron and no interstate
threat—leaders’ personal preferences and beliefs or domestic political factors will
determine recruitment outcomes in idiosyncratic ways.
Chapter 3 provided a quantitative test of my theory. The findings provided
powerful support for my initial hypotheses. First, they demonstrated that states are more
likely to use conscription if they are influenced by a patron state that uses conscription
after independence. There was also somewhat weaker evidence that there is a similar
emulation effect for states influenced by patrons that use volunteers. These findings take
into consideration and control for alternative arguments, including threat environment
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and colonial recruitment legacy—which is most often associated with domestic political
culture—of the client.
The most common of these counter-arguments is the claim that British colonies
adopted volunteer militaries because they internalized a British cultural antipathy towards
conscription.542 As Victor Asal et al. write, “an anticonscription precedent set during the
English Civil War….defined state power and individual rights in the English context, and
England passed it on to its many colonies through the institutions of colonial
governance.”543 This argument is unsatisfying for several reasons, which I laid out in
chapter 2, including that it ignores powerful incentives for dissociation from prior
regimes and the importance of independence as a critical juncture.
My results in chapter 3 confirm that there is unlikely to be a causal chain from
British volunteerism to volunteerism in former British colonies. For one, I found that
there is a more consistent effect across different model specifications of conscript patron
states. This indicates that new states are less likely to use volunteers simply because their
patron does, which likewise should weaken the connection between volunteerism in the
United Kingdom and its former colonies. Furthermore, in regressions that include my
patron state variables and a dichotomous measure of whether a state was a former British
colony, the latter was not found to be a statistically significant predictor of military
recruitment. In other words, there is no evidence, once my explanatory variables are
taken into consideration, that being a former British colony is associated with volunteer
military recruitment.
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Second, I find that the effect of having a patron state does not change with
different threat environments; whether clients face a dangerous or stable external threat
environment, patrons tend to lead clients toward adopting their own recruitment policies.
Third, when there is no foreign patron, major external threats lead states to use
conscription. This is important evidence that helps adjudicate conflicting theoretical
predictions in the literature on military recruitment: while some theories argue that
modern technology makes conscription obsolete, leading states to use volunteers to cope
with threats, others argue that increasing volunteerism in Europe is a product of the
declining threat environment of the post-Cold War period.544 My findings suggest that
states still view conscription as their best option when they face major territorial threats.
To establish these findings, I built a dataset of cases in which states have the
opportunity and interest in redesigning military institutions, including instances of
military design after independence, after social revolution, and after civil wars that ended
in negotiated settlements or rebel victory. These are the most likely instances in which
foreign actors should be able to influence military design. I also collected original data to
measure whether a military patron is present in a given case. These variables identify
who the patron state is, whether it used conscription or volunteers, and whether it used
military deployments, advisors, or seconded or contract officers to influence the client
state.
Chapters 4 through 6 presented case studies that represent each of the causal
pathways described by my theory. The first of these three chapters examines the
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formation of Jordan’s military. This chapter shows the way military recruitment policies
can result from the emulation of a foreign military patron. Jordan’s army was strongly
influenced by British military preferences. British officers commanded Jordanian units,
and the army was led by a former British officer, John Bagot Glubb. Local preferences
and historical practices would have prejudiced Jordan towards adopting conscription.
However, these factors could not overpower the efforts of British officers to design the
Jordanian military as a volunteer force after its independence. In fact, there is strong
evidence that in the absence of this British influence, Jordan would have adopted
conscription, like its previous colonial power, the Ottoman Empire, or its next most likely
patron, Iraq. Instead, Glubb implemented the volunteer system with which he was most
familiar. He explicitly resisted requests to use conscription, limiting any compulsory
policies to the supplementary National Guard reserve force.
Chapter 5 told the story of military recruitment in the absence of either a military
patron or major external threats. This chapter analyzed the creation of Iraq’s army after
its independence in 1932. While Iraq had a military patron during the Mandate era in the
form of the Mandatory power, the United Kingdom, it had no patron after independence.
While the United Kingdom fought vigorously against Iraqi efforts to adopt conscription
during the Mandatory period, it made it clear that it had no desire to assist in Iraqi
military design after the latter’s independence. Consequently, domestic preferences could
determine Iraqi military design. Moreover, Iraqi leaders did not perceive there to be
major external threats after independence. Instead, Iraq’s Minister of Defense, Jafar AlAskari, believed the army’s priority should be internal security, and that a strong army
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was the precondition for other strong institutions.545 Iraqi leaders sought to create a
military that could aid with internal pressures by integrating the country’s diverse
populations and tying them to the regime. In particular, they were strongly influenced by
their education in the Ottoman military system, which convinced them that conscription
was the best system for meeting this goal. Thus, Iraq had no military patron, faced no
external constraints on its military design in the form of major external threats, and as a
result was unconstrained in the recruitment policies that it could adopt.
Finally, chapter 6 demonstrated the importance of threat perceptions when there is
no foreign patron that dominates military design but when there is major external threat.
It applied my theory to the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite an extensive
international presence in Bosnia at the end of the civil war that established its
independence, no single power emerged to guide military design. In fact, the United
States, which led the statebuilding process in Bosnia, intentionally avoided questions of
military design in the 1990s, preferring to allow the Bosnian Entities to make their own
decisions. This resulted in the perpetuation of the status quo, which was the adoption of
conscription by each of the Entities to prepare for renewed hostilities that were perceived
as inevitable. Once the United States took a more active role in military design, spurred
by the High Commissioner’s introduction of the defense reform process in 2002, Bosnian
recruitment practices shifted to implement the volunteer practices of its new military
patrons. By illustrating a change in military recruitment practices after an initial period of
military design, this chapter also demonstrates the potential for my theory to explain
military recruitment policies beyond cases of new states.
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Overall, this dissertation contributions to political science literature by providing
a new theory of institutional design, focused specifically on militaries. It demonstrates
that military design is subject to forces often outside the control of the state, indicating
limitations to state sovereignty and emphasizing the hierarchical nature of the
international system. The remainder of this chapter details the contributions this
dissertation makes to important debates in political science and insights it provides into
relevant policy debates. It concludes with a discussion of avenues for further research.

II. Implications for Scholarly Literature and Policy
While this dissertation was intended to identify the factors that determine whether
a country develops a military that relies on conscripts or volunteers, its findings speak to
broader academic and policy communities. More specifically, it adds to a growing body
of work urging scholars to “see” hierarchy in international relations.546 In addition, it
implies relevant policy prescriptions for security force assistance and cooperation,
especially in post-conflict and weak state settings.
A. Hierarchy in International Relations
In arguing for the role of outside actors in affecting military design decisions, this
dissertation also bolsters the view that hierarchy constitutes an important component of
international order. Viewing the international system as characterized by hierarchy means
recognizing the ways state sovereignty can be limited or overlap with that of other states.
As a result, states can have different roles within the international system. Militaries in
subordinate or client states may serve very different functions from those in dominant or
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patron states, or from any state that can make a more independent defense policy.
Hierarchy implies that some states may not need to provide for their own defense, but can
rely on others to guarantee their security for them.547 Others have shown that interstate
relations are often characterized by hierarchy. As Paul Macdonald wrote, “unequal
imperial relations in which great powers seize sovereignty from less powerful states are
here to stay.”548 This dissertation shows that hierarchy often plays out in the realm of
military affairs. Traditionally, developing and controlling national militaries has been
viewed as a chief response to the constraints imposed by anarchy. I show that in many
states it is an institution characterized by shared sovereignty, not one that arose solely or
primarily out of the requirements of self-help.
This emphasis on hierarchy and patron-client relations also has relevance for
research into the security sector in weak states. While I developed my theory by thinking
about newly independent states and the process of military formation, my theory applies
beyond these circumstances to conditions that states are likely to continue to experience
today. The universe of cases I examined in Chapter 3 included not only states after they
became independent, but also the comparable circumstances of social revolution and
post-conflict reconstruction. These latter two conditions capture the broader phenomenon
of weak or fragile states. I found that 65% of the states in my universe of cases exhibit
some form of foreign military patronage, indicating that weak states are very likely to
lack full control over the design of their military institutions. Moreover, my results show
that emulation is a common result of this influence. This means that foreign sponsors of
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security sector reform have the ability to affect military design in weak states in a lasting
way, especially given how rarely recruitment practices change.
B. Policy Implications
This relevance to security sector reform means that my findings have implications
for policymakers. Decisions about military recruitment are but one example of the many
decisions states need to make when they design or reform militaries. Thus, this
dissertation demonstrates the importance of foreign actors during the security sector
reform process. In particular, foreign governments can play an important role by
controlling security practices in or modeling practices to states they target for security
sector reform. For example, the United States has a long history of attempting to build
militaries in other states, and it appears that it will continue to attempt to do this for the
foreseeable future.549 However, its record of building successful militaries is, at best,
mixed. As Biddle et al., point out, many U.S.-assisted militaries have failed in the
missions they have been assigned; the Iraqi army collapsed in the face of the Islamic
State offensive in 2014, while the Afghan army has been unable to prevent the resurgence
of the Taliban.550 Therefore security force assistance, they argue, has not led to the
emulation of successful warfighting practices.
However, this dissertation indicates that security force assistance can lead to
successful emulation with sufficient engagement from the foreign patron. The Afghan
and Iraq armies, after all, adopted many of the formal design policies that the United
States preferred. This of course does not necessarily mean that patron states will always
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pursue the right, or most militarily effective, policies for their clients; patrons will base
their military design decisions on their own experiences and biases rooted in their own
history and strategic culture. Regardless of whether this external influence is good for the
new state, though, when patron states are committed to providing assistance, new states
are more likely to emulate their practices. Indeed, this is consistent with a forthcoming
argument by Mara Karlin, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy
and Force Development in the U.S. Defense Department.551 Karlin argues that one of the
necessary conditions for successfully building a foreign military is deep engagement,
which includes selecting personnel for senior military leadership in the new state. One of
the key goals of military advisory missions and seconding officers is to train the next
generation of military leaders in the new military. Thus, if sufficient attention is paid to
training and selecting military leaders that have been exposed to the practices of the
patron state, security force assistance is especially likely to be successful.
In particular, recruitment policies can contribute to conflict resolution and
security in war-torn and divided societies through integration with efforts to support
human rights, power-sharing in the military, and broader security sector reform and
training efforts. Thus, my research highlights an important role for external actors in
helping states design or restructure their military after major regime change or conflict.
For example, military training and power-sharing was integral to the peace process in
Bosnia. Military recruitment policies are an important feature of military power-sharing
that have implications for other aspects of post-conflict security sector reform
agreements. My dissertation contributes to efforts to design such post-conflict militaries
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to support peace and domestic reconstruction. In short, my dissertation addresses an
important, recurring problem for policymakers: how to assist other states in the design of
militaries that support domestic stability and international peace.
There is another potential challenge for policymakers. I show that when states do
not have a foreign patron, they prefer to respond to highly threatening environments
using conscription. This demonstrates that, despite technological advances that appear to
favor capital-intensive military strategies, many states perceive conscription—a laborintensive strategy—as still their best bet in the event of major foreign threats. Therefore,
this dissertation says something about how states respond to threats. Capital-intensive,
volunteer militaries may appear to be the best practice in the international system because
of the success of the system’s most powerful actor—the United States—in using these
techniques. However, we should not necessarily expect states to adopt capital-intensive
militaries to address external defense in the international system without direct military
influence from a patron who already follows those practices. New states in particular may
prefer to pursue other goals, such as promoting a national identity, or may perceive their
capabilities as better suited to labor-intensive military organization. In reality, we should
still expect states to try to maximize their military effectiveness in the face of threats
using conscription. Indeed, there is some evidence that this is happening around the
world today, with several countries apparently implementing conscription in response to
rising threats from regional rivals. This has happened, for example, in countries as
diverse as Sweden and the United Arab Emirates, responding to a resurgent Russia and
Iran, respectively.552 As a result, foreign patrons who use volunteers may have a
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particularly challenging time affecting military policies in states that perceive they face
major foreign threats. This may change however, if states perceive there to be a decline in
the likelihood of land-based territorial wars. As these conflicts become less common and
threats to invade countries become less credible, fewer states may design their militaries
around conscription.
This is important because military policies determine the extent to which the
United States can rely on allies to contribute effectively to foreign deployments and
collective security: conscript and volunteer armies have different levels of effectiveness,
or rather, may be better in different types of conflicts.553 If volunteer militaries are more
effective in long counterinsurgency campaigns—as Cohen suggests—or in any type of
conflict—as Horowitz et al. argue—then the United States should want its allies to adopt
volunteer recruitment policies. The U.S. has an interest in whether coalition or alliance
partners use either conscription or volunteers. Military design and recruitment policies
can also foster domestic stability, which in turn facilitates more predictable long-term
relations, when they support democratic and civilian-controlled regimes. Understanding
what conditions make a preferred recruitment system more or less likely is useful for
policymakers designing foreign aid to affect these policy outcomes. For example, if
Afghan leaders consider reinstituting conscription—as they recently have—but US
policymakers prefer a volunteer Afghan army, my research identifies feasible ways to
achieve that goal. For example, maintaining an Afghan army that is consistent with
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American perceptions of military organization may require a heavy U.S. security
presence, either with local advisors that have some degree of control over the Afghan
military, or with sufficient numbers of trainers to teach their Afghan counterparts about
American military practices. Whether for advising allies or assisting security sector
reform, it is important to know what conditions make it easier for a country to adopt a
recruitment system successfully.
Similarly, this dissertation provides insight into how states define their security
interests. It is often assumed that militaries are designed primarily to be experts in
violence. However, my research demonstrates that there are cases where states sacrifice
military effectiveness to pursue other goals, such as social integration. My research
suggests in what conditions states may be freer to sacrifice military effectiveness for
other goals. When states have patrons, domestic preferences will have little effect on how
they design their military. Instead, the patron will dominate military design with its own
perceptions of military effectiveness in mind. Conversely, states with no patrons but
which face major external threats are also constrained, but by the international security
environment—they have no choice but to rely on themselves for military defense. Only
when there is no foreign patron or external threat are states relatively free to design their
militaries based on their own preferences. When there are no constraints from patrons or
external threats, states have more freedom to use the military to address less strictly
military goals. In these cases, some states facing high levels of domestic threat use loyal
volunteers to suppress rebellion violently, while others seek to tie the population to the
regime through a conscript system that treats the army like a “school for the nation.”
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However, my dissertation shows that the circumstances in which states can make military
decisions based on these factors are relatively rare.

III. Extensions for Future Research
The argument and findings of this dissertation offer several possible extensions
for future research. In addition, there are also several aspects of my theory that are
amenable to additional empirical testing.
First, I only focused on the broadest level of recruitment policy—whether states
used conscription or not at the national level. However, other aspects of recruitment
policies are also worth studying, and may in fact be related to the decision to use
conscription. For example, length of service, exemptions, and recruitment criteria are all
additional ways that states affect who serves in their militaries. Personnel policies that
make the military more or less open to diverse societal groups, especially policies relating
to gender or LGBT equality, is a particular area that is likely to be important for many
armies around in the world in the near future. It is reasonable to believe that if the
decision to conscript or not is determined by foreign influence, so might these other,
related policies. Thus, we could expect gender-inclusive military policies to occur in new
or post-conflict states whose security sector reform processes are being overseen by
patrons that have adopted similar policies. Similarly, my theory could also be extended to
test policies that are less directly related to recruitment. Any aspect of military
organization that is subject to variation across states, such as the main organizational unit
or level of mechanization, could be equally affected by patron-client relations or, in their
absence, by threat perceptions.
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Second, my theory could also apply to the timing of recruitment system changes.
In this dissertation I focused primarily on initial military design decisions based on the
empirical finding that recruitment changes are rare and self-reinforcing. Thus, it is
particularly useful to understand the contexts in which states initially design their
militaries. However, it is also important to study military reform by addressing when or
why states change their recruitment system. It may be that foreign patrons can affect
military design even after the initial period of military design. Thus, when a state loses a
foreign patron and regains control over its military design, my theory would imply that
threat perceptions should determine how it will choose to recruit. This is consistent with
the findings of my case study chapters on Jordan and Bosnia, which examined the
trajectory of these countries’ armies after the initial period of military design. In addition,
when a state switches between foreign patrons that use different recruitment methods, we
should also observe the state adopting the new patron’s recruitment method. Indeed, in
related work, I find that countries that participate in the American IMET program are
more likely to change their recruitment system to use volunteers, and are less likely to
change to conscript service if they already use volunteers.554 Thus, my theory may be
equally applicable to cases of recruitment change as to cases of design.
Third, my dissertation reveals additional avenues of exploration in terms of how
foreign patrons can affect military design. I argue that emulation is the effect of having a
patron state, but emulation can come about either via direct intervention or through more
indirect pressure, or exposure to successful techniques. Additional research could
determine which of these mechanisms happens under what conditions.
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Fourth, there is similar room for additional research on the nature of recruitment
decisions that are defined by my second causal pathway. While I argue that recruitment
under conditions of no patronage and no major foreign threat is fundamentally
determined by leaders’ idiosyncratic preferences, it may be possible to theorize factors
that further constrain their decisions. For example, some types of domestic threats may
more closely resemble the kinds of foreign territorial threats that create pressures toward
conscription. This may have been the case in Iraq for much of its history: a Sunni Muslim
minority ruled over a Shi’a majority, which may have created incentives to attempt to use
military conscription to create a national identity. In fact, there is some support for the
argument that ethnic representativeness may affect leaders’ strategic calculus regarding
conscription; Chapter 3 indicated that states with larger politically excluded populations
may be less likely to use conscription when they have no patron. Similarly, this is also
likely to be the pathway followed by many powerful states with more developed
militaries, particularly in an age when nuclear weapons have decreased the probability of
major territorial invasions. Thus, the foreign patronage portion of my theory applies best
to weaker, developing states, though one could imagine that a similar emulation argument
could explain military design in stronger states as well.
Fifth, my dissertation advances a theory of military design that can equally apply
to non-state actors. Great powers around the world have been involved in creating or
supporting rebel group proxies, often to avoid contributing troops of their own. Most
recently, the United States announced that it would create a new Kurdish-led and
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“professionally well trained” force in Syria.555 While other American-backed Kurdish
forces have reportedly relied on conscription, it appears that their regular forces—as
opposed to border and civil police—are comprised of volunteers.556 Whether non-state
actors tend to adopt the same recruitment practices—or other military practices—of their
sponsors remains to be seen.
Finally, it is only worthwhile to understand the determinants of military
recruitment strategies if this variation affects other important characteristics of the state
or aspects of state behavior. While existing research, as described in Chapter 1,
establishes that conscription has important effects on interstate relations, including
conflict onset and outcomes, there is much room for additional research on the
consequences of conscription. In particular, there is little research on how conscription
affects domestic political outcomes at the state level. Given its broad effects on military
design and its relationship to civilian society, conscription can be expected to affect many
domestic outcomes, including coup propensity, responses to mass demonstrations, state
capacity, and individual political participation. While conscription is often cited as a
factor that could affect these outcomes, there is little cross-national research to support
these arguments.557
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Similarly, the merits of conscription are still frequently debated in the United
States.558 It is rare for a Veteran’s Day or Memorial Day to pass without at least one oped in a major US news publication asking whether the United States should reinstate the
draft.559 Typical arguments in favor of such a policy state that a draft would lead to
greater cross-cultural understanding and would create better civil-military relations, in
part by ensuring more Americans are connected to the military and thus have “skin in the
game” when it comes to foreign policy decision-making. However, these arguments have
not been tested empirically. Additional research on the domestic consequences of
conscription would provide important information about how countries should design
their militaries in the future.
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APPENDIX B: SUPPORTING DATA FOR CHAPTER 3
Table A.1: Universe of Cases
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70
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660
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350
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211
315
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290
663
840
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Criterion for Entering Dataset
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China
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Iraq
Haiti
Spain
Ethiopia
Lebanon
Albania
France
Greece
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Poland
Jordan
Philippines
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1922
1924
1924
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1941
1943
1944
1944
1944
1944
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1944
1945
1945
1945
1945
1945
1946
1946
1946

ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
COW Interruption
ICOW
COW Interruption
COW Civil War
ICOW
COW Civil War
COW Civil War
ICOW
COW Interruption
COW Civil War
COW Interruption
ICOW
COW Interruption
COW Interruption
COW Interruption
ICOW
COW Interruption
COW Interruption and Goodwin
COW Interruption
COW Interruption
COW Interruption
COW Interruption
COW Interruption
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW

306
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750
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94
666
775
731
732
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850
713
620
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811
812
265
817
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260
600
625
616
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820
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40
434
439
471
482
483
484
437
352
490
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India
Pakistan
Costa Rica
Israel
Myanmar (Burma)
North Korea (DPRK)
South Korea (ROK)
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)
China
Indonesia
Taiwan (ROC)
Libya
Bolivia
Japan
Cambodia
Laos
German Dem. Rep. (East)
Rep. of Vietnam (South)
Vietnam/Dem.Rep.Vietnam
(North)
Argentina
Austria
German Fed. Rep. (West)
Morocco
Sudan
Tunisia
Ghana
Malaysia
Guinea
Cuba
Benin (Dahomey)
Burkina Faso (Upper Volta)
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Central African Republic
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Goodwin Revolution
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1960
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ICOW
Goodwin Revolution
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1960
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580
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451
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615
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51
812
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990
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511
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338
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420
781
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53
571
110
645
570
680
411
590
970
572
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Madagascar (Malagasy Rep.)
Mali
Mauritania
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Somalia
Togo
Kuwait
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Tanzania (Tanganyika)
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Burundi
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Laos
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Samoa (Western Samoa)
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Uganda
Kenya
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Malta
Zambia
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Maldive Islands
Singapore
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696
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155
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541
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591
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57
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935
58
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835
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Tonga
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Qatar
United Arab Emirates
Sudan
Bahamas
Chile
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Grenada
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Cape Verde
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Antigua and Barbuda
Belize
St. Kitts and Nevis
Brunei
Chad
Lebanon

1970
1970
1970
1971
1971
1971
1971
1972
1973
1973
1974
1974
1974
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1976
1977
1978
1978
1978
1978
1979
1979
1979
1979
1979
1979
1980
1981
1981
1983
1984
1984
1984

309

ICOW
COW Civil War
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
COW Civil War
ICOW
COW Civil War
Goodwin Revolution
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW and Goodwin
Goodwin Revolution
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
COW Civil War
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
Goodwin Revolution
ICOW
Goodwin Revolution
ICOW
ICOW
COW Civil War
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
COW Civil War
COW Civil War

987
983
500
680
339
355
310
290
360
483
255
660
565
679
540
371
373
370
811
344
366
530
372
705
703
367
368
343
359
349
702
701
369
704
346
92
359
316
531
317

Fed. States of Micronesia
Marshall Islands
Uganda
Yemen People's Republic
Albania
Bulgaria
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Chad
Germany
Lebanon
Namibia
Yemen
Angola
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Cambodia
Croatia
Estonia
Ethiopia
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia
Moldova
Slovenia
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Bosnia and Herzegovina
El Salvador
Moldova
Czech Republic
Eritrea
Slovakia

1986
1986
1986
1986
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1992
1992
1992
1993
1993
1993
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ICOW
ICOW
COW Civil War
COW Civil War
Goodwin Revolution
Goodwin Revolution
Goodwin Revolution
Goodwin Revolution
Goodwin Revolution
COW Civil War
COW Interruption
COW Civil War
ICOW
ICOW
COW Civil War
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
COW Civil War
ICOW
COW Interruption
COW Civil War
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
COW Interruption
COW Interruption
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
ICOW
COW Civil War
COW Civil War
ICOW and Goodwin
ICOW
ICOW and Goodwin

540
372
986
517
450
450
365
484
490
520
702
615
404
451
700
840
490
860
850
780
516
645
450
437
625
341
790
770
347
626

Angola
Georgia
Palau
Rwanda
Liberia
Liberia
Russia
Congo (Brazzaville)
Dem. Rep. Congo (Zaire;
Kinshasa)
Somalia
Tajikistan
Algeria
Guinea-Bissau
Sierra Leone
Afghanistan
Philippines
Dem. Rep. Congo (Zaire;
Kinshasa)
East Timor (Timor-Leste)
Indonesia
Sri Lanka
Burundi
Iraq
Liberia
Cote d'Ivoire
Sudan
Montenegro
Nepal
Pakistan
Kosovo
South Sudan
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1994
1994
1994
1994
1995
1996
1996
1997

COW Civil War
COW Civil War
ICOW
COW Civil War
COW Civil War
COW Civil War
COW Civil War
COW Civil War

1997

COW Civil War

1997
1997
1999
1999
2000
2001
2001

COW Civil War
COW Civil War
COW Civil War
COW Civil War
COW Civil War
Author Addition
COW Civil War

2002

COW Civil War

2002
2002
2002
2003
2003
2003
2004
2005
2006
2006
2006
2008
2011

ICOW
COW Civil War
COW Civil War
COW Civil War
Author addition
COW Civil War
COW Civil War
COW Civil War
ICOW
COW Civil War
COW Civil War
ICOW
ICOW

Table A.2: Missing Observations on the Dependent Variable
Country
Yemen Arab Republic
Lebanon
Bhutan
Benin
Samoa
Maldive Islands
Barbados
Equatorial Guinea
Nauru
Tonga
Guinea-Bissau
Tuvalu
St. Vincent and Grenadines
Kiribati
Vanuatu
Marshall Islands
Palau
South Sudan

Year
1918
1943
1947
1960
1962
1965
1966
1968
1968
1970
1974
1978
1979
1979
1980
1986
1994
2011

Table A.3: Frequency of Threat Environment by Foreign Influence
Any Land Borders
Any MIDs

No Influence
65 (87%)
30 (41%)

Volunteer Patron
25 (64%)
11 (28%)
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Conscript Patron
80 (87%)
40 (43%)

Table A.4: OLS Results for Table 3.9, The Effect of Patron Influence on the
Probability of Conscription in New States
Variables
Volunteer Patron
Conscript Patron
Volunteer
Legacy
Any Land
Borders

OLS
Model 8

OLS
Model 9

-0.144*
(0.0791)
0.150*
(0.0793)
-0.345***
(0.0918)

-0.0962
(0.0828)
0.158**
(0.0772)
-0.314***
(0.0934)
0.227***
(0.0832)

OLS
Model
10

OLS
Model
11

OLS
Model 12

OLS
Model
13

OLS
Model
14

-0.143*
(0.0796)
0.150*
(0.0794)
-0.342***
(0.0943)

-0.142*
(0.0799)
0.150*
(0.0795)
-0.343***
(0.0931)

-0.115
(0.0824)
0.158**
(0.0765)
-0.289***
(0.0959)

-0.140*
(0.0806)
0.159**
(0.0802)
-0.334***
(0.0949)

-0.137*
(0.0821)
0.158**
(0.0788)
-0.330***
(0.0932)

0.0150
(0.0709)

Any MIDs

0.0220
(0.0753)

Any Forceful
MIDs
Total Land
Borders

0.0470***
(0.0139)
0.0194
(0.0218)

Total MIDs
Total Forceful
MIDs
Constant
Observations
R-squared

0.0506**
(0.0253)
0.582***
(0.0676)
199
0.214

0.368***
(0.0996)
199
0.238

0.575***
(0.0735)
199
0.214

0.574***
(0.0715)
199
0.214

0.413***
(0.0867)
199
0.254

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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0.556***
(0.0749)
199
0.217

0.542***
(0.0709)
199
0.226

Table A.5: OLS Results for Table 3.11, The Effect of Influence and Threat on the
Probability of Conscription in New States
Variables
Any Land Borders

OLS
Model 15
0.486***
(0.0819)

OLS
Model 16

OLS
Model 17

OLS
Model 18

0.172
(0.114)

Any Forceful MIDs

0.0643***
(0.0184)

Total Land Borders

0.0614**
(0.0255)

Total MIDs
Total Forceful
MIDs

Conscript Patron
Volunteer
Patron*Threat
Conscript
Patron*Threat
Volunteer Legacy

Constant
Observations
R-squared

OLS
Model 20

0.132
(0.112)

Any MIDs

Volunteer Patron

OLS
Model 19

0.206**
(0.0951)
0.459**
0.206**
-0.367***
(0.118)
-0.336
(0.205)
-0.315***
(0.0937)

-0.106
(0.0917)
0.244**
(0.103)
-0.0967
(0.194)
-0.215
(0.142)
-0.330***
(0.0961)

-0.0481
(0.0938)
0.219**
(0.0943)
-0.351*
(0.199)
-0.206
(0.147)
-0.346***
(0.0958)

0.0133
(0.110)
0.225
(0.136)
-0.0488
(0.0297)
-0.0209
(0.0330)
-0.301***
(0.0984)

0.135*
0.522*** 0.525*** 0.360***
(0.0722)
(0.0835) (0.0780)
(0.0923)
199
199
199
199
0.250
0.223
0.228
0.260
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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0.112***
(0.0294)
-0.0454
-0.0504
(0.0933)
(0.0950)
0.237**
0.221**
(0.0938)
(0.0901)
-0.103** -0.158
(0.0508)
(0.0954)
-0.0791* -0.0945**
(0.0428)
(0.0455)
-0.338*** -0.331***
(0.0994)
(0.0969)
0.508***
(0.0790)
199
0.235

0.499***
(0.0768)
199
0.243

Table A.6: The Determinants of Military Recruitment on Recently Independent
States Only
(1)
dvdummy
0.249**
(0.116)
-1.312
(0.896)
0.491
(0.465)
-1.020*
(0.603)

Variables
Total Land Borders
Volunteer Patron
Conscript Patron
Volunteer Legacy
Volunteer Influence*Borders
Conscript Influence*Borders

Constant
Observations

-0.577
(0.502)
118
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(2)
dvdummy
0.498**
(0.215)
-1.192
(1.072)
1.627*
(0.843)
-0.954
(0.597)
0.00346
(0.327)
-0.397
(0.258)
-1.287*
(0.675)
118

Table A.7: Determinants of Military Recruitment when foreign influence is based
on tradition, rather than contemporary system
Variables
Total Land Borders
Volunteer Patron
Conscript Patron
Volunteer Patron*Borders

(1)
dvdummy
0.234***
(0.0819)
-0.164
(0.364)
0.870**
(0.418)
-1.571***
(0.442)

Conscript Patron*Borders
Volunteer Legacy

Constant
Observations

-0.416
(0.385)
199
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(2)
dvdummy
0.354***
(0.127)
0.490
(0.595)
1.218*
(0.719)
-1.561***
(0.476)
-0.336**
(0.165)
-0.109
(0.189)
-0.798*
(0.466)
199

Table A.8: The Effect of Recoding Cases of UN Influence
Variables
Total Land Borders
Volunteer Patron (including influence of US
if it is involved in multilateral missions)
Conscript Patron (including influence of US
if it is involved in multilateral missions)
Volunteer Legacy

(1)
dvdummy
0.254***
(0.0840)
-0.498
(0.439)
0.760**
(0.370)
-1.453***
(0.476)

Volunteer Patron*Borders
Conscript Patron*Borders

(2)
dvdummy
0.370***
(0.130)
0.316
(0.712)
1.221*
(0.716)
-1.533***
(0.516)
-0.266
(0.174)
-0.149
(0.204)

Volunteer Patron (including influence of UN
lead nations in multilateral missions)
Conscript Patron (including influence of UN
lead nations in multilateral missions)

(3)
dvdummy
0.262***
(0.0800)

(4)
dvdummy
0.440***
(0.131)

-1.289***
(0.488)

-1.395***
(0.539)

-1.179**
(0.508)
0.675*
(0.377)

-0.0260
(0.779)
1.325*
(0.697)
-0.359*
(0.216)
-0.218
(0.204)

-0.456
(0.419)
199

-0.971**
(0.493)
199

Volunteer Patron*Borders
Conscript Patron*Borders

Constant
Observations

-0.538
-0.889*
(0.402)
(0.483)
199
199
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.9: The Effect of Longer Threat Time Horizons on Military Recruitment
Variables
Total Forceful MIDs (within 3 years of
independence)
Volunteer Patron
Conscript Patron
Volunteer Legacy

(1)
dvdummy
0.147*
(0.0851)
-0.784*
(0.454)
0.728**
(0.365)
-1.546***
(0.465)

Volunteer Patron*MIDs
Conscript Patron*MIDs

(2)
dvdummy
0.289**
(0.133)
-0.392
(0.655)
1.047**
(0.432)
-1.546***
(0.504)
-0.359
(0.453)
-0.282*
(0.170)

Total Forceful MIDs (within 5 years of
independence)

(3)
dvdummy

(4)
dvdummy

-0.770*
(0.458)
0.735**
(0.364)
-1.529***
(0.465)

-0.287
(0.619)
1.154***
(0.440)
-1.508***
(0.489)

0.123**
(0.0577)

0.267**
(0.105)
-0.309
(0.284)
-0.249**
(0.118)

0.0833
(0.307)
199

-0.173
(0.347)
199

Volunteer Patron*MIDs
Conscript Patron*MIDs

Constant
Observations

0.137
-0.0368
(0.308)
(0.332)
199
199
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.10: The Effect of Foreign Influence and Threat on Recruitment at
Different Times
Variables
Total Land Borders
Volunteer Patron
Conscript Patron
Volunteer Legacy
Volunteer Patron*Borders
Conscript Patron*Borders

Constant
Observations

Recruitment at
Independence
0.198**
(0.0827)
-0.649
(0.467)
0.622*
(0.359)
-1.414***
(0.482)

Recruitment at
Independence
0.359***
(0.124)
0.138
(0.771)
1.500**
(0.750)
-1.488***
(0.526)
-0.245
(0.179)
-0.277
(0.204)

Recruitment at
Year 5
0.191**
(0.0782)
-0.727
(0.503)
0.704**
(0.352)
-1.586***
(0.456)

-0.463
-0.970**
-0.274
(0.397)
(0.472)
(0.395)
199
199
199
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Recruitment at
Year 5
0.284**
(0.116)
-0.0694
(0.758)
1.125
(0.716)
-1.651***
(0.480)
-0.213
(0.167)
-0.135
(0.190)
-0.561
(0.468)
199

Table A.11: The Effect of Technological Era on Recruitment
Variables
Post-1973
Total Land Borders
Volunteer Patron
Conscript Patron

(1)
dvdummy
0.341
(0.3468)
0.234***
(0.0852)
-0.789
(0.5016)
0.797**
(0.3648)

Volunteer Patron*Borders
Conscript Patron*Borders
Volunteer Legacy

Constant
Observations

-1.384***
(0.4837)
-0.639
(0.4101)
199
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(2)
dvdummy
0.353
(0.3446)
0.335***
(0.1272)
0.420
(0.7746)
1.208*
(0.7031)
-0242
(0.1789)
-0.132
(0.1960)
-1.451***
(0.5188)
-0.952**
(0.4754)
199

APPENDIX C: INTERVIEWS
On average, interviews lasted 30–40 minutes, with only one interview lasting less
than 20 minutes. One interview was in-person and lasted several hours, while the rest
were conducted either over the phone or via Skype. Interviews were semi-structured: I
went into them with a list of questions to ask or topics to cover, but the tone was
generally conversational and sought “to retain sufficient indeterminacy in the interview to
allow for unanticipated insights.”560 I began most interviews with an open-ended question
asking the interviewee to tell me about his or her role in Bosnian defense reform,
focusing on a specific episode or institution when applicable. Following Matthew
Beckmann and Richard Hall’s advice about interviews with policy elites, I focused my
efforts on “extract[ing] systematic information about [their] actual behaviors on specific
issues….”561 I asked them to recall their goals in initiating certain decisions, whether
those goals changed, and about any obstacles to their implementation. Often, one of the
most useful questions I asked was toward the end, when I would inquire about who else
was involved in specific decisions or whom else I should talk to. This allowed me to
identify the pivotal figures in recruitment decisions and to triangulate key information
about the actions and attitudes of other important policymakers.562

560

Martin, “Crafting Interviews,” 110.
Matthew N. Beckmann and Richard L. Hall, “Elite Interviewing in Washington, DC,” in
Interview Research in Political Science, edited by Layna Mosley, 196–208 (Ithaca, Cornell
University Press, 2013): 198, emphasis in original.
562
Layna Mosley, “Introduction. ‘Just Talk to People’? Interviews in Contemporary Political
Science,” in Interview Research in Political Science, edited by Layna Mosley, 1–28 (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2013): 6–7; Lynch, “Aligning Sampling Strategies,” 36.
561
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Table C.1: Interviewee Experience
Military Reform Participation
Inter
view
#

Name

Level of
Policy563

Dayton
Agreemen
t or Prior
(1995)

PostConflict
Stabilizatio
n
(1996–
2001)

First
Defense
Reform
Commissio
n (May
2003

Ongoin
g
Reform
Efforts
(2006–
Present)

Yes

Second
Defense
Reform
Commissio
n
(2004–
2005)
No

1

Clifford
Bond

No

No

2

Robert
Tomasovic

No

3

Anonymous

4

Marshall
Harris

5

Jim Pardew

6

Raffi
Gregorian

7

William
Crouch

8

Lejla Gelo

9

Lena
Andersson

US
Ambassador
to Bosnia
Inspector
General for
Entity Armed
Forces
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Delegation
Member at
Dayton
President of
Acquisition
Support
Institute
Negotiator at
Dayton; Head
of Train and
Equip
Director of
Bosnia Policy
at U.S. State
Dept; Cochair of
Second DRC
Commanding
General,
SFOR
Legal Advisor
for DRC
Secretariat
OSCE
Advisor;
DRC
Working
Group
Member

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

563

No

Note that many interviewees were involved in policy at different levels at different times. The
information here refers to their position during the most important period on which my interviews
focused.
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10

Vanja
Matic

11

Rohan
Maxwell

12

Robert
Beecroft

13

Selmo
Cikotic

14

Ric Bainter

15

James
Locher III

16

John
Drewienkiewicz

17

Nikola
Radovanovi
c
Lord Paddy
Ashdown

18

OSCE
Interpreter
and DRC
Working
Group
Member
Senior
PoliticalMilitary
Advisor &
Chief,
PoliticoMilitary
Advisory
Section,
NATO HQ
Sarajevo
Special Envoy
for
Federation,
OSCE
Representativ
e
Negotiating
Team for
Bosniaks at
Dayton,
Defense
Minister of
BiH
Legal Advisor
and Chief of
Staff at DRC
Former Under
Secretary of
Defense for
Policy, DRC
Chairman
Military
Advisor to
High
Representativ
e, 2005 DRC
ViceChairman
Defense
Minister of
BiH
High
Representativ
e, 2002–2006

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No
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